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PREFACE
The economic transformation of the Republic of China in
Taiwan from a semicolonial to a rapidly growing and prosperous
economy within two decades is an accomplishment that has few
parallels in the history of world development. Today Taiwan is
not only a key member of the economic community of the Pacific
Basin, but also a major trading partner of many developed
nations and a model of development for other developing
economies. 1 To many government administrators, scholars, and
businessmen who maintain a keen interest in Taiwan's changing
roles, two crucial and interrelated questions arise: How did the
transformation occur, and will Taiwan be able to sustain its
phenomenally high growth rate in the future? The latter question
is especially timely because the economic security of Taiwan has
always been highly dependent on external circumstances, and in
recent years international developments have repeatedly turned
against the Taiwan economy. The abrupt change in U.S. and
Japanese policy toward Peking since 1971 was a major diplomatic
setback to the Republic of China and generated widespread
concern over Taiwan's economic future. In the aftermath of the
worldwide energy crisis, Taiwan had to face strong inflationary
pressures and mounting protectionist sentiments abroad. At this
moment, even more diplomatic storms loom over the horizon. Will
the Taiwan economy encounter problems so severe and intractable that high rates of growth can no longer be sustained? Clearly
the question for the future is not independent of those for the past.
To provide a better understanding of Taiwan's development
experience and its economic prospects, the present volume brings
together six essays that address various aspects of these two
problems.
The introduction outlines some preliminary thoughts on the
lessons of Taiwan's development as reflected in the major
economic challenges and Taiwan's responses. The first chapter
presents an overview of Taiwan's growth record, the distinctive
features of the development process, and the principal sources of
growth. Because growth of output is only one, although an
important, aspect of economic progress, Chapter II deals with a
key element that is closely related to the economic welfare of the
people, that is, the changing distribution of income in the growth
1. For editional convenience we use the names the Republic of China, ROC,
and Taiwan interchangeably in this study. Likewise, Communist China, the
People's Republic of China, and PRC are used interchangeably.
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process and its implications for future growth and political
stability. Chapters III through V discuss three important aspects
of Taiwan's development strategy: agricultural growth, external
economic relations, and the development of human resources.
Because this study is a collection of essays by different authors,
there are inevitably some duplications and major gaps that we
have not been able to remedy.
Several features distinguish this study from others in the
literature and should make it more useful to those concerned about
Taiwan's economic future. First, the analysis is set in a
comparative framework. The development experiences of five
major Asian economies (South Korea, the Philippines, Japan,
Mainland China, and India) are used as a background against
which we observe and assess the record of Taiwan's performance.
The selection of these economies as bases of comparison is not
arbitrary. Although these six economies differ markedly in size,
natural resource endowment, economic organization, extent of
reliance on external trade, stage of economic development, and
their strategic positions and historic heritages, it still seems fair to
say that a high rate of growth of per capita output has been the
most important single national goal for all these countries. It
should be of interest to relate their economic performances to the
different development paths they follow, the different value
systems and institutional frameworks, or to the various constraints each must face. Second, special emphasis has been placed
on noneconomic factors to underscore our basic precept that
economic growth can best be understood if we take into account
the political, social, and strategic factors as well as the economic.
Finally, this study is specifically designed for the general public
and not for professional economists.
In the preparation of this study we are indebted to numerous
persons for comments and suggestions regarding various parts of
the manuscript, particularly Professors Yu-chu Hsu of National
Cheng-chih University, Wan-yung Kuo, Kuo-shu Liang, Chiensheng Shih, Chun Sun, Tso-yung Wang, all of National Taiwan
University; and Tzong-shian Yu of the Academia Sinica. We wish
to also thank Mr. Chi-cheng Chang (Secretary General of the
Executive Yuan), Mr. Kwang-shih Chang (Vice Minister of
Economic Mfairs), Mr. Kan Lee (Director of the Central Bank of
China), Ms. Carolyn Lee (The Rand Corporation), Mr. Kuo-ting Li
(Minister without Portfolio), Mr. Shih-cheng Liu (Vice Minister of
Economic Affairs), Mr. Y. C. Liu (Chairman of China Sea
Products Development Corporation), Mr. Yun-suan Sun (Minister
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of Economic Mfairs), Mr. Yien-si Tsiang (member of the Joint
Commission on Rural Reconstruction), Mr. M. T. Wu (Director of
Investment and Trade Office, New York), Mr. Wan-an Yeh
(Economic Planning Council), and Mr. Kuo-hwa Yu (Governor of
the Central Bank of China), for their comments and stimulating
discussions. Finally, we are grateful to Prof. Hungdah Chiu of the
University of Maryland School of Law for his efforts in expediting
the publication of these essays and to Ho-I and Pyng-Pyng Wu for
their preparation of the index.
But it is the authors, not the organizations or individuals who
have so generously helped them, who are responsible for the views
expressed in this study.
Y. L. Wu
K. C. YEH
Pacific Palisades, California
Palo Alto, California
January 1, 1978

INTRODUCTION
YuAN-LI Wu

To understand the course of Taiwan's economic development
in the last 25 years, we need to bear in mind that the activities of
individuals-including both those who make policy and the
ordinary consumers and producers-are influenced, if not fully
determined, by the internal and external environment they
perceive, their objectives and priorities, and their ideological,
cultural and historical background. It is only when we bear in
mind the sources of these influences that we can understand why
the ROC government in Taiwan has adopted certain policies at
certain times, why they have refrained from doing certain other
things, and why the population has responded in a particular
manner and taken certain initiatives of its own. The behavior of
private producers and consumers in Taiwan has also been
profoundly influenced by their experience during the post-World
War II inflation and, for a segment of the population, by life under
Japanese rule before 1945. A combination of these circumstances
has made possible the remarkable economic performance of
Taiwan in the last quarter century.
The constraint imposed by certain physical factors is obvious.
Taiwan is an island economy with limited natural resources, with
the exception, relatively speaking, of land resources during the
early phase of its economic development when the population was
much smaller than it is now. Its sustained economic development
must therefore be predicated upon the utilization of natural
resources located in other countries and on the creation of new
and sometimes intangible resources. Since acquisition of foreign
resources and their products cannot be continued in the long run
except through imports that have to be paid for, development of
the island can proceed indefinitely only on the basis of foreign
trade and export promotion. Import substitution would take much
longer before it could bring about the same degree of development,
and it would be easier to pursue at a later stage of development.
For the beginning, and at any rate for Taiwan, export promotion
is a much faster and surer way of entry into sustained economic
growth.
Export expansion is not without its preconditions. To be able
to export requires knowledge and availability of external markets.
Furthermore, production must be at an adequate level and the
economy must have sufficient capacity for expansion before
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exports can develop on any scale. Since an abundant resource
available on the island in the beginning was labor, the most
natural development was the type offered by "export processing
zones." Here foreign investors would bring in their technical
know-how, raw material, and intermediate goods, which Taiwan
does not possess, for processing with the aid of labor that was
cheaper than they could hire elsewhere. Then the finished
products were exported by the same investors who had a
preconceived and prearranged export market to begin with. When
the labor became less abundant and, therefore, more expensive,
new resources had to be developed so the country could regain its
comparative advantage for export promotion. At a later stage of
development, which corresponds to the present time for Taiwan,
new labor resources that are qualitatively at a more advanced
level must be created through upgrading by education and
training. Sustained economic growth must, in the long run, be
predicated on the proper coordination of manpower development
with economic policy. This leads to considerations of educational
and manpower policy, reversal of the "brain drain", infusion of
technology from overseas, etc., as part and parcel of the gradual
restructuring of the economy.
Furthermore, as the island becomes more developed and
domestic demand increases, the domestic market will be more able
to absorb sales of new products. At the same time, as the number
and size of productive enterprises increases, the relative importance of intersectoral, or intermediate, demand will also increase.
Thus the time will come, and it may already have, when a greater
degree of import substitution in the form of producing domestically more and more goods that would provide both forward and
backward linkages and that were previously imported can be
profitably pursued. (Import substitution does not mean the
exclusion of imports.) This shift in emphasis is, however, only
relative because total exports must continue to be expanded even
though their content will change in the direction of a larger
percentage of goods with higher value added per unit of sales than
before, and so will the content of total imports.
What constituted the most likely items on Taiwan's export list
in the beginning of the post-war period? Since the island's major
prewar exports were sugar, rice, pineapples, and other agricultural
products, one would expect these same primary exports to
constitute the core of the island's exports while new exports would
also emerge in the agricultural field. This historical factor was
compounded by the fact that at the time of the transfer of both
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government institutions and trained manpower from the mainland to Taiwan in 1949, there was a sizable inflow of agricultural
technicians and researchers who were connected with the former
National Bureau of Agricultural Research and whose employment
was continued through U.S. aid. At that time, overall U.S. aid to
the ROC had been suspended with the exception of a small
amount that was still in the pipeline. This aid enabled the
researchers on food and agriculture to move to Taiwan and,
fortunately for Taiwan, there happened to be a sizable pool of
such talents that had emerged during the prewar and wartime
development of applied agricultural research in China. Assured of
employment, these specialists were able to apply their talents to
work on Taiwan which increased productivity, controlled pests
and insects, and developed agricultural extension. Fortunately
again for Taiwan, the island's farmers had been well organized,
disciplined, and trained while under Japanese rule, in the use and
acceptance of new farming techniques. Communication between
the farmers and the technicians was readily established and
successfully maintained. This combination of circumstances,
which one can only attribute to the vagaries of history, provided a
favorable climate for the development of new agricultural exports
and a general increase in farm output.
When the ROC government moved to Taiwan, it correctly
attributed its own defeat on the mainland partly to the Chinese
Communist Party's successful strategem of gaining both domestic
and foreign support by cloaking itself in the mantle of agrarian
reform. The Nationalists, having learned this bitter lesson, were
now ready to carry out agrarian reform in Taiwan in a way that
they had advocated in their party platform but had never been
able to enforce while they still ruled the mainland. The successful
land reform of the early 1950s inevitably reduced the average size
of farm holdings. This could have had a negative effect on
productivity but for the offsetting influence provided by the
agricultural researchers, as well as the stimulus of new land
ownership to former tenant farmers. Consequently, land redistribution in Taiwan was accompanied by an increase in productivity
and by the restoration of agricultural exports and the expansion
of new farm exports. Land reform, increasing agricultural
production, expansion of agricultural exports and later of
processed agricultural goods for export all combined to increase
overall exports in the early phase of Taiwan's economic development. Political theorists argue that one can never really expect
any group of people in a position of authority to adopt policies
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that are seriously detrimental to their own economic interests.
This is not to say that individuals can never rise above personal
considerations. However, in the case of Taiwan, the government
that enforced the land reform program and redistributed private
property in land came from the mainland, and members of that
government were not landowners in Taiwan. Consequently,
consideration of private personal interest could not have affected
their decisionmaking, and whatever they might have done in
other circumstances is immaterial. This historical political fact
has also worked in favor of Taiwan's economic development.
Still another lesson of the past that both the policymakers
and the older members of the population have learned is the
devastating effect of galloping inflation as well as the potential of
an incipient inflation to get out of control. The ROC government
on Taiwan has continuously stressed that economic stability is a
national goal equally as important as rapid economic growth.
During the hyperinflation on the Chinese mainland before 1949,
the accelerating depreciation of the Chinese currency in terms of
foreign exchange was widely regarded as an indicator of inflation
in general and was exploited by speculators who benefited from
instability. This explains the reluctance of the ROC authorities in
the 1950s to adjust the official exchange rate to a more realistic
level or to relax exchange controls until the end of that decade. By
the time exchange and trade controls were relaxed, which
benefited Taiwan's exports, there had been a prolonged period of
reasonable price stability. Apparently, the body politic had by
then recovered from the inflation psychosis of the late 1940s. One
can always argue about the timing of the 1960-61 exchange
reform, but these historical circumstances explain the delayed
decision of the ROC government to adopt measures that were soon
to prove eminently successful in promoting exports.
It is in the same light that one should regard the current
reluctance of the ROC government to allow the New Taiwan
dollar to be untied from the U.S. dollar and float on its own. It
also explains why the ROC authorities habitually resist the idea
of either devaluing or revaluing the New Taiwan dollar against
the U.S. dollar. There still is a lingering concern that the public
might regard changes in the foreign exchange value of the
currency as an indication of monetary instability. This concern
has been magnified by the experience of the price hikes made
necessary in early 1974 following the quadrupling of the
international price of crude oil, which Taiwan must import. The
oil price hike and long years of development and demand
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expansion had finally made the raise in domestic prices inevitable, and the authorities felt constrained to reemphasize their
dedication to economic stability.
One cannot overestimate the importance of U.S. economic
aid-both commodities and project aid-in the stabilization of
prices and the reconstruction and initial development of the
economic infrastructure during the 1950s. Nor can one overestimate the effect of confidence provided by the U.S. security shield
on economic development and stabilization. Initial reluctance
notwithstanding, in the end, the ROC government did gather
enough courage to institute exchange reform in the beginning of
the 1960s, and the policy was a success. Together with reconstruction and expansion of the economic infrastructure with U.S. aid,
the exchange reform of 1960-61 and the removal of restraints on
private business succeeded in bringing about rapid economic
growth. Consequently, when U.S. aid was finally ended in 1965,
this potential shock was met by a renewed upsurge of the economy
and unprecedented expansion of exports. Confidence was now
building up until the oil crisis again dealt Taiwan a severe
economic blow. However, by then the Taiwan economy was able
to demonstrate a high degree of resilience so that after a short
recession, economic growth was resumed in the latter half of 1975,
and new economic heights were scaled in 1976.
The Nationalist government that established itself in Taiwan
is obviously against the type of command economy practiced on
the Chinese mainland. At the same time the Nationalists are not
advocates of laissez-faire. They have tried time and again to
intervene in the economy, to maintain economic stability, to
promote greater equality in the distribution of income, and to
guide economic development in the direction of agricultural
expansion and then in industrial development-first in the
promotion of exports and more recently in the restructuring of
foreign trade. Fortunately, however, the ROC authorities have
opened up the economy to private efforts and have restricted
government economic activity to a limited area of public
enterprise and state monopolies. They have also restricted
government intervention primarily to the maintenance of price
stability and the promotion of greater equity. Taiwan's economic
progress and future, therefore, owe a great deal both to government efforts and to the deliberate limitation of these efforts to
certain areas. One may argue about the appropriateness of timing
of different policies, but the authorities' ability to learn from the
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past and their increasing readiness to face new issues and
problems as they arise cannot be gainsaid.
Throughout the past quarter century, the theme of national
survival has run through all government policies. Survival in the
long run is predicated upon economic growth, the maintenance of
relative stability, and the good measure of general consensus
through a widely shared sense of equitable distribution of income
and wealth. Growth has always been a primary objective, as has
stability. In recent times, however, more and more emphasis has
been given to equity and to the uplifting of those segments of the
economy and population that have lagged behind in the general
advance of the last decades. Somehow the above approach to
economic development has succeeded; it would seem to create a
sufficiently broad consensus in Taiwan to have galvanized the
private sector into a notable economic performance, some aspects
of which are described and analyzed in the following essays. Even
in the post-oil crisis era of widespread uncertainty, cautious
optimism seems more than justified· in future projections for
Taiwan.

Chapter I

ECONOMIC GROWTH: AN OVERVIEW
KUNG-CHIA YEH

Taiwan emerged from the Second World War a backward,
war-tom economy. In six years, it more or less restored its prewar
productive capacity. During the following two decades, it has
become one of the fastest growing economies in the world, and its
living standard has risen far above levels prevalent in most Asian
countries. This paper examines the various macroeconomic
dimensions of the transformation that have taken place since
1952, and compares Taiwan's performance with those of five other
Asian economies: Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Communist China, and India. 1 The purpose is to lend a broader
perspective to Taiwan's economic growth by comparing it with
economies that are similar or different in resource endowment,
organization and institutions, scale and stage of development,
and objectives and strategy of development.
1. This paper draws heavily on a number of excellent studies on Taiwan's
economic development. Foremost among them are: Kuo-wei Chang (ed.), Taiwan
ching-chi fa-tsan (Economic Development in Taiwan), Taipei: Cheng-Chung Book
Co., 1967; Cheng-hsuing Chiu (ed.), Taiwan ho-pi yu chin-yung lun-wen-chi
(Studies in Money and Finance in Taiwan), Taipei: Lien-ching Publishing Co.,
1975; Mo-huan Hsing, Taiwan: Industrialization and Trade Policies, London:
Oxford University Press, 1971; Anthony Y. C. Koo, The Role of Land Reform in
Economic Development: A Case Study of Taiwan, New York: Praeger, 1968;
Shirley W. Y. Kuo, The Economic Structure of Taiwan 1952-1969, Taipei: Graduate
Institute of Economics, National Taiwan University, 1970; Teng-hui Lee,
Intersectoral Capital Transfer in the Economic Development of Taiwan-A Case
Study (Ph.D. dissertation; Cornell University, 1968); Kuo-shu Liang, Foreign Trade
and Economic Development in Taiwan 1952-67 (Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt
University, 1970); Douglas S. Pauuw and John C. H. Fei, The Transition in Open
Dualistic Economics, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973; Tzong-shian Yu,
"An Econometric Model for Taiwan's Economy," Journal of the Chinese Statistical
Association, March 1970, 2892-2909; and papers in the two conference volumes,
Conference on Economic Development of Taiwan, Taipei, 1967, and Conference on
Population and Economic Development in Taiwan, Taipei: Institute of Economics,
Academia Sinica, 1976, especially those by Kwoh-ting Li and Wan-an Yeh, "Public
Policy and Economic Development on Taiwan," Conference on Economic
Development of Taiwan, Taipei, Taiwan, 1967, 27-51, Kuo-shu Liang, "Trade and
Policy in Taiwan, 1952-1965," Conference on Economic Development of Taiwan,
Taipei, Taiwan, 1967, 239-277 and; K. T. Li, The Experience of Dynamic Economic
Growth on Taiwan, Taipei: Mei Ya Publications, 1976.
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Economic performance can be measured in a number of ways
depending on the specific criterion of performance. 2 For the
present purpose, we have selected three basic criteria to assess the
achievements of Taiwan's economy: growth, stability, and
welfare. 3 These are not the only, nor necessarily the ultimate goals
of economic development, but they clearly are fundamental to
economic progress, however defined.
Section I focuses on the growth of total and per capita
product, and on stability of the growth rates and domestic prices.
Section II discusses structural changes in the economy. The level
and pattern of private consumption are examined in Section III.
Section IV traces the sources of rapid economic growth. A
summary of the main findings is given in Section V.

I. ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY
Growth of Total and Per Capita Product
The most common yardstick for evaluating economic performance is the growth of real gross national product. 4 Figure 1
shows changes in Taiwan's GNP, population, and per capita
product in 1952-72. 5 The tremendous growth of total output since
2. For a variety of indicators of socioeconomic change, see Irma Adelman
and Cynthia T. Morris, Society, Politics and Economic Development, Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1967; United Nations Research Institute for Social
Development, Contents and Measurement of Socio-Economic Development,
Geneva, 1970; Nancy Baster, "Development Indicators: An Introduction," Journal
of Development Studies, April1972, 1-20; Dudley Sears, "What are We Trying to
Measure?" Journal of Development Studies, April 1972, 21-36; Donald McGranahan, "Development Indicators and Development Models," Journal of Development
Studies, April 1972, 91-102; Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, World
Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, Second edition, New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 1972; Milton Moss (ed.), The Measurement of
Economic and Social Performance. Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. 38, New
York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1973.
3. Welfare is a rather elusive concept. It is used here loosely to mean the
quantifiable material well-being of the people.
4. The conceptual limitations of GNP as a performance indicator have been
extensively discussed in recent years. See especially Moss, op. cit. Nonetheless, for
all practical purposes, GNP remains the most useful single indicator. Its
shortcomings, of course, should be borne in mind.
5. Data underlying this chart refer to GDP in constant 1971 prices and are
taken from Statistical Yearbook 1975 pp. 194-195; and Monthly Bulletin,
November 1976, p. 18. In general, there are two conceptually different measures of
total product: gross national product (GNP) and gross domestic product (GDP).
GNP refers to total output attributable to the factors of production supplied by the
nationals of Taiwan; GDP refers to total payments from abroad. GNP is the
appropriate measure of its productive capacity. Furthermore, an economy is often
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1952 is unmistakable. By 1972, GNP rose to more than five times
its initial level, and per capita GNP was 186 percent higher than
in 1952. Growth was continuous throughout the period and has
actually accelerated since the early 1960s. The oil crisis in 1973
and its disruption of the world economy also brought a halt to
Taiwan's growth in 1974, but since 1975 the economy has been
turning upward again.
Table 1. Rates of Growth of Population and
GNP, 1952-1972t
1952-72

1952-60

1960-65

1965-72

GNP per capita
Republic of China
Japan
South Korea
Philippines
Communist China
India

5.6
8.5
4.8
2.7
3.3
1.3

3.6
7.2
2.7
3.1
3.6
1.8

6.4
8.8
3.6
1.6
2.9
0

7.3
9.5
8.4
2.9
3.3
1.8

GNPtt
Republic of China
Japan
South Korea
Philippines
Communist China
India

8.8
9.6
7.2
5.7
5.6
3.5

7.2
8.3
4.9
6.2
6.0
3.8

9.6
9.8
6.4
5.0
4.7
2.6

10.1
10.8
10.3
5.6
5.7
3.9

3.2

3.6
1.1
2.2
3.1
2.3
2.0

3.2
1.0
2.8
3.4
1.8
2.6

2.8
1.3
1.9
2.7
2.3
2.1

Population
Republic of China
Japan
South Korea
Philippines
Communist China
India

1.1

2.4
3.0
2.2
2.2

operating below its full capacity. For some purposes, potential GDP (or GNP) i.e., full employment GDP- should be used. In the present case, GNP and GDP for
Taiwan do not differ very much and can be used interchangeably for most
purposes.
t The initial year for South Korea is 1953.
tt For Republic of China, the growth rates are based on gross national product
in constant market prices of 1966; for Japan, South Korea, and Communist China,
gross national product in constant prices; for the Philippines and India, net
domestic product at constant factor cost.
Source: Economic Planning Council, Republic of China, Taiwan Statistical
Data Book 1974, 1975, pp. 4, 19; United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts
Statistics, 1969, New York, 1970, Vol. III, pp. 175-177; id., 1973, 1975, pp. 152-153;
United Nations, Demographic Yearbook 1970, New York, 1971, pp. 128-131; id.,
1973, p. 103; Joint Economic Committee, China: A Reassessment of the Economy,
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975, pp. 42-43.
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To show how fast the Taiwan economy has been growing
compared with other countries, Table 1 presents the average rates
of growth of GNP, population, and per capita product for Taiwan
and five selected Asian countries in 1952-72 and three subperiods.6 The year 1952 has been selected as a base point for appraisal
mainly because by then the economies had fairly well recovered
from the war and were entering a new phase of economic growth.
In Taiwan, the land reform program initiated in 1951 was just
about completed. Agricultural output had regained its prewar
peak. The focus of U.S. aid, which began flowing in soon after the
Korean War, now shifted from rehabilitation to expanding social
infrastructure and agriculture. For Communist China and India,
the year 1952 marked the period immediately before they both
launched their first five year plans. In Korea, the war had by then
stabilized, and rehabilitation and growth got underway soon
afterward. The choice of 1972 as the terminal point is not a
compelling one; indeed, a more recent year might have been
preferred. However, it was the last year before the worldwide
economic disruptions caused by the oil crisis in 1973 and thus
provides a convenient vantage point from which to take stock of
developments in the last two decades.
The striking feature suggested by Table 1 is the rather high
growth rate of Taiwan's per capita income of 5.6 percent per year
since 1952, which exceeded those in all other countries except
Japan. In particular, Taiwan's growth rate is much higher than
those of the Philippines, Mainland China, and India. The rapid
growth of Taiwan's per capita income is all the more remarkable
if one notices that Taiwan's population increased very -rapidly
6. The measures of total product for the six countries are not uniform. Some
represent gross domestic product, others refer to gross national product. Some are
net, others are gross of capital consumption. Some are based on constant market
prices of a certain year, others are based on constant factor cost of another year.
Even if uniform measures were available, international comparisons of rates of
GNP growth would still be beset with numerous conceptual and statistical
difficulties. For a brief discussion of these complexities, see Simon Kuznets,
Economic Growth of Nations, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1971, pp. 3-10. In
the present case, varying degrees of statistical differences in the evaluation basis
will undoubtedly affect the comparison. In particular, the estimates of GNP and
population for the Chinese mainland are likely to have wider margins of error
because of uncertainties surrounding the rather narrow statistical base, the quality
of the data, and certain methodological issues. And, with the exception of Japan,
all the countries were primarily agricultural economies in the 1950s and their GNP
may well be heavily influenced by their harvests, which tend to fluctuate with the
weather conditions. The rate of growth based on the initial and terminal years
would therefore be rather sensitive to the harvests in these years. Nonetheless, all
these difficulties are not likely to distort the overall picture significantly.
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during this period. In fact, all the five developing countries in
Table 1 had quite high rates of population growth of more than 2
percent per year. But Taiwan's population increased the fastest, at
an average rate of 3.2 percent per year during the last two
decades. Yet, despite such a high rate of population growth, per
capita income expanded at a phenomenal pace, faster than in the
other developing countries. 7 This implies, of course, that Taiwan's
aggregate income expanded even more rapidly than those of other
countries. In the two decades since 1952, Taiwan's real GNP rose
at an average rate of 8.8 percent per year, second only to Japan's
9.6 percent, and higher than those of others, which range from
India's 3.5 percent to Korea's 7.2 percent.
Table 1 also shows the growth rates in three subperiods:
1952-60, 1960-65, and 1965-72. The main reasons for taking 1960
and 1965 as intermediate time points are that there had been a
major shift in Taiwan's developing policy around 1960 and that
economic assistance from the U.S. terminated in 1965. It is of
interest to examine how the economy performed after these crucial
events took place. For other countries such a periodization might
seem arbitrary, but it apparently introduces no serious distortion
except perhaps in the case of India, which had a poor year in 1965.
During these three subperiods, growth of Taiwan's per capita
income has been accelerating. The growth rate in the 1960s was
distinctly higher than in the 1950s. The higher growth rate since
1965 is of particular interest, for it signifies unmistakably a
sustained growth without external economic aid. Among the
countries listed in Table 1, only Japan and South Korea
experienced a similar pattern of accelerating growth. For the
others (the Philippines, Communist China, and India) no
acceleration occurred. In the latter case, the average growth rates
in the second subperiod (1960-65) declined rather sharply and
they hardly recovered to their initial levels in the third subperiod
(1965-72).
7. There appears to be a consensus among experts that, on balance, rapid
population growth has a retarding effect on growth of per capita income even
though how serious the effect is remains controversial See Study Committee of the
Office of the Foreign Secretary, National Academy of Science, Rapid Population
Growth - Consequences and Policy Implications, Vol. I, Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1971, pp. 27-34. Some believe that "rapid population growth is not
a bar, perhaps not even a hindrance to rapid rise in per capita income." Everett E.
Hagen, The Economies of Development, Homewood, Illinois: Irwin, 1968, pp.
247-271. Others argue that "there are serious economic dangers arising from the
natural tendency of population to grow too rapidly." Stephen Enke, Economics for
Development, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1963, pp. 335-355.
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In contrast to total GNP, Taiwan's population growth has
been declining, from 3.6 percent in the 1950s to about 3 percent in
the 1960s, quite possibly as a result of the population control
program. Again, no comparable downward trend can be found in
the other countries during the same period. 8 However, up to the
early 1970s, Taiwan's population growth rate remained the
highest, more than twice as high as Japan's. If population growth
should continue to slow down as is likely, per capita income could
increase even faster.
As a result of rapid growth in the last two decades, Taiwan
now ranks high among the Asian countries in terms of per capita
income. Table 2 compares the per capita income of 11 Asian
countries in U.S. dollars in 1975 prices and averages for world
developed and developing countries. 9 Taiwan's per capita income,
U.S. $900 in 1975, is still far below that of Japan, but exceeded
that of Malaysia and far above those of India, Communist China,
and the Philippines. It is substantially higher than that of
neighboring Korea, not to mention the average for the world
developing countries. But equally clear, it still has a long way to
catch up when compared with the developed countries.
8. The effect of birth control on the Chinese mainland is unclear. Despite
some reports of a sharp decline in birth rates in some localities, some
demographers have not found the available evidence sufficiently convincing to
conclude that the rate of population increase had indeed fallen during 1953-70. See
John S. Aird, "Population Policy and Demographic Prospects in the People's
Republic of China," in Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, People's
Republic of China: An Economic Assessment, Washington, D.C., 1972, 220-:l:34.
9. The measure of a country's product in terms of another's currency unit is
an intricate problem. Thus, the figures shown in Table 2 are only a rough order of
magnitude. Different estimates of GNP have been made of the different Asian
countries based on different conversion rates, but they do not alter the ranking
significantly.
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Table 2. Rank of Selected Asian Countries by
GNP Per Capita, 1975
GNP/capita
(in 1975 U.S.$)
World:
Developed countries
Developing countries
Asia:
Japan
Taiwan
Malaysia
Republic of Korea
Philippines
Thailand
Communist China
Indonesia
India
Pakistan
B).lrma

Rank

4,445
437
4,358
900
761
551
352
334
253
215
158
147
101

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

"-" Not applicable.
Source: U.S. Department of State, The Planetary Product in 1975, Washing·
ton, D.C., 1977, pp. 22-27.

Economic Stability
Economic stability refers here to stability in the domestic
price level and in the growth of total output with reference to a
long-term trend. 10 Clearly, economic stability is a highly desirable
development goal. Fluctuations in prices and output not only
disrupt economic growth, they generally result in underutilization
of the economic capacity and more inequitable distribution of
income. In an important sense, economic stability is also an
essential element in political and social stability. Has the Taiwan
economy been able to maintain relative stability in the process of
rapid growth? We focus first on fluctuations in its total economic
activity.
10. Two important aspects of economic stability (employment and balance of
payments) have not been included in the following discussion for lack of adequate
information for international comparison.
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Table 3. Fluctuations in GNP, Selected Countries
Country
Taiwan
Philippines
Japan
India
South Korea
Communist China
Eighteen free market
economies
Eight planned
economies

Period

Degree of instability

1952-72·
195Q-70
1952-72
195Q-72
1953-72
1952-72

2.0
2.0
3.0
3.1
3.3
9.5

195Q-60

5.7

195Q-60

2.7

Sources: See note to Table 1, Staller, 1964, p. 391.

Table 3 compares the year-to-year fluctuations in GNP for
Taiwan and five other Asian economies in the last two decades.
For reference, we also include the averages for 18 free market
economies and eight planned economies in 1950-60. 11 The
measure of the degree of instability is the antilog of the square
root of logarithmic variance of the series Yt/Ytl, with unity
subtracted from the antilog. 12 The value ranges from zero to
infinity. If there were no fluctuation at all, the value would be
zero. The higher the value, the less stable the path of growth. As
Table 3 shows, economic growth in Taiwan has been much
smoother than in almost any of the other five countries and the
11. The 18 free market economies are: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, Germany (F.R.), Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Nether·
lands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. The 8 planned economies include: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East
Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia.
12. The method is described in Joseph D. Coppock, International Economic
Instability, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962, pp. 23-24, and has been applied to
various countries by George J. Staller, "Fluctuations in Economic Activity:
Planned and Free-Market Economics, 1950-1960," American Economic Review,
June 1964, 385-395; and Yuan-li Wu, "Communist Economic Planning vs.
Capitalism as a Model for Development," in M. M. Drachkovitch (ed.), Marxist
Ideology in the Contemporarq World - Its Appeals and Paradoxes, Stanford:
Hoover Institution, 1968. The index of stability equals

antilog

y~

[log(Yt/Yt-1)-(l!N}
N

~log(Yt/Yt

where Yt represents GNP in constant prices in year t, and N is the number of years
minus one.
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averages for planned and free market economies in the 1950s. Of
particular interest is the exceptionally high degree of instability in
Communist China. While the European Communist economies
were subject to wider fluctuations than those of the free market
economies, Communist China had even greater instability in
growth than the other planned economies.
As noted by Wu, the Chinese Communists claim that
fluctuations result in higher rates of growth. The implication is
that the pace of development and smoothness of the growth path
are tradeoffs. A rough test of this proposition is made in a scatter
diagram relating the rates of growth to the measure of instability
in Figure 2. If the Communist claim were empirically true, the
data should show a positive correlation between the growth rate
and the degree of instability. But the scatter diagram for the six
countries indicates no such relationship. It is not clear whether a
larger sample would yield results that corroborate the proposition.
In any event, data for all the countries except Communist China
suggest that both high and low rates of growth could be achieved
with fairly low degrees of instability. Among these six countries,
the performances of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea are clearly
better. Their growth rates are higher and their paths of growth
have been quite smooth. That of Communist China is perhaps the
worst. Its growth rate is considerably lower than the three best
countries, and its economy exhibited a much higher degree of
insta hili ty.
Taiwan was also successful in maintaining price stability. To
be sure, there were considerable inflationary pressures immediately after the war and following the massive evacuation from the
mainland. However, since 1952, the implicit GDP deflator rose at
a moderate rate of 6.8 percent per year. 13 This is well within the
limit of 10 percent considered by some economists as the
maximum justifiable price of rapid development. 14 The path to
price stability has not been a smooth one. During the earlier
period 1952-60, the inflationary rate was about 10 percent per
year. It was not until the 1960s that it fell to about 5 percent. In
1974-75, prices rose sharply by 34 percent, but the rate of increase
has since declined.
13. Statistical Yearbook 1975, pp. 194-195.
14. See A. C. Harberger, "Some Notes on Inflation," in Warner Baer and Isaac
Kerstenetzky (eds.), Inflation and Growth in Latin America, Homewood, Illinois:
Irwin, 1964.
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Table 4. Average Annual Rates of Increase in Wholesale
and Consumer Prices, Selected Countries, 1952-73
(Percent per year)

Wholesale prices
Taiwan
Japan
S. Korea
Philippines
India
Consumer prices
Taiwan
Japan
S. Korea
Philippines
India

1952-60

1960-73

1952-73

8.8
0.3

5.4
1.3

0.9
2.6

3.4
2.0
11.8
8.3
6.9

5.4
5.2

9.7
2.4
18.9
0.2
2.2

4.0
6.2
12.2
3.6
6.9

6.1
4.7
14.7
2.3
5.1

Source: Economic Planning Council, 1974, pp. 157, 272-273; United Nations,
Statistical Yearbook 1960, New York: United Nations, 1960, pp. 447-448, 453-455;
Statistical Yearbook 1966, New York: United Nations, 1967, pp. 535-537;
Statistical Yearbook 1970, New York: United Nations, 1971, pp. 566-568.

Table 4 compares the rates of increase of the wholesale and
consumer price indexes in Taiwan and four other countries in
1952-73. The comparison shows that, for the period as a whole,
Taiwan's wholesale price and consumer price indexes rose at a
rate faster than those of all others except Korea. Taiwan's higher
rate of inflation than Japan's should not be surprising. The
financial system in a developed country like Japan is apparently
more efficient in mobilizing and economizing the use of money in
the face of inflation, and the degree of mobility of re,sources is
likely to be higher so that the response of output to price changes
might well be faster and more flexible. 15 The higher inflationary
rates in Taiwan than in other developing countries seem to
suggest that Taiwan had been less successful than others in
controlling inflation. This is clearly true of the period 1952-60.
Wholesale and consumer prices in Taiwan rose at a rate many
times those of others, except Korea, which was still feeling the
effects of the war. However, the picture was very much different in
the 1960s. Although the inflation rates in Japan, the Philippines,
15. See Harry Johnson, "Is Inflation the Inevitable Price of Rapid Develop·
ment or a Retarding Factor in Economic Growth?" Malayan Economic Review,
X:1, April 1966, 22-28.
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and India were higher than in the 1950s, those in Taiwan declined
markedly. It may be recalled that Taiwan's economic growth
during this period (1960-72) was much faster than in 1952-60. The
experience of Taiwan suggests that inflation need not be a
concomitant of rapidly rising per capita income, either as an
instrument of development policy or an inevitable outcome of
structural change.
The comparison in Table 4 leaves out the case of the Chinese
mainland, mainly because data on price changes are lacking.
Official sources claim that prices have been stable for the past 25
years. 16 However, almost all prices are administratively set.
Changes in demand and supply conditions generally are reflected
in quantity changes rather than in price variations. Price stability
under these conditions thus has a different meaning and cannot
be easily interpreted. 17

II. PA'ITERNS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
Changes in Industrial and Employment Structure
Economic growth is both the cause and consequence of
changes in the industrial and employment structure. In the
process of growth some sectors generally grow faster than others,
and structural changes in output and employment are simply
manifestations of the differential rates of growth of the various
sectors during the period. At the same time, economic growth is
largely the result of continuous shifts of resources from lowproductivity to high-productivity sectors. For these reasons it is
useful to make a brief examination of the extent and pace of
structural changes in Taiwan.
16. See, for example, New China's First Quarter Century, Peking: Foreign
Languages Press, 1975, pp. 45-50; and Kuang-hsi Peng, Why China Has No
Inflation, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1976.
17. For a discussion of the price system, see Nai-renn Chen, Chinese Economic
Statistics, Chicago: Aldine, 1967; Peter Schran, "China's Price Stability: Its
Meaning and Distributive Consequences" (mimeographed), 1976.
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Table 5. Industrial Origin of Net Domestic Product, 1952-73
(Percent)
Agriculture

Industry
Total

1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973

35.7
38.0
31.5
32.5
31.2
31.3
31.0
30.3
32.5
31.3
29.0
26.6
27.7
27.0
25.7
24.5
23.8
20.3
19.1
17.1
16.7
15.5

17.9
17.6
22.0
20.9
22.2
23.6
23.8
25.5
24.7
24.9
25.7
28.0
28.2
28.2
28.6
29.4
30.3
31.6
32.5
34.5
35.3
37.9

Mining Manufacturing Electricity

~

2.1
1.7
1.8
1.7
2.2
2.6
2.9
2.5
2.3
2.1
2.5
2.1
1.8
1.9
2.0
2.0
1.7
1.4
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.0

10.8
11.2
14.4
13.7
14.4
15.5
15.4
17.6
16.7
16.9
16.9
19.6
20.4
19.9
20.1
20.9
21.9
23.0
23.8
25.7
26.8
29.8

0.6
0.7
0.5
0.7
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.1

1.3
1.5
1.8
1.7
1.7
1.8
1.8
1.7
1.7
2.0
2.3
2.3
2.2
2.1

C

.!>-

Transportation Commerce Others
.
and
onstructwn Communications
4.4
4.0
5.3
4.8
4.8
4.5
4.3
4.3
4.4
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.3
4.6
4.7
4.8
5.0
5.2
5.0
5.2
5.1
5.0

Source: Economic Planning Council, Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1974, p. 28.
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4.3
4.1
3.9
4.1
4.8
4.6
4.4
4.3
4.8
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5.5
5.7
5.7
5.8
6.0
5.4
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18.4
17.5
16.8
16.9
15.2
15.4
14.6
14.4
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15.0
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15.0
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Table 5 shows Taiwan's net domestic product by industrial
origin in 1952-73. 18 The most striking feature of the table is the
rise in industry's share from roughly 18 percent in the early 1950s
to about 38 percent in 1973. The rise was accompanied by a fall in
agriculture's share by almost the same amount, leaving the share
of the service sector virtually unchanged over the last two
decades. Within the industrial sector, the shares of manufacturing
and electric power rose while those of mining and construction
declined. The rise in manufacturing was especially marked. It
accounted for almost the entire increase in industry's share.
Within the service sector, the shares of transportation and
communications and other services rose slightly while the share
of commerce declined moderately.
The rise in industry's share is characteristic of the process of
economic growth. Taiwan's experience, however, is unique in
several respects. First, the pace of industrialization is unusually
rapid. Within a period of two decades, industry's share of net
national product increased by 18 percentage points. By comparison, industry's share in Britain rose by only 11 percentage points
over a period of 40 years during 1801-1841. In the early phase of
Japan's development during 1878/82 to 1923/27, industry's share
increased sharply by 22 percentage points, but it took Japan 45
years to bring about such a drastic structural change. 19 As shown
in Table 6, the Philippines and India both experienced less rapid
change in their industrial structures over the same period. Only
South Korea and Communist China could match Taiwan in its
rapid pace of industrialization. In the case of Communist China,
undoubtedly there has been considerable industrial development.
However, it is not clear whether and to what extent the rather
sharp increase was due to the larger price weights attached to
industrial growth than in other countries. In any event, Taiwan in
the 1970s is second only to Japan in the degree of industrialization as measured by industry's share of total output, and is
substantially ahead of South Korea, Communist China, India,
and the Philippines. The experience of Taiwan, and for that
matter, of South Korea, clearly demonstrates that rapid industrialization is certainly feasible without having to repeat the
prolonged process of the developed countries.
18. Estimates are based on totals in current prices. Conceivably a rise (or fall)
in relative agricultural prices could have exaggerated (or understated) agriculture's
share in real terms. However, in the present case, relative prices of agricultural and
nonagricultural products have not changed significantly enough to distort the
picture.
19. See Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth, New Haven and London:
Yale University Press, 1966, p. 88-91.

26

CONTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

Table 6. Industrial Distribution of National
Product, 1952- 71, Six Economics
(Percent)
Manufacturing,
Mining, and
Construction

Services

36
32
27
17

18
25
28
35

46
43
45
48

23
15
11
6

31
36
36
44

46
48
53
49

49
40
41
29

11
19
24
29

40
42
35
40

35
31
32
29

23
24
24
20

42
45
45
51

49
50
46
45

17
21
22
27

33
30
31
28

56
33
38
32

15
36
31
37

29
31
31
31

Agriculture
Taiwan, shares in
NNP, market prices
1952
1960
1965
1971
Japan, shares in
NDP, factor cost
1952
1960
1965
1971
S. Korea, shares in
GDP, factor cost
1953
1960
1965
1971
Philippines, shares
in NDP, factor cost
1952
1960
1965
1971
India, shares in
GDP, factor cost
1952
1960
1965
1971
Communist China,
shares in GNP
1952
1960
1965
1971

Source: EPC, 1974, p. 28; United Nations, 1970, pp. 91-93; United Nations,
1974, pp. 574-575; JEC, 1972, p. 42; JEC, 1975, pp. 42-43.
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Second, the structural shift from agriculture to industry in
Taiwan occurred over a period of expansion in which both
agricultural and industrial production advanced rapidly and
simultaneously, although at different rates. During 1952-72,
industrial production rose at 15 percent per year. 20 But agricultural output has also been growing contin\lally at a respectable rate
of 4.6 percent per year. This remarkable achievement can be seen
in Fig. 3, which shows the growth rates of industrial output on the
horizontal axis and that of agricultural output on the vertical axis
for six countries. 21 The two perpendicular lines with Taiwan as
the origin divide the plane into four quadrants. Any point in the
northwest quadrant (I) indicates that the country's industrial
growth rate is higher than that of Taiwan but its agricultural
growth rate is lower. The southwest quadrant (II) is the worst case
for the other countries in which both the agricultural and
industrial growth rates are below those of Taiwan. Countries in
the southeast quadrant (Ill) have higher agricultural growth rates
than Taiwan, but their industrial growth rates are lower.
Countries in the northeast quadrant (IV) have both growth rates
higher than those of Taiwan. It can be seen that none of the five
major Asian countries could match Taiwan's performance. The
only country that came close is South Korea. Japan and
Communist China did experience rapid industrial growth, but
their agricultural growth rates are considerably lower than
Taiwan's. For India and the Philippines, both their agricultural
and industrial growth rates are very much below Taiwan's. The
significance of the Taiwan experience is that rapid industrialization need not be at the expense of agricultural development, and
indeed, the two sectors might well be closely complementary
rather than competitive in the medium run.
A third interesting feature in Taiwan's case is that the time
path of the structural changes assumed the form of successively
rising plateaus. The years 1953, 1961, and 1965 stand out as major
20. Economic Planning Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, Taiwan
Statistical Data Book 1974, Taipei, 1974, p. 70.
21. For data used to calculate rates of agricultural growth, see Statistical Data
Book 1974, p. 51; Joint Economic Committee, op. cit., pp. 42-43; Food and
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Production Yearbook 1970,
Rome: FAO, 1970, p. 30, and 1973, pp. 27-28. Growth rates are computed on the
basis of averages for 1952-54 and 1970-72 to reduce the sensitivity of the index to
single-year fluctuations. For those used to calculate industrial growth rates, see
Statistical Data Book 1974, p. 70; JEC, op. cit., pp. 42-43; Statistical Yearbook
1960, New York: United Nations, 1961, pp. 81-82; United Nations, Statistical
Yearbook 1973, New York: United Nations, 1974, pp. 143-153.
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benchmarks of a step function. Up to 1953, agriculture's share
remained at about 37 percent of net domestic product. Then it
settled at a lower level of about 31 percent during 1954-61.
Beginning in 1962, it fell to a still lower plateau of about 27
percent for the period 1962-65. Thereafter, it declined continuously rather sharply to a low of about 16 percent by 1973. These
benchmarks generally coincided with major changes in development policies.
When we turn to the structure of the labor force, a similar
pattern emerges. As Table 7 shows, a structural shift from
agriculture to industry has occurred in the employment structure
as in the output structure. The share of labor force in agriculture
dropped from 52 percent in 1952 to 30 percent in 1975, while that
in industry rose significantly from 20 to 36 percent, and the share
of employment in the service sector rose moderately from 28 to 35
percent over the same period.
Table 7. Labor Force by Industrial Sectors, 1952-75
(Percent)
Year

Agriculture

Industry

Services

1952
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975

52.1
50.3
47.2
44.1
36.7
29.9

20.2
20.9
22.0
23.1
28.3
35.5

27.7
28.8
30.8
32.8
35.0
34.6

Source: W.Y. Kuo, "A Study of Factors Contributing to Labor Absorption in
Taiwan, 1954-1971," Conference on Population and Economic Development in
Taiwan, Taipei, Taiwan: Academia Sinica, 1976, p. 492.

Changes in Expenditure Patterns
Two broad problems concerning the pattern of expenditures
are of interest: First, how is total output distributed among
various end uses in Taiwan compared with other countries at their
present stage of development? In particular, how much of the total
output has been set aside for future growth? Second, what major
changes since 1953 have occurred in the relative share of each
category of final demand?

w
0

Table 8. Expenditures On Gross Domestic Product,
Six Economies, 1973
(Percentage of GDP in current prices)

0
0

Personal consumption
Government consumption
Gross fixed investment
Inventory change
Exports
Imports

Taiwan

Japan

Korea

Philippines

52
15
26
1
49
-43

51
9
37
3
10
-10

68
10
24
2
32
-35

69
8
18
2
22
-20

-

-

-

-

Total

100

100

100

100

M. China*

64
10
23
3
100

Indiat
77

10
16
1
4
-5
100

* 1970.
t 1971. Sub-items sum up to 103 percent. Apparently there is a statistical discrepancy of -3 percent.
Source: Taiwan -Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1975, p. 190. Japan, Korea, Philippines and IndiaUnited Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1974, New York: United Nations, 1975, pp. 43-45. Mainland
China- T. C. Liu and K. C. Yeh, "Chinese and Other Asian Economies: A Quantitative Evaluation," American Economic
Review, May 1973, p. 221.
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Table 8 shows the distribution of gross domestic product for
Taiwan and five other Asian economies in 1973 in terms of six
categories of final expenditures: personal consumption, government consumption, capital investment (gross domestic fixed
capital formation), inventory changes, exports, and imports. 22 The
distinctive features of resource allocation in Taiwan are the large
share of resources devoted to growth, the substantial government
consumption, high proportion of output entering into foreign
trade, and the small share of personal consumption. In terms of
the proportion of total output allocated to growth, Taiwan stands
second only to Japan, slightly above Korea and Mainland China,
and considerably higher than the Philippines and India.
Government consumption in Taiwan absorbed a much larger
share of total output than in other countries partly because of its
fairly large expenditures on education, science, and culture, 23 and
presumably also because of a large defense burden. Taiwan is
trying to maintain rapid growth and a sizable defense program at
the same time, a difficult task that most other countries have been
able to avoid.
The extent of Taiwan's participation in external trade is
highest among the six economies. About one-half of total output
was exported in 1973. Its average propensity to import is also very
high. Such high foreign trade proportions are not uncommon for
small countries. 24 South Korea and the Philippines also have
rather high import ratios. What is unique in Taiwan's case is its
trade surplus, about 6 percent of total GDP, whereas other
countries had either a deficit or a much smaller surplus.
Figure 4 shows the changing pattern of expenditures over the
last two decades. The most striking feature is the very rapid
increase in the share of exports from less than 10 percent in the
1950s to 44 percent of GDP in 1973-74. The rise has been
especially steep since the mid-1960s. Over the same period, the
share of imports also increased but at a less rapid rate, so that the
sizable trade deficit in the 1950s declined steadily, and finally a
surplus appeared in the early 1970s. The increase in the share of
22. For definitions of these concepts, see Statistical Yearbook 1975, pp.
370-371.
23. These expenditures accounted for 20 percent of total government current
expenditures in FY 1973. See Statistical Yearbook 1975, p. 239.
24. By size we refer to the size of land area and population. For a discussion of
the inverse relationship between size and foreign trade ratio, see Simon Kuznets,
V. Capital Formation Proportions: International Comparisons for Recent Years (in
Economic Development and Cultural Change, VIII: 4, Part II, July 1960), pp.
14-32.
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gross fixed capital formation was no less dramatic, from about 10
percent in the 1950s to about 25 percent of GDP in the early 1970s.
The marked increase was accompanied by a substantial reduction
of the share of government consumption and a moderate decrease
in the share of personal consumption. In sum, the shift of resource
allocation clearly indicates that Taiwan in the last two decades
has transformed itself from a high consumption to a high
investment economy, and from an internally oriented to an
externally oriented economy.
The significant size of foreign trade in Taiwan's GDP
indicates that rapid domestic growth has been intertwined with
rapid growth of external trade. Two observations in this
connection are worth noting. First, foreign trade has become
significant only since the early 1960s. As Table 9 shows, both
Taiwan's imports and exports grew at about the same rate as
world imports and exports in 1952-61 so that Taiwan's share of
world trade remained the same during this period. But in 1960-73,
Taiwan's trade expanded much faster so that its share of the
world's imports increased threefold and exports fivefold. The
ratios of goods and services traded to GDP show the same trend.
Table 9. Selected Measures of Taiwan's Participation
In Foreign Trade, 1952-73*
(Percent)

(1) Taiwan's imports as percent
of world imports
(2) Taiwan's exports as percent
of world exports
(3) Ratio of imports of goods
and services to GDP
(4) Ratio of exports of goods
and services to GDP
(5) Ratio of imports to GDP
plus imports
(6) Ratio of exports to GDP
plus imports
(7) Index, physical volume
of imports, 1952 prices
(8) Index, physical volume
of exports, 1952 prices

1952

1961

1973

0.23

0.23

0.64

0.16

0.15

0.78

16.0

15.7

38.0

8.7

10.8

46.0

13.8

13.5

27.5

7.4

9.4

33.3

100

186.4

1,284.0

100

168.7

2,260.3

* Imports are valued cif, and exports fob. Lines (1) and (2) refer to imports and
exports of commodities only, and are based on totals in current U.S. dollars. Lines
(3) through (6) refer to imports and exports of goods and services and are based on
totals in constant 1971 NT dollars.
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Second, by 1973 the interdependence of foreign trade and
economic growth reached unprecedented proportions. About 28
percent of the total supply of resources were from abroad, and
exports absorbed one-third of Taiwan's total resources. Consequently, Taiwan's economy is now rather sensitive to the
changing economic conditions abroad that affect its imports and
exports. In particular, the enormous size of the export-GDP ratio
means that the direct effect of export expansion on economic
growth will be substantial. 25 For example, in 197D-73 the high
rate of growth of exports (29.9 percent per year) compounded by a
large export-GDP ratio (29.2 percent in 1970) accounted for over
70 percent of the growth of GDP during this period. 26 During
1973-74, mainly as a result of the oil crisis, exports declined and
(involuntary) inventory rose sharply. Consequently, GDP hardly
increased at all.

III. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF GROWTH: LEVEL
AND PATTERN OF CONSUMPTION
One of the principal goals of economic development is to
increase the economic welfare of the people. Economic welfare,
however, is hard to define. Conventional measures in terms of
national income are only rough approximations, partly because
many crucial aspects of welfare lie outside the scope of national
income measurement, and partly because the national income
estimate itself involves many intricate aggregation problems,27
For our present purpose of a general overview, we focus on the
levels and patterns of personal consumption as indicators of
25. The rate of growth of GDP is a linear combination of the growth rates of
exports and other components of GDP, with their corresponding shares in GDP in
the base period as weights. By direct effect of exports, we refer to the rate of growth
of exports weighted by the export-GDP ratio. For further discussion, see the
following section.
26. Growth of GDP over the same period was ll.8 percent per year. For data
used, see Statistical Yearbook 1975, p. 195.
27. Theoretical and empirical issues surrounding the use of national income as
a measure of economic welfare have been the subject of an extended discussion
among economists in the past two decades. See Simon Kuznets, "National Income
and Economic Welfare," inS. Kuznets, Economic Change, New York: Norton, 1953,
192-215; Paul A. Samuelson, "Evaluation of Real National Income," in Kenneth J.
Arrow and Tibor Scitovsky, Readings in Welfare Economics, Homewood, Illinois:
Irwin, 1969, 402-433; Milton Ross (ed.), The Measurement of Economic and Social
Performance, New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1973. Foremost
among the difficulties of using per capita income as a measure of standard of
living is that it fails to take into account the distribution of income among persons.
On this problem regarding Taiwan, see Chapter II of this volume.
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changes in the standard of living in Taiwan, bearing in mind the
many limitations of these measures. 28
Earlier, we observed that the proportion of private consumption in gross domestic product declined moderately in the last two
decades. The decline, however, does not signify a reduction in the
standard of living. Both per capita income and consumption have
been rising, and the decline only implies that per capita
consumption increased at a lower rate than per capita income. In
fact, a downward trend in the proportion of private consumption
in GNP is not uncommon in the experience of the developed
countries. 29 The decline is generally accompanied by a rise in the
share of capital formation as was the case with Taiwan. In an
important sense, the change represents a tradeoff between current
and future consumption. Moreover, the decline in the share of
private consumption is compensated for to some extent by an
increase in the share of government services to the consumers
such as education, health, recreation, and environmental improvement. For example, the share of public expenditures on education
in GNP doubled during 1952-72. 30
The rise in the standard of living in Taiwan is clearly
reflected in the various indicators in Table 10. Per capita
consumption in 1973 is almost two and one-half times that in
1952. This is a significant increase by any standard. But perhaps
more impressive is the pace of change compared with the
experience of other developed countries. For example, Japan
doubled its per capita consumption between 1924-28 and 1962-64,
a 38-year period. 31 It took Taiwan less than 20 years to increase its
per capita consumption more than twofold.
28. The implicit assumption here is that personal consumption is the end in
itself and not an intermediate product. As Kuznets points out, "higher consumption levels may make for higher productivity of the population, either because of
beneficial physical effects or greater training, or because of inducements toward
more enthusiastic participation in productive activity." Simon Kuznets, Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations: VII. Supplement to Economic
Development and Cultural Change, X:2, Part II, January 1962, p. 59. Nonetheless,
it seems fair to say that personal consumption is more a goal of, rather than a
means to, production in societies like that of Taiwan.
29. Kuznets, 1962, op. cit., pp. 2Q-23.
30. Statistical Yearbook 1975, p. 262.
31. Simon Kuznets, "Trends in Level and Structure of Consumption," in L.
Klein and K. Ohkawa (eds.), Economic Growth, Homewood, Illinois: Irwin, 1968, p.
198.
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Table 10. Selected Indicators of Consumption
In Taiwan, 1952, 1961 and 1973
1952

1961

1973

100
2,078
12

127
2,430
11

246
2,754
19

Index of food consumption per capita:
Cereals, as flour
Potatoes and other tubers
Sugar
Pulses, nuts and seeds
Meat
Milk
Fats and oils
Protein

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

120
93
100
150
93
500
144
122

117
27
154
235
172
1,100
289
151

Per capita consumption of industrial
products (1952 = 100)
Steel
Rubber
Energy
Residential use of electricity

100•
100
100b
100

2,329
423
137
192

13,480
2,495
327
956

100
100
100
100
100

134
117
168
257
247

227
130
349
800
695

Per capita consumption in 1971 prices

(1952

= 100)

Per capita calorie intake per day
Percent from animal products

Index of per capita output (1952
Alcoholic beverages
Cigarettes
Cotton fabrics
Paper
Cement

= 100)

•1953 as base.
h1954 as base.
Source: Economic Planning Council, 1974, pp. 79-80; Statistical Yearbook
1975, pp. 2, 117, 168-169, 208-209; Economic Planning Council, 1976, p. 46.

As per capita income increased, both the quantity and quality
of the diet improved, as suggested by increases in per capita daily
calorie intake, in the proportion of calorie intake from animal
products, and in the substitution of meat, pulses, nuts, seeds, fats
and oils, and milk, for such inferior products as potatoes and other
tubers. Per capita consumption of basic industrial products (steel,
rubber, and energy) also went up sharply. No doubt, a large
proportion of these products went into other final uses such as
investment and exports. But most likely private consumption also
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rose significantly. The 856 percent increase in residential use of
electricity was primarily the result of the rapid increase in
consumer durables.
Table 10 also shows indexes of per capita output of five
industrial products related to private consumption: alcoholic
beverages, cigarettes, cotton fabrics, paper, and cement. In all
cases, the rise in the last two decades or so has been substantial.
As measures of standard of living, these indexes are less
meaningful than per capita consumption, but they do point to the
direction if not the magnitude of improvements of the people's
consumption standards.
All the indicators show an acceleration in improvements in
the 1960s compared with the 1950s. The average rate of growth of
per capita consumption was 5.4 percent per year from 1960-62 to
1972-74, considerably higher than the average of 3.0 percent for
the period 1951-53 to 1960-62. 32 The rapid growth was interrupted
in 1973-74 when per capita consumption hardly increased. But
there are indications that the upward trend resumed again in 1975
and 1976. 33
Table 11. Distribution of Private Consumption
Expenditures by Types Of Goods In Taiwan, 1951-74
(Percent)

Food, beverages and tobacco
Clothing and footwear
Gross rent, fuel and power,
furniture, furnishings,
household equipment, and
operations
Medical care and health expenses
Transportation and communications
Recreation and entertainment
Miscellaneous goods and services,
including education and cultural
services
Total private consumption

1972-74

1951-53

1960-:-62

66.7
3.8

59.1
4.2

47.1
5.2

15.8
4.4
1.1
2.4

19.5
4.6
0.8
2.9

21.8
5.6
3.4
4.8

5.8
100.0

8.9
100.0

12.0
100.0

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China 1975, 1976, pp. 208-209.
32. For data used, see Statistical Yearbook 1975, pp. 2, 208-209.
33. See Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, The Republic of China, Il:7, July 1976,
pp. 15, 18.
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As per capita consumption increased, the structure of
consumption expenditures by types of goods also changed. Table
11 shows the percentage shares of types of expenditures in total
private consumption: (1) food, beverages, and tobacco; (2) clothing
and footwear; (3) gross rent, fuel and power, furniture, furnishings, household equipment, and operations; (4) medical care
and health expenses; (5) transportation and communications; (6)
recreation, entertainment, education, and cultural services; (7)
miscellaneous goods and services. Two distinctive features of the
trend are evident. First, the share of food in personal consumption
declined considerably, indicating an expenditure (or income)
elasticity of less than one. 34 This change conforms with the
experience of other countries and accords with Engel's law. 35
Second, the shares of all other categories increased. 36 Changes in
the shares of transportation and communications, and recreation
and other services are especially marked. Although this may seem
unusual, it is by no means unique. The Japanese experience in
1952-64 shows a similar pattern. 37 So does the cross-section
comparison of non-Communist countries with different levels of
per capita income. However, it should be borne in mind that the
level of per capita income is but one of many factors underlying
the structural changes in Taiwan. Other socioeconomic and
demographic changes such as urbanization, reduction in income
inequality, interregional and international diffusion of technologi34. One should not confuse the elasticity of consumption of a commodity group
with respect to total consumption expenditures with the elasticity of consumption
of the commodity group with respect to income. The two are different concepts. The
income elasticity of food consumption, for example, is equal to the expenditure
elasticity of food consumption multiplied by the income elasticity of total personal
consumption. In Taiwan's case, we have observed that the average propensity to
consume has been declining, implying that it was greater than the marginal
propensity; i.e., the income elasticity of consumption is less than one. If the
expenditure elasticity of food consumption is also less than one, as in the case here,
then one can infer that the income elasticity of food consumption is also less than
one. However, where the expenditure elasticity of consumption of a commodity
exceeds one, as is the case with all categories other than food in Taiwan, one
cannot infer that income elasticity of consumption of these commodity groups is
greater or less than one.
35. See Kuznets, 1962, op. cit. Note that the empirical findings on structural
change in personal consumption based on cross-section intercountry and
intertemporal comparisons for individual countries do not always agree. The
inverse relationship between the share of food expenditures in total expenditures
and the level of per capita income is perhaps the most consistent result.
36. The original data for transportation and communications for 1961 are
apparently in error. Hence the irregular pattern.
37. Kuznets, 1968, op. cit., p. 229.
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cal change, consumption habits, and the size of households may
also be significant. 38 Whatever the causes of the structural
change, such changes do indicate shifts from "necessities" (such
as food) to "luxuries" (such as recreation, entertainment, education, and l!ultural services), suggesting a rise in the standard of
living.
Consumption expenditure is one important component of the
level of well-being of the people. There are other dimensions of
welfare, such as the pleasantness of living environment, working
conditions, security of income, crime rate, equity in the distribution of the tax burden and benefit, etc. A detailed examination of
these elements is beyond the scope of this paper. We shall briefly
review changes in three aspects of the quality of life: health,
education, and living conditions. Changes in these elements are
the consequences of rapid economic growth and in tum may affect
future growth.
One commonly used indicator of the general health of the
population is its life expectancy at birth. Table 12 shows that the
life expectancy of males in Taiwan increased from 56 years in
1952 to 68 years in 1974, and females from 61 to 73 years over the
same period. Closely associated with this change was the sharp
drop in the crude death rate, from 9.9 to 4.8 per thousand during
this period. How this improvement was achieved can be readily
seen from the increases in the number of medical personnel and
hospital beds per thousand population in 1952-74. Again it is
clear that the change in the last decade or so was much more
impressive than during the decade before
38. For some in-depth studies, see Yung-san Lee, "The Effect of Population
Growth on Consumption Patterns in Taiwan," in Conference on Population and
Economic Development in Taiwan, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica,
Taipei, 1976, pp. 487-526, and references therein.
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Table 12. Selected Indicators of Social
Development in Taiwan, 1952-1974

Medical care and health
Medical personnel per 10,000 population
Physicians
Nurses, including midwives
Others•
Hospital beds per 10,000 population
Life expectancy at birth: Male (no. of years)
Life expectancy at birth: Female (no. of years)
Crude death rate (no. per 1,000)
Infant mortality rate (no. per 1,000)
Crude birth rate (no. per 1,000)
Education
Enrollment rate, primary education (age 6-ll)h
Secondary education (age 12-17)
Male
Female
Higher education (age 18-24)
Male
Female
Public expenditures on education as % of GNP
Living conditions
Percent of urban population in total
Percent of households using electricity
Percent of households using piped water
Radio receivers per 1,000 population
TV sets per 1,000 population
Telephone sets per 1,000 population
Automobiles per 1,000 population

1952

1961

1974

14.5
6.3
3.5
4.7
2.9
56.5
60.7
9.9
37.2
46.6

16.4
6.6
5.2
4.6
3.9
62.3
67.7
6.7
32.7
38.3

33.8
9.3
15.5
9.0
6.3
67.9
72.8
4.8
14.1
23.4

84.0

96.0

98.5

17.9
7.2

33.9
16.6

69.8
56.8

1.5
0.2
1.7

4.0
0.9
2.4

11.8
7.1
3.0

47.6
35.4
28.8

50.9
60.8
30.8
87.8C
1.4d
9.8
2.2

63.4
97.3
46.1
88.8
60.1
57.0
15.3

4.2
1.1

• Includes herb physicians, dentists, assistant dentists, pharmacists, and
assistant pharmacists.
b Ratio of number of students to the corresponding school·age population.
c 1962.
d 1963.
Source: Economic Planning Council, Social Welfare Indicators, Republic of
China 1975, Taipei, 1976; Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1975,
Taipei, 1976.

Meanwhile, the crude birth rate also declined sharply, from
46.6 per thousand in 1952 to 23.4 per thousand in 1974. Taiwan
began its development process in the early 1950s with substantial
population pressure. The rapid reduction in the mortality rate
would have intensified the pressure had not the birth rate fallen
even more sharply. As it was, the natural rate of increase in
population fell from 3.6 percent in 1952 to 1.9 percent in 1974.
From a longer perspective, the almost simultaneous improvement
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in health conditions and reduction of the crude birth rate within a
short period is one of Taiwan's most important achievements as
well as one of the most significant development lessons Taiwan
could offer to other countries. 3 9
Development planners have rightly placed great emphasis on
education as an investment in human capital. Nonetheless, this in
no way diminishes the importance of intellectual enlightenment
as a development objective in itself. But whether education is to be
an end or means to economic growth, its tremendous development
in Taiwan is unmistakable. By 1974, over 98 percent of the
population aged 6-11 years are enrolled in primary schools. The
enrollment rates for the population in age groups of 12-17 and
18-24 have also risen severalfold. In particular, the rather sharp
rise in secondary school students has been due to the extension of
free schooling for ages six to nine since the late 1960s. This is
reflected in part in the rise of the share of public expenditures on
education in total GNP. As noted earlier, GNP has grown very
fast in the last two decades, but public expenditures expanded
even faster so that its share increased from 1.7 percent in 1952 to 3
percent in 1974.
Seven indicators of the changing living conditions are
summarized in Table 12. The proportion of total households using
electricity and piped water rose sharply. By 1974 about 97 percent
of the households were using electricity. The percentage is
substantially higher than the percentage of total population in
urban areas, indicating that rural electrification is highly
developed. The numbers of major consumer durables (television,
telephones, and automobiles) per thousand population increased
dramatically, especially since 1961, but the number of radios
remained unchanged. In sum, all the indicators suggest substantial improvements in the standard of living in the last two decades
or so. This is not to say that there have been no disamenities
resulting from economic growth. Indeed there are clearly discernible negative aspects, such as the pollution of air and water in
Taipei, traffic overcrowding in the cities, and erosion of traditional cultural values, all directly or indirectly associated with
rapid industrialization. Still, it is difficult to accept the conclusion
that such undesirable developments have outweighed the tremendous positive achievements.
39. The problem is actually more complicated than it appears. See T. Paul
Schultz, Evaluation of Population Policies: A Framework for Analysis and Its
Application to Taiwan's Family Planning Program, Santa Monica: The Rand
Corporation, R-643-AID, June 1971.
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Table 13. Selected Indicators of Personal Consumption,
Six Asian Economies, 1973
Taiwan

Japan

S. Korea

0

0

Mainland
Philippines China

India

z

~

t'l

Per capita income, U.S.$
(2) Percent of total consumption
Food, beverages, and tobacco
Clothing and footwear
Gross rent, fuel and power
Furniture, furnishings and household
equipment
Miscellaneous goods and services
Total private consumption
(3) Nutrition
Calories per capita per day
Protein, grams per capita per day
(4) Education**
Public expenditures per capita, U.S.$
School-age population per teacher
School-age population in school,
Literacy rate
(5) Health
Public expenditures per capita, U.S.$
Population per physician
Population per hospital bed
Infant mortality, no. per 1,000
Life expectancy at birth
(1)

601

3,838

374

262

221

128

47.1
5.4
17.8

32.4
9.4
14.8

54.6
12.0
8.0

59.3
5.9
10.6

-

61.2
7.8
8.6

4.5
25.2
100.0

10.4
33.0
100.0

3.5
21.9
100.0

5.8
18.4
100.0

-

2,620
70

2,510
79

2,520
68

1,940
47

a=

"0

0

-

-

~

>

~

...:

>
rJ)

3.9
18.5
100.0

>
z
00
~

2,170
60

2,070
52

23
53
66
85

166
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99

10
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65
88

7
47
67
72

9
47
63
95

2
58
39
34

17
2,967
1,064
18
69

130
864
97
12
73

1
1,983
1,723
60
61

1
1,490
776
78
58

2
8,142
1,000
55
62

1
4,399
1,980
139
50
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Other indicators
Sugar consumption per capita, kgt
Newsprint consumption per capita, kgt
Energy consumption per capita, kgt
Steel consumption per capita, kgt
Radios per 1,000 population
Television sets per 1,000 population
Telephones per 1,000 populationt
Passenger cars per 1,000 populationt

19.6
2.0
1,427
151
94
58
48
6.0

30.4
20.2
3,839
691
658tt
229
35.6
144.0

6.5
4.8
961
124
127tt
36
3.5
2.3

20.5
1.5
309
29
47
11

4.8
0.9
460
37
16*
0.4*

1.1

-

8.7

6.5
0.3
201
14
24
0.3
0.3
1.2

t;rj
(j

0

t

tt
*
**
write.

Not available.
1974.
1972.
1970.
School-age refers to ages 5-19. Literacy rate refers to percent of adult population (over 15) able either to read or

Source: Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1976, Arms Control Association, 1976, pp.
26-27; Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China 1975, pp. 2, 117, 153, 166-168, 209, 280; United Nations, Yearbook of
National Accounts Statistics 1975, New York: United Nations, 1976, Vol. I, pp. 627-628, 782, 834-835, Vol. II, pp. 32:3-:324;
United Nations, Demographic Yearbook 1965, New York: United Nations, 1966, p. 135, United Nations, Demographic
Yearbook 1974, New York: United Nations, 1975, p. 129; United Nations, Statistical Yearbook 1975, New York: United
Nations, 1976, pp. 70, 380, 493-494, 582, 587, 593-594, 605, 901; China: Energy Balance Projections, Washington, D.C.:
Central Intelligence Agency, 1975, p. 33.
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Table 13 compares a number of socioeconomic indicators for
six economies in 1973 to show how Taiwan stands among these
countries. Direct comparison of per capita consumption in terms
of a common currency unit is not possible for lack of statistical
data. As an approximation, we compare the per capita GDP in
U.S. dollars. These figures are subject to serious limitations in
comparability, and the share of personal consumption in GDP
varies widely among countries. Nonetheless, the differences
shown in Table 13 are so wide that clearly Taiwan's per capita
consumption in 1973 was above all these countries except Japan.
A comparison of the structure of consumption corroborates this
finding. In general, the larger the shares of such "luxuries" as
household equipment and miscellaneous goods and services, or
conversely, the lower the shares of "necessities" such as food,
clothing, and rent, the higher the standard of living. As Table 13
shows, the share of "luxuries" in total consumption in Taiwan
(29.7 percent) is lower than Japan's but higher than those of the
three other economies.
A comparison of the daily calorie intake per capita indicates
that the people in Taiwan enjoy a larger supply of calories. To
some extent, the number of calories depends partly on climatic
conditions. A better indicator of the standard of living is the per
capita consumption of protein in the diet. Here, again, Taiwan is
second only to Japan in terms of protein consumption.
In education and health, Taiwan's public expenditures on
education on a per capita basis are much less than Japan's, but
several times larger than the other countries'. Its enrollment
rate and literacy rate are about the same as all others except
India. The relative sizes of population per physician or hospital
bed rank about the middle among the six economies. However, its
infant mortality rate is distinctly lower, and its life expectancy at
birth distinctly higher than all others except Japan.
Various other indicators also convey the impression that the
standard of living in Taiwan is quite high relative to that in other
countries. Its per capita consumption or possession of eight major
industrial products ranks second or third. In particular, the
number of television sets, radios, telephone, and passenger cars
per capita is very much higher than in most other countries.

IV. SOURCES OF GROWTH
The preceding sections describe the various dimensions and
consequences of growth. We turn to the question: How did the
Taiwan economy grow so fast? Longrun growth of output is
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possible only if there is a sustained increase both in the productive
capacity of the economy and in aggregate demand. The first
question is, therefore: What are the sources of growth on the
supply side?

Changes in Output per Worker and Employment
As a first approximation, the growth of GNP can be
separated into two parts: the rates of growth in the· size of the
labor force and output per worker. Table 14 shows two interesting
features in the rates of growth of these two elements in 1952-73
and in the two subperiods. First, for the period as a whole, growth
of output per worker contributed a larger share to growth of GNP
than increase in employment, a characteristic common to
economies undergoing rapid economic expansion. Second, the
pattern of change in the subperiods shows that the growth rate for
employment rose markedly, whereas that of output per worker
remained the same in the 1960s as compared with the 1950s. As a
result, increase in output per worker accounted for about threefourths of the growth in GNP during 1952-60, but it declined to
about one-half in 1961-73.
Table 14. Rates of Growth of GNP, Employment,
and Output Per Worker in Taiwan, 1952-73
(Percent per year)
1952-60

1960-73

1952-73

GNP

6.9

9.7

Employment
Output per worker
Output per worker as
share of total

1.6

4.7

5.3

5.0

8.6
3.5
5.1

76.8

51.5

59.3

Source: Statistical Yearbook 1975.

The growth of employment at 3.5 percent per year over two
decades is impressive. Its significance, however, lies in the extent
to which human resources in Taiwan have been fully and
economically utilized. 40 Some insight into the question can be
40. For excellent studies of various aspects of this problem see Cheng Li (ed.),
Taiwan jen-li tzu-yuan lun-wen-chi (Studies in Human Resources in Taiwan)
Taipei: Lien-ching Publishing Co., 1975; and Conference on Population and
Economic Development in Taiwan, Taipei: Institute of Economics, Academia
Sinica, 1976.
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gained by relating employment to population and labor supply as
shown in Table 15. Three points suggested by the data are of
interest. First, the proportion of population participating in
production had hardly changed between 1953 and 1974. The rapid
increase in employment was matched by an equally rapid increase
in total population.
Table 15. Labor Supply and Employment in
Taiwan, 1953, 1960, and 1974
1960

1974

8,283
4,759
1,677
3,082
2,888
194
34.9

10,612
5,822
2,339
3,483
3,270
213
30.8

15,708
9,957
4,321
5,636
5,486
150
34.9

57.5

54.9

63.4

64.7
93.7
6.3

59.8
93.9
6.1

56.6
97.3
2.7

1953
(1) Total population (1,000)
(2) Population, aged 15 and over (1,000)
a. Not in labor force
b. Labor supply
(3) Employment (1,000)
(4) Unemployed (1,000)
(5) Labor participation rate
(6) Percent of population aged 15 and
over
(7) Ratio of labor supply to population,
aged 15 and over
(8) Employment rate
(9) Unemployment rate

Source: (1) and (2)-Statistical Yearbook 1975, pp. 14-15, 20. Totals refer to
midyear population calculated by taking an average of those in beginning and end
of year.
(2)a = (2) minus (2)b.
(2)b = sum of (3) and (4).
(3) and (4)- W. Y. Kuo, "A Study of Factors Contributing to Labor Absorption
in Taiwan, 1954-1971," Conference on Population, pp. 485, 494.
(5) = (3)/(1).
(6) = (2)1(1).
(7) = (2)b/(2).
(8) = (3)1(2)b.
(9) = (4)/(2)b.

Second, the rate of increase of total population was especially
high in the early 1950s so that the number of new entrants into
the labor supply in the late 1960s and early 1970s was quite large,
raising the proportion of those aged 15 and over from 58 percent in
1953 to 63 percent in 1974. In short, potential labor supply
actually increased faster than population or employment. 41
However, the economic life of the people of Taiwan is such that
not all those in this age group would seek employment. In fact, the
41. Strictly speaking, potential labor supply should be defined as the total
population in the age group 15 and over, less the number of those disabled. The
latter is believed to be small relative to total population.
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proportion of those that could have been but are not gainfully
employed has increased, partly because of a sharp rise in student
enrollment in the secondary level or above, and partly because of
an increase in life expectancy and per capita income. Thus, if we
define labor supply as those aged 15 and over, excluding those
unable or unwilling to work and those not otherwise occupied
(such as students and housewives), total effective labor supply as
a percentage of those in the age group 15 and over declined from
65 percent in 1953 to 57 percent in 1974.
Third, the rate of employment, defined as the ratio of those
gainfully employed to effective labor supply increased perceptibly
from 93.7 percent in 1953 to 97.3 percent in 1974. Correspondingly,
the unemployment rate was cut in half from about 6 percent in
1953 to 3 percent in 1974. It probably went up in 1975 somewhat
under the effects of the world recession.
Growth of employment is but one of several dimensions of the
problem of labor's contribution to growth of output. Possible
changes in man-hours worked, in the quality of labor, and in
interindustry shifts in the employment structure are also pertinent. The limited information on hours of work suggests little
change over the years. 42 This means that employment changes
are fair approximations to changes in labor input. No information
on the changing quality of labor is available, but there can be
little doubt that the tremendous achievements in Taiwan's
educational effort noted in the preceding section has greatly
enhanced the contribution of Taiwan's labor force to economic
growth.
On the question of structural shifts in employment, it can be
shown that, ex post, changes in output per worker for the economy
as a whole reflected relative changes in sectoral output per worker
and in the sectoral shares of employment. 43 Table 16 presents
42. Statistical Yearbook 1975, p. 45.
43. Let 0 and 0' represent total output in the current and base periods; Nand
N', total employment in the current and base periods; and Oi and Ni, output and
employment in sector i. Then,

OIN
O'IN'

~

=LJ..

[(0[/N[)
Oi'!Nj'

(N[!N)
• N(!N' •

Oi']

(Y

The item on the left-hand side refers to changes in overall output per worker. The
three items on the right hand side represent changes in the average output per
worker in sector i, relative changes in sector i's employment share, and the output
share of sector i in the base period.
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estimates of output and employment structure and output per
worker by the three broad sectors: agriculture, industry, and
services in 1952, 1962, and 1972. As may be expected, output per
worker in agriculture is lower than those in industry or services,
and the gap has been increasing. A comparison of the relative
output per worker in the industry and service sectors in the last
two decades indicates that the ratio of the former to the latter has
been increasing. The trend is consistent with the findings based
on cross-country studies that the ratio is positively correlated to
total product per worker.44
Table 16. Output and Employment Structures and
Output Per Worker in Taiwan, 1952, 1962, and 1972

Shares in NDP, current prices (%)
Agriculture
Industry
Services
Shares in labor force (%)
Agriculture
Industry
Services
Product per worker (1000 NT/worker)
Total
Agriculture
Industry
Services
Index of output per worker (%)
Total
Agriculture
Industry
Services

1952

1962

1972

35.7
17.9
46.4

29.0
25.7
45.3

16.7
35.3
48.0

52.1
20.2
27.7

45.9
22.5
31.6

33.0
32.1
34.9

5.1
3.5
4.5
8.6

18.0
11.4
20.6
25.8

46.1
23.4
50.7
63.5

100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00

352.9
325.7
457.8
300.0

903.9
668.6
1,126.7
738.4

Source: Economic Planning Council, 1974, pp. 27-28; Kuo, 1976, pp. 492 pp.
492, 494.

Capital Formation
It has been observed that the rise in output per worker has
been responsible for a considerably larger share of the growth in
GDP than has the rise in the size of the labor force in the two
44. Simon Kuznets, Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations.
II. Industrial Distribution of National Product and Labor Force, in Economic
Development and Cultural Change, V:4, Part II, July 1957, p. 41.
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decades since 1952 (Table 14). Changes in the output per worker,
however, are the combined result of many factors other than those
associated with labor, such as changes in the stock of capital per
worker, new technology, scale of production, efficiency in
management, and so on. Among these factors, capital investment
is perhaps one of the most important. 45 This is primarily because
the formation of physical capital is a necessary if not sufficient
condition for an increase in productive capacity, and because
growth in any economy must depend on its own capability to
generate and sustain fairly high rates of capital formation. To
evaluate the performance of the Taiwan economy in this
particular respect, we focus on three issues: (1) the level, structure,
and trend of capital formation proportions, to indicate the
changing volume of output set aside for investment; (2) the
financing of capital formation, to trace the sources of funds that
make capital formation possible; and (3) the relation between
investment and economic growth, to indicate roughly how
effectively investment is being used to increase output.
Table 17 shows the gross domestic capital proportions in
1952-74 in constant 1971 prices. Three observations based on this
table are worth noting. First, the proportion of capital formation
rose significantly during 1952-74, from an average about 12
percent in the 1950s to about 27 percent in the early 1970s. Over
the entire period, it accounted for about 18 percent of total output.
Second, the rising trend shows sharp upturns around 1960 and
1965. Before 1960, the rate of capital formation averaged less than
12 percent. It rose to 16 percent in 1961-65, followed by an even
larger increase to 25 percent after 1965. Third, the increase in the
rate of capital formation was almost entirely due to the rise in the
rate of fixed capital formation. The proportion of inventory
change in total output varies from year to year but remains more
or less constant at about 3 percent over the long run. 46 The
overwhelmingly large share of fixed capital formation is significant because fixed capital formation generally contributes more to
increasing productive capacity than increases in stocks.
45. The role of investment in economic growth has been a controversial issue
in the economic literature of the 1950s and 1960s. But despite the controversy, no
development economist goes so far as to deny the importance of capital. See Gerald
M. Meier, Leading Issues in Economic Development, Second edition, London:
Oxford University Press, 1970, pp. 165-185.
46. The exceptionally high percentage in 1974 was probably due in part to the
accelerated purchase of raw materials in the face of world inflation following the
oil crisis, and in part to involuntary inventory accumulation.
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Table 17. Percentage of Gross Capital Formation
in Gross Domestic Product, 1952-74*
(Percent)

1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
Average
1952-60
1961-65
1966-74
1952-74

*

Gross
Capital
Formation

Gross Fixed
Capital
Formation

Increase
in Stocks

12.0
12.5
12.7
9.9
11.0
10.3
11.7
12.8
14.7
15.4
15.5
15.3
16.4
19.1
19.8
22.4
24.4
23.5
25.7
25.8
23.4
24.9
34.0

9.1
10.8
10.7
8.6
9.3
8.5
9.9
11.1
12.0
12.7
12.5
13.5
12.8
14.2
16.4
18.6
20.5
20.8
21.7
22.9
24.1
23.7
25.9

2.9
1.7
1.7
1.3
1.7
1.8
1.7
1.7
2.7
2.7
3.0
1.8
3.6
4.9
3.4
3.8
3.9
2.7
4.0
2.9
-0.7
1.2
8.1

11.9
16.3
24.9
18.0

10.0
13.1
21.6
15.2

1.9
3.2
3.3
2.7

Based on totals in constant 1971 prices.
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1975, pp. 194-195.
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Table 18. Capital Formation Proportions, Six Asian
Economies, 1952, 1961, and 1972a

Gross capital formation (%)
Taiwan
Japan
South Korea
Philippines
Mainland China
Indiac
Gross IlXed capital formation (%)
Taiwan
Japan
South Korea
Philippines
Mainland China
Indiac
Increase in stocks (%)
Taiwan
Japan
South Korea
Philippines
Mainland China
India

1952

1961

1972

15
26
16h
12

20
35
14
19

23
36
-22
19

10

15

15

11
20
7h
11
10
10

16
33
12
17
15

24
34
20
17
24d
15

4
6
9h
1

4
2
2
2

-1
2
1
1
1

• Based on totals in current prices except those for Mainland China.
b 1953.
c Fiscal year beginning 1 April, 1952, 1961, and 1970 respectively.
d 1970 and 1957 prices.
- Nil or not available.
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1969,
Vol. II, 1970, pp. 46-47; 1973, .1975, pp. 42-44; ECAFE, Economic Survey of Asia
and the Far East 1957, p. 216; Statistical Yearbook 1975, pp. 194-195; Field, 1976.

Compared with those of five selected Asian countries shown
in Table 18, Taiwan's capital formation proportion in 1972 is
second only to that of Japan, and substantially above those of the
Philippines and India. Even more impressive is the rapidity with
which the current high capital formation was attained. While all
the developing countries experienced a rise in capital formation
during this period, none experienced an increase as large as that
of Taiwan.
Capital formation can be financed by domestic savings or
capital flows from abroad. Foreign capital inflows are important
both as additional resources to fill the savings or foreign
exchange gaps and as carriers of new technology. But in the long
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run, economic growth can be sustained only if internal financing
becomes an inherent part of the growth process. Table 19 shows
the proportions of the two different sources of capital formation in
Taiwan in 1952-72: gross domestic savings (which include
provision for capital consumption and private and public savings)
and capital inflows (which include U.S. aid, foreign capital, and
loans). Up to 1962, Taiwan depended heavily on external sources.
During this period U.S. aid, foreign capital, and loans accounted
for over one-third of domestic capital formation. But after 1962,
there was a sharp drop in the percentage of external financing.
The dramatic shift reflects the increasing capability of the
economy to generate domestic savings. By comparison, there had
been no discernible downward trend in the degree of reliance on
foreign financing in Korea or the Philippines over more or less the
same period, although proportions of foreign financing in the
early stages in these countries were lower than in Taiwan. 47 About
the only other developing country in the group that has become
much more independent of external financing since the early
1960s is Communist China. However, the method of mobilizing
domestic savings is very much different in the two regions.
47. See United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1969, New
York: United Nations, 1970, pp. 201-202.
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Table 19. Sources of Gross Capital Formation, 1952-72*
(Percent)
Gross Domestic Savings

1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972

Total

Provision
for Capital
Consumption

58.1
60.6
49.7
65.6
58.0
63.4
54.1
51.2
59.9
64.8
68.4
93.6
99.8
84.9
93.2
89.5
88.5
94.8
97.8
108.9
127.5

31.3
33.0
31.2
37.6
33.2
36.9
33.2
33.2
32.1
31.4
33.1
35.2
32.7
27.0
26.8
24.4
23.9
24.4
24.2
25.8
27.6

U.S. Aid, Foreign
Net National Savings
Total
Private Capital, and Loans
26.8
27.6
18.5
28.0
24.8
26.5
20.9
18.0
27.8
33.4
35.3
58.4
67.1
57.9
66.4
65.1
64.6
70.4
73.6
83.1
99.9

27.7
26.6
21.6
25.5
25.1
23.5
18.3
16.3
23.2
32.9
34.8
49.9
52.1
42.4
52.1
49.4
43.4
42.3
51.1
62.9
69.2

40.0
36.9
52.5
32.5
42.9
33.2
44.2
45.8
37.3
35.6
34.5
4.0
-1.2
15.4
4.5
7.9
11.5
4.1
0.8
-9.8
-27.5

* Gross domestic savings and capital inflows do not sum up to 100 percent
because of statistical discrepancies.
Source: Economic Planning Council, Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1974, p.
41.
As Table 19 shows, the rise in the share of domestic savings
in Taiwan was due primarily to the increase in net national
savings. While provision for capital consumption declined
slightly, net national savings rose from 25 percent of total
domestic capital formation in the 1950s to about 85 percent in the
early 1970s. The latter, in tum, was the result of the rising trends
in both private and public savings. By contrast, savings in
Communist China consist almost entirely of public savings. In
Taiwan, the decision to save or consume remains largely with the
individuals or private businessmen. In Communist China, the
state determines how much to save.
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The incremental output-capital ratio (i.e., the ratio of increase
in output to investment) has often been used to show what
additions to output could be obtained from one unit of investment.
Other things being equal, the higher the ratio the larger the
"returns" to a given amount of investment. The concept has many
limitations and its measurement is usually beset with numerous
difficulties. 48 For this reason, measures of total factor productivity
are often used instead. Nonetheless, under certain not too
unrealistic assumptions, the ratio can be useful as a device to
separate the two elements underlying the rate of growth of output:
the rate of savings and the incremental output-capital ratio. 49
This has been done by others for various countries. 50 It is
interesting to compare Taiwan's experience with some of the
findings for other countries summarized in Table 20.
48. See Otto Eckstein, "Capital Theory and Some Theoretical Problems in
Development Planning," American Economic Review, May 1961, 92-101; Maurice
Allais, "The Influence of the Capital-Output Ratio on Real National Income,"
Econometrica, 30 1962, 700-728; A. A. Walters, "Incremental Capital-Output
Ratios," Economic Journal, December 1966, 818-822; G. Myrdal, Asia Drama, New
York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1968; Hagen, op. cit.; Harvey Liebenstein,
"Incremental Capital-Output Ratios and Growth Rates in the Short Run," Review
of Economics and Statistics, February 1966, 2Q-27; Kazuo Sato, "International
Variations in the Incremental Capital-Output Ratios," Economic Development and
Cultural Change, July 1971, 621-640; J. Vanek and A. H. Studenmund, "Toward a
Better Understanding of the Incremental Capital-Output Ratio," Quarterly Journal
of Economics, August 1968, 435-451.
49. These assumptions are that new technology is generally embodied in new
capital; the rate of utilization of existing equipment remains more or less constant,
the supply of factors other than capital is fairly elastic; and appropriate time lags
have been allowed for.
50. Kuznets, 1960, op. cit.; Simon Kuznets, VI. Long Term Trends in Capital
Formation, in Economic Development and Cultural Change, IX:4, part II, July
1961; Liebenstein, op. cit.; Sato, op. cit.; United Nations, Statistical Yearbook 1960,
New York: United Nations, 1960.

Table 20. Rates of Growth of Output, Investment,
and Incremental Output-Capital Ratios,
Selected Countries, 1950s and 1960s

trl

(")

Country
(1) 18 countries
(2) 10 countriest
(3) Taiwan
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

Japan
S. Korea
Philippines
India
Communist Chinat

Period

Rate of growth
of GNP
(%/year)

1951-57
1950-58
1952-58
1960-72
1960-72
1960-72
1960-72
1960-70
1961-70

4.6
4.7
7.1
9.5
10.6
9.2
5.3
3.4
4.2

Rate of
investment
(%)
15.5
14.2
11.4
20.1
36.7
20.2
20.2
16.6
21.5

0

Incremental
output-capital ratio
0.30
0.33
0.62
0.47
0.29
0.45
0.26
0.20
0.20

t Gross fixed capital formation only.
Source: (1) Kuznets, 1960, pp. 50-51. See pp. 78-79 for countries in the group. (2) Kuznets, 1961, p. 16. (3) Statistical
Yearbook 1975, pp. 194-195; (5) through (7) United Nations, 1975, pp. 42-44, 101, 114. (8) Liu and Yeh, 1973, pp. 218-221.
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The comparison brings out several notable features in
Taiwan's development experience. First, the ratio for Taiwan is
distinctly higher than the average for developing countries in the
1950s and for the other selected countries in the 1960s. In short,
during these periods investments were rather "productive" in the
sense that increase in output per unit of investment was much
larger than in other countries.
Second, in the 1950s, the rate of growth of output in Taiwan
was higher than the average for developing countries, not because
the rate of investment was higher but because its incremental
output-capital ratio was higher. Similarly, Taiwan's rate of
growth of GNP was higher than those of the Philippines, India,
and Communist China in the 1960s for the same reason.
Table 21. Sectoral Distribution of Gross Fixed
Capital Formation in Taiwan, 1952-74*
(Percent)

Agriculture
lndustry 1
Utilities
Transportation
Housing
Others 2
Total

1952

1960

1970

1974

20.5
21.5
7.1
10.3
1.7
38.9
100.0

15.0
25.9
10.9
14.9
2.0
31.3
100.0

7.5
37.9
9.4
14.5
1.2
29.6
100.0

6.8
38.4
16.7
8.8
0.8
28.5
100.0

Includes mining, manufacturing, and construction.
Includes trade, education, military construction, and other services.
* Based on totals in current prices.
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1975, pp. 210-212.

1

2

Third, the incremental output-capital ratio for Taiwan during
the two subperiods declines, suggesting that a higher rate of
growth of output was obtained only from much more capital. The
declining trend could have been due partly to a shift of investment
from sectors with higher ratios (such as manufacturing) to those
with lower ratios (such as utilities and transportation), and partly
to changes to technology that requires more capital per unit of
output. 51 But the sectoral distribution of gross fixed investment
shown in Table 21 indicates that such shifts are likely to have
rather small effects. Industry's share of investment did rise
markedly from 1952-70 and remained at a high level between
51. Changes in relative prices could also have been a factor.
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1970 and 1974. However, the increase was largely offset by the
decline in the share of agricultural investment, so that if we take
investment in agriculture and industry together, their combined
share hardly increased in 1952-74. 52 Similarly, aggregate investment in the sectors with low output-capital ratios such as
transportation and housing also remained virtually unchanged,
from 27.8 percent in 1960 to 26.3 percent in 1974, the sharp rise in
the share for utilities during 1970-74 being offset by a decline in
the shares of transportation and housing. The presumption is
quite strong that structural or technological changes within a
sector favoring lower incremental output-capital ratios have
taken place. Little is known about technological changes associated with the new investment. There are, however, some
indications that within the industry sector more investment
apparently has been allocated to "heavy" industries in recent
years. This is suggested by the rather drastic change in the output
structure in the last decade or so. Gross value added in the
manufacture of food, beverages, and tobacco as a percentage of
value added in manufacturing as a whole declined from 45 percent
in 1960 to 19 percent in 1974. 53 By contrast, the share of
chemicals, and chemical, petroleum, coal, rubber, and plastic
products increased from 10 percent in 1960 to 23 percent in 1974;
and that of fabricated metal products, machinery, and equipment
from 8 to 24 percent over the same period. To the extent the
change in output structure implies a corresponding shift in
investment allocation and that investment in the "heavy"
industries requires larger doses of capital per unit of output, a
good part of the decline in the aggregate incremental output-capital ratio could be traced to structural shifts within the industry
sector. Whatever the cause for the decline, if the trend should
continue, the need for further rise in the savings ratio would be
great, as more and more investment would be required to
compensate for the decline in the incremental output-capital ratio
in order to maintain a high rate of growth. 54
Growth in Total Factor Productivity
Thus far we have been concerned with growth of employment
and capital stock as two major sources of growth. Other factors,
such as improvement in skills, technology, organization, and
52. Note that investment in agriculture includes mostly equipment purchase
for agricultural production. Investment in water works and the like is included in
"others" as part of investment by producers of government services.
53. Statistical Yearbook 1975, pp. 206-207.
54. An incisive analysis of·this problem was made by Ta-chung Liu in an
unpublished study.
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scale, also contribute to growth of output. How significant these
other factors were, relative to capital stock and employment, can
be roughly measured by a combined capital and labor input
approach. 55 Table 22 summarizes estimates of the sources of
growth of output, attributable to growth of labor, capital and
"total productivity" in Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, India,
Communist China, and the Soviet Union. The comparison brings
out several interesting features in Taiwan's development process.
The first is the relative importance of increases in total
productivity compared with growth of labor and capital inputs. It
accounted for over one-half of the growth of total output in the last
two decades, far more significant than increases in capital or
labor. 56
55. The rate of growth of these other factors, generally referred to as total
factor productivity or technical progress, is defined as that portion of growth of
total output not attributable to increases in labor and capital input. We use here a
simple method developed by Solow that measures technical progress as the
residual obtained by deducting the logarithmic aggregation of the rates of growth
in labor and capital from the rate of growth of total output. The weights used in
combining the labor and capital inputs represent the relative factor shares in total
output and are assumed to add up to one. This simple device is subject to a number
of criticisms. Conceptually, its weakness lies in the restrictive properties of the
underlying Cobb-Douglas production function. Implicitly, the approach assumes
neutral technical progress, technical progress being independent of increases in
factor inputs, and constant unitary elasticity of substitution between factors
(whatever the factor intensity). Statistically, as the residual, the measure not only
includes increases in total productivity but also contains the measurement errors
in the capital and labor series. Moreover, both capital and labor are highly
heterogeneous with respect to levels of skill and age. The meaning of the aggregate
series is thus imprecise. Because of these limitations, many attempts at refinement
have been made. (For a comprehensive survey of these studies, see M. Ishaq
Nadiri, "Some Approaches to the Theory and Measurement of Total Factor
Productivity: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, December 1970,
1137-1177; and C. Kennedy and A. P. Thirlwall, "Surveys in Applied Economics:
Technical Progress," Economic Journal, March 1972, 11-72.) However, these
various more sophisticated approaches are not without shortcomings. For example,
the more general constant elasticity of substitution production function (of which
the Cobb-Douglas is a special case) has specification errors that only production
functions with variable elasticity of substitution could avoid. (See the discussion in
George H. Hilderbrand and Ta-chung Liu, Manufacturing Production Functions in
the United States, 1957, Ithaca, New York: New York State School of Industrial
and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1965.) For our present purpose of a
limited inquiry, the simple Solow approach, though far from ideal, is adequate.
56. Although the weights used to combine labor and capital outputs are
arbitrarily assigned, estimates of productivity increase using alternative sets of
weights are not very sensitive to the choice of weights. The same findings are also
true of the estimates for the Philippines. See Jeffrey G. Williamson, "Dimensions of
Postwar Philippine Economic Progress," Quarterly Journal of Economics,
February 1969, p. 96.

Table 22. Sources of Growth of Real National Income, Selected Countries
(Percent per year)
Sources of growth

Country

Period

Growth of
national
product

Taiwan

191?2-73
1952-61
1961-73
1953-71
1953-61
1961-71
1947-65
1950-60
1952-57
1950-58
1958-67

8.61
6.86
9.94
8.77
8.13
9.29
5.75
4.48
6.00
6.40
5.30

Japan
Philippines
India
Communist China
Soviet Union

Labor
input

Capital
input

Increase in
productivity

1.79
1.04
2.36
1.85
1.91
1.78
2.24
1.86
1.05
1.08
1.02

2.37
1.12
3.34
2.10
1.62
2.57
1.01
1.55
1.95
3.60
3.60

4.45
4.70
4.24
4.82
4.60
4.94
2.GO
1.06
2.90
1.72
0.68

Sources: (1) Taiwan - GDP in 1971 prices, Statistical Yearbook 1975, pp. 194-195; employment, W.Y. Kuo, 1976, p.
494; capital stock data provided by Professor W.Y. Kuo. The weights are assumed to be 0.6 and 0.4 for labor and capital
inputs respectively. (2) Japan - Edward F. Denison and William K. Chung, "Economic Growth and Its Sources," in Hugh
Patrick and Henry Rosovsky (eds.), Asia's New Giant, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975, p. 94. (3) Communist
China - T.C. Liu, "The Tempo of Economic Development of the Chinese Mainland, 1949-65," An Economic Profile of
Mainland China, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967, pp. 62-63. (4) Philippines and India - M.
lshag Nadiri, "International Studies of Factor Inputs and Total Factor Productivity: A Brief Survey," Review of Income
and Wealth, June 1972, p. 136. (5) Soviet Union - Abram Bergson, "Towards a New Growth Model," Problems of
Communism, March-April, 1973, p. 3.
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Second, in both absolute and relative terms, productivity
increases in Taiwan during the 1950s was greater than in all the
other countries, including Japan. During this period, Taiwan's
growth of total output was only moderately higher than those of
the Philippines, Communist China, and the Soviet Union. Yet its
productivity increase was far greater than in those countries. In
the 1960s, the pace of productivity increase in Taiwan remained
high, far above that of the Soviet Union and only slightly below
that of Japan. Since productivity indicates how efficiently the
inputs are being used, its change is a useful measure of economic
performance. In this respect, Taiwan has out-performed the
Philippines, India, Communist China, and the Soviet Union, and
its record matches that of Japan.
Third, in Taiwan and, for that matter, in most other countries
for which estimates are available, productivity increases have
slowed down in the 1960s compared with those in the 1950s. 57
However, the growth of output in Taiwan accelerated, while those
in other countries slowed. The result was that the relative
importance of productivity increases in Taiwan's growth declined,
while that of capital input increased markedly. If the trend should
continue, it points again to the increasing importance of capital
formation in Taiwan's future growth.

Sources of Growth: Changes in Final Demand
Turning to the sources of growth on the demand side, we
summarize the contributions of various components of final
expenditures to GDP growth in Table 23. 58 For the period as a
whole, exports of goods and services were the most important;
government consumption and increase in stocks were the least
important. The picture, however, was very much different in the
1950s. During 1952-60, growth of private consumption and
government consumption accounted for over 80 percent of the
growth of GDP. But since then, the contribution of both
components declined, while those of gross fixed capital formation
and exports rose sharply. By the early 1970s exports constituted
over 80 percent of total growth.
57. See M. Ishaq Nadiri, "International Studies of Factor Inputs and Total
Factor Productivity: A Brief Survey," Review of Income and Wealth, June 1972, p.
147; and Williamson, op. cit., p. 96.
58. By definition, GDP is the sum of its components. Its rates of growth can
thus be expressed as the sum of the growth rates of the components each weighted
by its percentage share in GDP at the base period. The contribution of each item to
growth of total product is simply the share of its weighted rate of growth in the
growth of GDP.
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Table 23. Sources of Growth of GDP by
Final Expenditures, 1952-73

Average annual rate of growth (%)
Private consumption
Government consumption
Gross fixed capital formation
Increase in stocks
Exports
Less: imports
Gross domestic product
Percentage share of GDP growth (%)
Private consumption
Government consumption
Gross fixed capital formation
Increase in stocks
Exports
Less: Imports
Gross domestic product

1952-73

1952-60

196Q-70

197Q-73

7.7
4.7
13.7
4.1
17.6
13.2
8.6

6.2
6.0
10.6
5.9
9.0
6.1
6.9

8.2
4.2
15.7
13.6
21.3
16.8
9.1

9.6
2.6
15.2
-25.3
29.9
21.3
11.8

49.9
11.2
26.8
0.8
53.9
42.7
100.0

55.6
27.4
16.1
2.4
12.2
13.7
100.0

52.2
11.4
28.7
4.9
43.2
40.4
100.0

44.0
3.8
28.8
-5.8
87.9
58.7
100.0

Source: Statistical Yearbook 1975, pp. 194-195. Estimates are based on totals
in constant 1971 prices.

To identify exports as the fastest growing component of total
output is simply to describe what happened. The decomposition of
output growth does not tell us whether export expansion was the
cause or consequence of growth, and if the former, how export
expansion has generated growth. Has Taiwan's growth been
export-led? Export-led growth occurs when an export expansion
originating from an external source triggers domestic growth.
Cves has suggested a test of whether growth is export-led. If the
export expansion arises primarily from external demand, then
changes in the prices and quantity of exports should be positively
correlated; if it arises from shifts in domestic supply, the
correlation would be negative. 5 9 By this test, Taiwan's growth was
clearly export-led, since both the price index for exports and the
export volume moved upward during 1952-73. To be sure, one can
trace the origin of Taiwan's export expansion at some stage to
such exogenous factors as the liberalization of Japan's import
restrictions, the sharp increase in imports of the developed
countries, and the escalation of the Vietnam War in the 1960s.
And, the increase in exports undoubtedly had direct effects on
59. Richard E. Caves, "Export-Led Growth and the New Economic History,"
in J. N. Bhagwati (ed.), Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth, Amsterdam:
North Holland, 1971, 403-442.
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output growth. However, at most, such external factors could have
accounted for only part of the growth of exports. An equally, if not
more plausible, explanation of the relation of exports and
economic growth is that exports played a strategic role in
channeling the inflow of resources essential for domestic growth.
A glance at the ratio of imports to GDP shows that Taiwan's
reliance on imported goods has been increasing during the last
two decades. In 1974, Taiwan required almost three times as much
imported resources per unit of GDP as it did in 1952. These
imports contributed to economic growth in several ways. First,
close to one-half of total imports consists of raw materials and
fuels for which the possibility of domestic substitution in the short
run is rather limited. Fuel, oil, cotton, and wheat are examples.
Second, capital goods imports also accounted for a substantial
share of total imports, larger than that of consumer goods. We
noted earlier the importance of investment to Taiwan's economic
growth, and clearly investment depends heavily on imports. 60
Third, imports of capital goods have also been major carriers of
foreign technology. But growth of imports could not have been
achieved without a concomitant export growth, particularly after
U.S. economic aid was terminated in 1965.
60. For an interesting model of the relation between imports and growth along
these lines, see Tzong-shian Yu, "Taiwan's Foreign Trade and Economic Growth,"
in Cheng Sun (ed.), Studies in Taiwan's Foreign Trade, Taipei: Lieng-ching
Publishing Co., 1975, 85-131.
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Table 24. Relative Effects of Increased Home Demand, Export
Expansion and Import Substitution on Manufacturing
Output, 1953-70
(Percent)
Home
demand
Total manufacturing products
1953-70
1953-55
1955-60
1960-65
1965-70
Nondurable consumer goods
1953-70
1953-55
1955-60
1960-65
1965-70
Metals and machinery
1953-70
1953-55
1955-60
1960-65
1965-70
Intermediate goods
1953-70
1953-55
1955-60
1960-65
1965-70

Export
Import
expansion substitution

80.0
99.5
91.7
82.7
73.4

28.1
-8.6
16.5
17.3
34.9

-8.0
9.2
-8.3
0
-8.3

42.5
75.2
84.6
72.2
27.9

59.1
2.5
21.2
31.3
78.8

-1.6
22.4
-5.8
-3.3
-6.8

65.4
80.5
93.6
77.9
72.4

15.4
1.5
3.8
9.5
22.2

19.1
18.0
2.5
12.6
5.4

84.4
99.4
96.2
77.5
87.0

13.7
0.5
5.5
14.8
16.1

1.9
0.1
-1.6
7.7
-3.0

Source: Liang Kuo-shu, op. cit., p. 236.

Table 24 shows the relative effects of increased domestic
demand, export expansion and import substitution on manufacturing industries for 1953-70 and subperiods, estimated by
Liang. 61 (1) For manufacturing as a whole, the importance of
export expansion is clear. Except for the early 1950s when import
substitution was significant, exports accounted for an increasing
proportion of total output growth. (2) The most drastic shifts
occurred in the nondurable consumer goods. In the early 1950s,
the influence of domestic demand was dominant. Import substitution accounted for 22 percent of its output growth, and the effect of
export expansion was miniscule. By the late 1960s, export
61. Kuo-shu Liang, ''Taiwan's Exports and Employment," ibid., pp. 209-246.

64

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIEs SERIES

expansion became the most important source of growth, far more
important than domestic demand, not to mention a negative effect
of import substitution. (3) A similar but less drastic change has
also taken place in metals and machinery and intermediate goods.
In both cases, domestic demand remained significant, with export
expansion assuming an increasingly important role, particularly
for metals and machinery.

V. SUMMARY
The intent of this chapter is to describe what happened to the
Taiwan economy in the last two decades in terms of some broad
aggregates. The principal findings can be briefly summarized: (1)
The most significant feature is of course the high rate of growth of
total and per capita output since 1952. Few nations in the world,
both developed and developing, could match Taiwan's performance during this period. Fewer still had achieved such a high
rate of growth with relatively stable prices and little fluctuations
in output, and in the face of rapid population growth and a heavy
commitment to defense. Of the five main economies selected for
comparison, only Japan and South Korea experienced such high
growth rates. The Philippines, Communist China, and India
belong to a different group with distinctly lower growth rates.
(2) As is characteristic of all countries going through rapid
industrialization, Taiwan's industrial and employment structure
shifted in favor of manufacturing, while the share of agriculture
in GDP declined. The unique feature in Taiwan's experience is
that the transformation occurred in a fairly short span of time.
Furthermore, the agricultural sector actually expanded quite
rapidly as the economic structure changed. This was in marked
contrast to the experience of such economies as that of Communist China.
(3) From yet another standpoint, Taiwan's economic change
was also unique. Like most other developed countries, Taiwan
shifted from a high-consumption to a high-investment economy.
But unlike most others, its development process went through,
first, an import substitution stage, which was then replaced by a
dramatically different export-oriented phase.
(4) As per capita income rose, both the level and the structure
of per capita consumption changed. Per capita consumption more
than doubled in two decades. Proportions of consumption
expenditures on high-income elasticity items (education, recrea-
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tion, household equipment) increased markedly. Other indications
of social development, such as life expectancy, enrollment rate in
schools, and television sets per capita, also suggest rapid
improvements in this standard of living to a level considerably
more advanced than other developing Asian economies.
(5) Rapid growth was the result of growth in employment and
even faster growth in output per worker. The latter is probably
related to the sharp rise in the capital formation proportions. U.S.
aid was particularly important in financing capital formation up
to the early 1960s. But domestic savings and to a lesser extent
foreign private capital became the important sources of capital
formation after 1965. The incremental output-capital ratio has
been fairly high, considerably above those of other countries. But
it declined somewhat in the last decade, presumably because of
structural changes within the industrial sector favoring industries
that required larger doses of capital per unit of output. The change
suggest that, if the trend continues, demand for capital will
intensify in the future growth of the Taiwan economy.
(6) A breakdown of the sources of growth of GDP by the
simple Solow method indicated that increases in total factor
productivity were far more important than either the growth of
labor input or capital input. The overall pattern is similar to that
of Japan but very much different from those of the Philippines,
India, or the Soviet Union where increases in labor or capital
input were the important sources of growth. It will be recalled that
the growth rates of Taiwan and Japan are substantially higher
than the rates of these other countries. The disparities in the
growth rates might well be related to the difference in the relative
weights of the various sources of growth.
(7) An examination of the increase in GDP by final
expenditures indicates that increments in exports by far accounted for the largest share. Exports have become important
only since the 1960s, reflecting the dramatic shift of an import
substitution policy in the 1950s to an export promotion policy
since the late 1950s. In an important sense, the economic
achievements of Taiwan were largely due to the successful
promulgation of an outward-looking policy.
Our brief overview necessarily overlooks many interesting
aspects of Taiwan's development experience. In particular, we
have not discussed the role of the government and the major
economic policies in various stages of development. It will suffice
to point out that U.S. aid, land reform and technological change
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in the agricultural sector, and an inward-looking development
strategy emphasizing import-substitution were the major landmarks in this first phase of the development (1952-59). Since the
1960s, export expansion has provided the momentum for rapid
economic growth. Subsequently, the inflow of private foreign
capital and technology became the crucial growth-generating
elements, reinforcing the outward-looking development program.
Some of these issues will be taken up in the following chapters.

Chapter II

INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE PROCESS OF
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN TAIWAN
YuAN-LI Wu

I. INTRODUCTION

Economic Benefits - Distribution and Growth
Analysis of economic development in quantitative aggregates
would be woefully incomplete if one were to ignore the distribution
of benefits of development. If we compare the GNP, a frequently
used quantitative measure of economic welfare, to a pie, successful
economic development will make the pie larger, as has been amply
demonstrated in the case of Taiwan. However, since a growing
"pie" is not produced merely as an object of wonderment, to be
admired in the abstract but not to be touched by anyone, how the
pie is sliced and how and when the slices are made available to
individual members of the society are an inalienable part of
economic development. Success or failure of the development
process must, therefore, be judged from the points of view of both
production and distribution.
Some students of economic development have even gone so far
as to suggest that a single index of economic development might
be constructed that would automatically take into account both
aspects 1 so that when the index is employed in choosing from
among economic policies and assessing their results, the best
policies chosen will automatically take both goals into account.
For instance, one might divide the population into five (or any
other number of) income classes in descending order of income
size, each class to consist of one-fifth (or quintile) of the total
population. One might then choose to consider a 1% increase in
income of the lowest fifth of the population to be equivalent to a
multiple of a 1% increase in the income of the highest one-fifth,
and so forth for the other income intervals. If such a weighting
system is adopted in calculating the result, a policy to achieve
1. See Montek S. Ahluwalia and Hollis Chenecy, "The Econom-ic Framework," Chapter II in Hollis Chenery, Montek S. Ahluwalia, C.L.G. Bell, John H.
Duloy and Richard Jolly, Redistribution with Growth (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1974). A. K. Sen has actually developed such a measure. See his "Real
National Income," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 43, No. 1 (February 1976): 1939.
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high economic growth would automatically tend to favor an
accelerated increase in the income of the poorest one-fifth of the
population. Conversely, a policy favoring the poorest segment of
the population in income distribution would tend to yield a higher
calculated rate of growth even if the absolute increase in output
were constant.
The choice of weights in constructing such a comprehensive
index of development (i.e., including objectives in both production
and distribution) must in the final analysis rest on value
judgments, and a decision on this basis can be reached only as a
part of the society's political process, with the term "political"
being construed in a very broad sense, including both ideological
considerations and practical (i.e., institutional and other) constraints. However, before we proceed further, let us remind
ourselves of some of the relationships between production and
distribution in general, as well as the object of distribution.
First, the nature of the economic development strategy
followed will inevitably affect the pattern of income distribution,
which is a major component of the distribution of benefits in
general. For instance, an industry-first policy will initially and
directly create more income for those in industry - owners as well
as workers - and for those in both industry and non-industry
who sell to the industrial sector. Alternatively, an agriculture-first
strategy would have the corresponding primary effect on those
engaged in agriculture and in industries supplying agriculture.
Moreover, whether the development strategy aims at achieving
self-sufficiency or is export-orientated is another major channel of
causal relationship that directionally runs from production to
distribution. Still another element in development strategy which
has causal relationship running from production to distribution is
the choice between labor-intensive and capital-intensive methods
of production.
Second, a major determinant of the rate of expansion of
production is capital formation. Since private capital formation in
a market economy, even when there is an inflow of foreign capital,
is largely determined by the availability of domestic private
savings, the distribution of income, which could affect savings,
can influence the rate of increase of aggregate production,
although, according to some students, the propensity of thrift may
not vary as much between the rich and the poor in Taiwan as one
might be inclined to believe a priori. Furthermore, the pattern of
income distribution will also affect the composition of market
demand for goods, and, therefore, the demand for inputs and the
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rate at which production in the aggregate can expand. Here the
causal relationship is directionally reversed; the linkage is from
distribution to production.
A third linkage between production and distribution has to do
with the effect of the distributive pattern of economic benefits on
the institutional framework and socio-political environment
within which production takes place. If this environment is hostile
to the orderly planning and execution of economic activities,
production will not expand rapidly or steadily. Since no economic
system can realistically expect the benefits (and cost) of production to be shared absolutely equally by every member of the
society, whether the distributive pattern will lead to the emergence
of groups whose interests are mutually antagonistic becomes a
critical issue to social and political stability. For example, a
particular development strategy might consistently favor urban
dwellers and discriminate against rural residents so that ruralurban antagonism will in due course arise as an outcome of
opposition of economic interests. Antagonism may also stem from
conflicting economic interests between farmers and non-farmers,
between new immigrants and earlier settlers (e.g., the Chinese in
Malaysia versus the Malays under the Bumiputra program),
between those who were initially rich and those who were initially
poor, and so forth. If the economic development strategy followed
tends to create such antagonistic groups, the latter would work
against the emergence of political consensus which is needed for
an effective economic policy, including measures to modify the
distributive pattern that would otherwise prevail. Effective
implementation of the income tax, subsidies, and other forms of
income transfer, is more likely if a reasonable degree of consensus
can be developed. The same issue can also be formulated in terms
of the effect of a particular distributive pattern on socio-political
homogeneity.
Economic interest groups that could become mutually antagonistic may overlap. For example, there could be one conflict of
economic interests between farmers and non-farmers and another
between two linguistic or ethnic groups, yet each of the latter may
include both farmers and non-farmers. In the Taiwan context, in
addition to the usual farmer-non-farmer division, we must also
look into the relative positions of the post-1945 settlers (commonly
described as "mainlanders") and the pre-1945 settlers (commonly
described as "Taiwanese"), who, or whose forebears, came to
Taiwan in €arlier times.
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Economic Benefits and Non-economic Values
The preceding remarks have focused attention on the
interrelationships between economic growth and the distribution
of economic benefits. However, man does not live by bread alone.
A longer life in good health, better education, more congenial
working conditions, stable employment, and, last but not least, a
greater measure of personal freedom are easily among the
desiderata that many would wish to attain. Since economic
development is only one aspect of development, and since with
economic development many other variables will also change, two
questions immediately arise. First, what other variables might
usefully serve as indicators of socio-political-economic development other than the sheer volume of output? 2 Discussion of the
importance of distribution in addition to production can be viewed
as a variant of this question, the scope of which can be expanded
to cover non-economic values. Second, what are the interrelationships among these different variables? In particular, how might
the pattern of distribution of economic benefits affect that of noneconomic values and vice-versa?
Clearly, the development of Taiwan can and should be
analyzed also from this broader perspective. [This is discussed in
a later chapter of the book from which this chapter is excerpted ed.] Nevertheless we might note in this connection that, a priori,
one can envisage the interrelationships between the distributive
patterns of two such variables both as supportive of each other
and as substitutes. Thus, as time passes, a more equitable
distribution of educational opportunities is likely to lead to greater
equality of economic opportunities and, therefore, of income.
Conversely, a more equitable income distribution is likely to lead
to a more equitable distribution of education. 3 In a more static
2. See, for instance, Adelman and Morris, Society, Politics and Economic
Development: A Quantitative Approach (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1967), and D. V. McGranahan, C. Richard·Proust, N. V. Sovani and M.
Subramanian, Contents and Measurement of Socioeconomic Development (New
York: Praeger, 1972). For a discussion on Taiwan in this respect, see Charles H. C.
Kao, "Development Indicators and their Implications for Taiwan's Economic
Development," Industry of Free China, Taipei: Economic Planning Council, Vol.
XXXXI, No. 5 (May 1974).
3. These propositions are predicated on the assumption that the initial level
of educational opportunities is sufficiently high so that their greater availability
would benefit the recipients. Similarly, in the second case, the initial level of
income must be sufficiently high if a more equal distribution is to be beneficial. A
more equal distribution of very little income (or of educational opportunities) would
hardly increase the potential availability of more educational opportunities (or of
income).
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sense, it is quite plausible that at a given time those who are at
the lower end of income distribution could regard greater
educational opportunities, such as special scholarships, as
partially making up the disadvantage they suffer in income
distribution. The initial disadvantage could be viewed as temporary, and more future advantage may be traded for less present
advantage.
Of all the non-economic values to which people aspire,
perhaps the most fundamental is the sharing of political decisionmaking power which can result in a more equitable "allocation" of
all other "values." Consider now the relationship between the
distributive patterns of income - representing all economic
benefits - and of political power- representing all non-economic
values. On the one hand, those who do not enjoy an equal share of
political power may regard a more than equal share of income as
an adequate compensation, at least in the short run, and vice
versa. On the other hand, as equity in the distribution of political
power increases, it is likely to be used to increase equity in income
distribution. 4 By the same token, as income distribution becomes
4.

Increasing
political
equality

1

Increasing
income equality
In the above diagram Point A represents total inequality in both income
distribution and the distribution of political power. Point D, on the other hand,
denotes complete equality in both respects. Point C represents complete political
equality together with complete economic inequality in distribution. At the other
end, Point B represents complete economic equality with complete political
inequality. The proposition advanced in the text is that both B and C are
essentially unstable situations. As political equality increases, for instance,
through the evolution of democratic institutions, it is likely that the more equally
distributed political power will be used to promote economic equality. This
essentially is in accord with the thesis advanced by Simon Kuznets in his 1955
paper on the tendency toward greater income equality during the later stages of
economic development following the establishment of political democracy. See also
Simons Kuznets, "Demographic Components in Size-distribution of Income"
(Papers and Proceedings of the Seminar sponsored by the Japan Economic
Research Center and The Council for Asian Manpower Studies, December 16-20,
Vol. II, July 1975). On the other hand, Point B is also unstable because the
population that shares economic benefit and power equally among its members
will probably be unwilling to support the smaller group holding political power in a
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more equal, barring the existence of a totally authoritarian
government, 5 it will become increasingly improbable for inequity
in the distribution of political power to prevail inasmuch as such
an inequity will become progressively harder and more costly to
support. [These issues are also discussed fully in the next chapter
- ed.]
Finally, the distribution of the benefits of economic development is, of course, only one side of distribution. The obverse is the
distribution of development costs, which one might regard as
negative benefits. Unfortunately, it is not possible to net the
benefits or costs of economic development for individual members
or groups of the society. Rather the two aspects must be
considered separately. Since consideration of the distribution of
the costs of development would require a detailed examination of
the sources of private savings and of the financing of government
capital formation, which would take us far afield, we will confine
our discussion in this paper to an account of income distribution
and how changes in the pattern have come about.
II. INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN TAIWAN

Distribution by Income Class - A Preliminary International
Comparison with Developed and Less Developed Countries
According to an IBRD study on income distribution in less
developed countries 6 (LDCs), the typical pattern to be found in an
LDC is as shown in Table 1.
highly concentrated form. Such a situation would seem to require the use of force
by those holding political power in order to maintain their own authority.
Our hypothesis suggests that the two kinds of equality can to some degree be
traded in order to maintain the same level of satisfaction for individual segments
of the population. This is illustrated by the "indifference curves" shown in the
diagram. At the same time, it is also our hypothesis that increase in either income
(or political) equality is likely to facilitate further increases in political (or income)
equality. The movement in the direction from A to D, as denoted by the arrow in
the diagram, tends to become progressively easier, at least for a part of the way.
This part of Kuznets' hypothesis may be true even if his argument that economic
development in its early stages leads to greater inequality may not hold. The point
raised by Oshima in "Income Inequality and Economic Growth, the Postwar
Experience of Asian Countries," in The Malayan Economic Review, Vol. XV, No.2
October 1970), is further substantiated in our discussion in the text.
5. One may note in this connection Mao Tse-Tung's concern about the
periodic recurrence of "revisionist tendencies" in mainland China which would
give rise to greater income inequality especially as the lower incomes remain at an
extremely low level absolutely.
·
6. Chenery et al., op. cit., pp. XVI and 40.
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Table 1. Income Distribution in LDCs
Percent of total Households
Arranged in Descending
Order of Income
Highest 20%

Percent of Total Income
53

2nd 20%
3rd 20%
4th 20%
Lowest 20'P'o

22
13
7
5
Total

100

Sixty-six developed and underdeveloped countries that had
data on income distribution were examined by the author and
classified into three groups: (1) "high inequality" (income share of
the lowest, i.e., poorest, 40% of all households being less than 12%);
(2) "moderate inequality" (income share of the lowest 40%,
between 12 and 17%); (3) "low inequality" 7 (income share of the
lowest 40%, 17% and above). Each of the three groups was further
divided into three subsets according to the level of per capita
income. See Table 2.
Of the 66 countries included in the IBRD study, ten are in
East, Southeast and South Asia. 8 In terms of GNP per capita,
Japan is the most developed of these ten while Sri. Lanka, India,
Pakistan and Burma, all in South Asia, with Burma also
straddling Southeast Asia, are the poorest. The remaining five,
including Taiwan, Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines fall within a relatively narrow range and are all in East or
Southeast Asia. For comparison, the respective income distribution patterns of these Asian countries, as given by Chenery et al.,
can be seen in Table 3.
As far as Taiwan is concerned, especially noteworthy are (1)
the virtually identical pattern of its income distribution with that
of Japan, (2) the close approximation of the Taiwan and Japanese
patterns to that of the United States, and (3) the slightly larger
share of the lowest 40% on the income ladder in the Taiwan and
Japanese distributions as compared with the other Asian
countries of low inequality, or, for that matter, as compared with
the United States.
7. Montek Ahluwalia, "Income Inequality: Some Dimensions of the
Problem," Chapter I •. in Chenery et a!., op. cit., pp. 8-9.
8. Iran, Iraq and Turkey are regarded as Middle Eastern countries and are,
therefore, not listed here.
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Table 2. Number and Percent Distribution of
Selected Countries in Terms of
Income Distribution
Total

High Inequality

Moderate Inequality

Low Inequality

(1) 26 Countries with per capita GNP up
to US $300 a year
Number 26
Percent 100.0

10
38.4

8
30.8

8
30.8

(2) 21 Countries with per capita GNP of
US $300-750 a year
Number 21
Percent 100.0

10
47.6

6
28.6

5
23.8

(3) 19 Countries with per capita GNP
above US $750
Number 19
Percent 100.0

3
15.8

8
42.1

8
42.1

22
33.3

21
31.8

(4) All 66 Countries
Number 66
Percent 100.0

23
34.8

Source: Chenery et a!., Redistribution with Growth (Oxford: Oxford Univer·
sity Press, 1974), pp. 8·9.

The fact that income distribution has become increasingly
equitable over a lengthy period of rapid growth in GNP per capita
has made the Republic of China on Taiwan one of the few
developing countries whose growth is "distributionally biased" in
favor of persons with low incomes. A comparison with three other
Asian countries can be seen in the estimates of Chenery et al.,
given in Table 4.

The Trend of Increasing Equality in Income
Distribution by Household
The cross-section comparison presented in Table 2 shows the
Taiwan economy as one of low income inequality on the basis of
1964 data. A closer examination can be made by looking at the
same statistics in several benchmark years both before and after
1964. These figures show a progressive decline of inequality
during a 20-year span in terms of several alternative measures
(Table 5).
Several phenomena are most interesting from the point of
view of economic policy, and politically most significant from the
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Table 3. Patterns of Income Distribution in
Selected Asian Countries
Relative Shares of Income
by Income Class
Year
of
Data

GNP per
Capita
(US$)

Lowest 40% Middle 40% Top20o/n
of All
of All
of All
Households Households Households

High Inequality
The Philippines
Malaysia

1971
1970

239
330

11.6
11.6

34.6
32.4

53.8
56.0

Moderate Inequality
Burma
India

1958
1964

82
99

16.5
16.0

38.7
32.0

44.8
52.0

Low Inequality
Sri Lanka
Pakistan
Thailand
ROK (South Korea)
ROC (Taiwan)
Japan

1969
1964
1970
1970
1964
1963

95
100
180
235
241
950

17.0
17.5
17.0
18.0
20.4
20.7

37.0
37.5
37.5
37.0
39.5
39.3

46.0
45.0
45.5
45.0
40.1
40.0

Source: Chenery et al., op. cit., pp. 8-9.
According to Chenery et al., "The income shares of each percentile group were
read off a free-hand Lorenz curve fitted to observed points in the cumulative
distribution. The distributions are for pretax income. Per capita GNP figures are
taken from the World Bank data files and refer to GNP at factor cost for the year
indicated in constant 1971 U.S. dollars."
For the benefit of American readers, the corresponding figures for the United
States, also a country of low income inequality, are:
1970

4,850

19.7

41.5

38.8

perspectives both of the Republic of China and of other countries.
One is the combination of a progressive movement toward greater
equality by income class with a sharp increase in GNP and in
average household income over the same period. At constant 1972
prices, per capita GNP in Taiwan rose from NT$10,875 in 1964 to
NT$19,122 in 1972, while average household income rose from
NT$32,452 in 1964 to NT$61,032 in 1972. 9 This means that the
9. At constant 1972 prices the real household income of the lowest decile rose
by 109.2% from NT$9,854 in 1964 to NT$20,618 in 1972. In contrast, the
improvement for" the top decile was 52.5% during the same period, from NT$84,454
in 1964 to NT$128,760 in 1972. These data, not including the Taipei municipality
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Table 4. Comparative Income Growth Rates
Annual Rates of Income
Growth in Percent by
Class of Income
Recipients

Korea
The Philippines
India
Taiwan

Period

Upper
20%

Middle
40%

1964-70
1961-71
1954-64
1953-61

10.6
4.9
5.1
4.5

7.8
6.4
3.9
9.1

Annual Increase in
Welfare for the
Country as a Whole

Lowest GNP
Equal Poverty
40%
Weights Weights Weights
9.3
5.0
3.9
12.1

9.3
5.4
4.5
6.8

9.0
5.5
4.1
9.4

9.0
5.4
4.0
10.4

Source: Chenery et a!., op. cit., Chapter 2, p. 42.
"Equal Weights" implies a weight of 0.2 for the upper 20% of the income
recipients, and 0.4 and, again, 0.4 for the middle and lowest 40% respectively.
"Poverty Weights" are 0.1 for the highest 20%, 0.3 for the middle 40%, and 0.6 for
the lowest 40%.
Although the "poverty weights" are clearly arbitrary and could just as well be
replaced by other weights, the effect of their use in the case of Taiwan is especially
illuminating.

groups at the lower end of the income ladder enjoyed an
accelerated rate of absolute and relative improvement, which is
what some development economists have advocated as most
desirable. 10 The narrowing of the income gap between the rich and
the poor in the course of economic growth through the faster
improvement of those in lower income intervals is bound to affect
mutual perceptions of one another by people of different incomes,
making the establishment of consensus for major policies easier.
Given the wide distribution of television sets in Taiwan and the
great visual impact of differences in living standards and life
styles due to income differences, this is an important stabilizing
and unifying influence not to be lightly ignored.
A second interesting phenomenon is the continuation of the
trend toward greater equality over the entire 20 year period. The
first decade of economic development was accompanied by a
sharp decrease in income inequality: 18% between 1953 and 1961
for 1972, would yield a ratio between the top and bottom deciles of 6.2. If Taipei is
included, as in Table 2, the ratio becomes 6.8, reflecting the greater concentration
of higher income households in the capital city.
I 0. See Chenery et al.; op. cit.

INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE ROC

77

Table 5. Changes in Income Distribution in Taiwan
Distribution in Quintiles

1953

1961

1964

1972

3.0
8.3
9.1
18.2
61.4
28.8
32.6

4.5
9.7
14.0
19.8
52.0
26.4
25.6

7.7
12.6
16.6
22.1
41.0
24.8
16.2

8.6
13.1
17.0
22.2
39.1
24.8
14.3

0.56

0.46

0.33

0.30

Top 10% to bottom 10%
Top 20'1'o to bottom 20%

30.4
20.5

19.3
11.6

8.6
5.3

6.8
4.6

Index of Decile Inequality

0.46

0.37

0.26

0.24

Lowest quintile of all households
Second quintile
Middle quintile
Fourth quintile
Highest quintile
Second highest 15%
Top 5%
Gini Coefficient
Ratio of Income Share

Source: Wan-yong Kuo, "Income Distribution by Size in Taiwan Area Changes and Causes" (Paper presented to the Joint JERC-CAME Seminar on
Income Distribution, Employment and Economic Development in Southeast and
East Asia, Tokyo, December 16-20, 1974), Table 5. The original 1953 figures are
taken from Kuo-wei Chang, "An Estimate of Taiwan's Personal Income Distribution in 1953 - Pareto's Formula Discussed and Applied" (in Chinese), Journal of
Social Science, Taipei, Vol. 7 (August 1956): 260. The 1961 estimates are from Kuowei Chang's report on a Pilot Study of Personal Income and Consumption in
Taiwan (mimeographed in English), prepared under the auspices 6f a National
Income Statistics Working Group of the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting
& Statistics (DGBAS), of the Executive Yuan, Table A, p. 23. The 1964 estimates are
those of DGBAS as presented in its report on Survey of Family Income &
Expenditure & Study of Personal Income Distribution in Taiwan (in Chinese). The
1972 estimates are also based on DGBAS data, adjusted by Wan-yong Kuo with
income tax receipts data and through the incorporation of data for the Taipei
special municipality which is no longer included in the original provincial figures
following the elevation of its administrative status in 1968. (Provincial Statistics in
1968 still include Taipei.) The 1964 data in this table give us 20.3% for the lowest
40%, 38.7% for the middle 40%, and 41% for the top 20%, which are very close to the
estimates for Taiwan in Table 1.

in terms of the Gini income concentration ratio.U This was
followed by a further decrease in terms of the same index of 28.3%
m 1961-64 and of another 9.1% in 1964-72. How did these
11. The Gini index can vary from 0 (total absolute equality) to 1 (total
inequality). The Gini index for family income in the United States was .37
according to the 1960 census and .36 in the 1970 census. That of Japan was .35
(1960). U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960 and 1970 Census of Population, Part I, U.S.
Summary, and Annual Report of the Family Income and Expenditure Survey,
Japan, 1963.
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progressive and continued improvements in distribution come
about simultaneously with rapid increases in total output and
several significant shifts of Taiwan's development strategy
during the two decades?

Income Differentials between Farmers and Non-Farmers
and Sectoral Distribution Patterns
If changes in income distribution in Taiwan have resulted in
greater equality in terms of various measures based on income
classes cutting across different economic sectors, what changes in
income differences have occurred both between and in individual
sectors? An answer to this question will go a part of the way in
answering the question raised at the end of the last section. As
mentioned in the Introduction, growing differences in this respect
could also create antagonisms detrimental to economic and
political stability and the national consensus in policy making.
Let us attempt to answer this question with respect to farm
and non-farm families 12 about which considerable statistical
information is available. Using the DGBAS data for 1970-72
adjusted to include the city of Taipei, Kuo Wan-yong shows that
while income equality increased in the entire economy during
1964-72, the degree of equality increased more- that is, the Gini
coefficient decreased more- for non-farm families than for farm
families (Table 6). In 1972, the Gini coefficient showed a greater
degree of equality for the former than for the latter although their
relative standings had been the reverse in 1964. The "cross-over"
occurred between 1970 and 1971. Given these patterns of
distribution within the two sectors, respectively, it is not
surprising that the rapid expansion of the industrial sector in the
late 1960s and early 1970s contributed to greater overall equality
:rather than inequality.
Contrary to the preceding favorable distributive effect of rapid
industrial growth, to be explained below, an unfavorable development during 1964-72 was the widening discrepancy between farm
and non-farm incomes although both were rising. Average income
per farm family rose by 53.3% between 1964 and 1972, from
NT$32,013 to NT$49,090, at constant 1972 prices. On the other
hand, average non-farm family income rose by 97%, from
NT$32,740, virtually at par with farm family income, in 1964 to
12. The classification is based on the occupation of the family head. Family
income from all sources is included. Thus, the income of a farm family may include
income from both agricultural and non-agricultural pursuits of all family members.
The same is true of the income of a non-farm family.
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Table 6. Gini Coefficients of Income Concentration by Sector
Year

Farm

Non-farm

Both Sectors

1964

0.315

0.336

0.328

1968

0.292

0.338

0.3:35

1970

0.283

0.285

0.299

1971

0.297

0.292

0.301

1972

0.291

0.288

0.295

Source: Kuo Wan-yong, "Income Distribution by Size in Taiwan Area Changes and Causes" (1974). (Papers and Proceedings of the Seminar sponsored
by the Japan Economic Research Center and The Council for Asian Manpower
Studies, December 16-20, Vol. II, July 1975), Table 7.

NT$64,497 in 1972, 31.5% higher than the corresponding farm
figure. 13 This factor is probably among the most serious potential
threats to income equality if it is allowed to continue unchecked.

Economic Policy and Income Equality
The changes in overall and sectoral income distribution in
Taiwan can be explained in terms of (1) sectoral emphasis and
shifts in development strategy over time, (2) the open economy
and foreign trade orientation of the island, (3) the initial state of
asset distribution and subsequent changes effected by government
intervention, and (4) other governmental measures that have
improved access to education and technology and redirected
investment in favor of certain groups and sectors that might
otherwise have been at a disadvantage in comparison with the
rest of the society.
The 1950s and Early 1960s
Two basic facts should be borne in mind. First, since the ratio
of labor to capital in agricultural production, given Taiwan's
small-farm, labor-intensive economy, was a priori greater in
13. Kuo, op. cit., 1974, Table 13. This increasing sectoral discrepancy also
accounted for the facf that the overall Gini index in 1970-72 (Table 4) is higher
than both sectoral coefficients. See Kuo, op. cit., for a technical discussion of what
she calls the "within," "between," and "share" effects.
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agriculture than in the non-agricultural sector during the 1950s, a
larger share of factor income should go to labor in the agricultural
sector than in the non-agricultural sector as production in both
sectors increased. (The reverse may be true in the case of the
labor-land ratio other than, urban housing construction.) How the
relative shares of labor to capital (or labor to land) in factor
income might change in the aggregate ~ould depend upon the
relative rates of growth of the two economic sectors during a given
period. Second, as shown in Table 7 the contribution of agriculture
to net domestic product per capita grew at about the same rate
during 1952-60 as did the non-agricultural sector. Thus, if other
things had been equal, the expansion of agricultural and nonagricultural production at a virtually equal pace during 1952-60
should not alter the proportion between factor income earned by
labor and factor income that went to owners of property, i.e., both
land and capital. The benefit of increased production would then
be shared by labor and property owners in the same proportion as
their respective income shares were at the beginning of the period.
Table 7. Contribution of Agriculture to Net
Domestic Product per Capita

Total population (in thousand persons)
Agriculture
Non-agriculture

1952

1960

1972

8,128
4,257
3,871

10,792
5,373
5,419

15,289
5,947
9,342

5,233
9,424

16,528
34,305

38,121
190,217

1,229.3
2,434.5

3,076.1
6,330.5

6,410.1
20,361.5

1.98:1

2.06:1

3.18:1

Net Domestic Product (NT$ million)
Agriculture
Non-agriculture
Per Capita Value-added (NT$)
Agriculture
Non-agriculture
Ratio of Non-agriculture:
Agriculture
Source:
27, 49.

Taiwan Data Book (Taipei: Economic Planning Council, 1974),pp. 4,

However, other things did not remain equal during this
period. One of the most important economic events in the early
1950s, if not the most important single event, was the implementation of land reform in Taiwan in 1953 (one of the benchmark years
previously selected), preceded during 1949-52 by sale of public land
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and reduction of land rent paid by tenant farmers. The rent
reduction had the effect of reducing the rate of return to property
in the agricultural sector, thereby increasing the relative share of
labor in a period of rising agricultural output and income (Table
8).
Table 8.

Distribution of Agriculture Income
by Factor (in percent)
Land

Capital

Labor

1941

52.20

11.48

36.32

1942

51.99

11.44

36.57

1943

45.65

10.04

44.31

1953

37.39

8.23

54.38

1956

36.28

7.98

55.74

Before Land Reform
(Under Japanese Rule)

Post Land Reform

Source: S. C. Hsieh and T. H. Lee, "Nung-yeh Fa-chan ti Tsung-ho Lun-shu"
(A Comprehensive Study of Agricultural Development). JCRR Special Report No.
28, July 1959 reprinted in T. H. Yu, ed., Taiwan Nung-yeh Fa-chan Lun-wen-chi
(Essays on Taiwan's Agricultural Development) (Taipei: Lien-ching Publications
Co., 1975), p. 37, Table 13.

Under Land Reform, the conversion of many tenants into
owner farmers and wider dispersion of land ownership, with
limitation on the size of individual holdings, had the effect of
further spreading property income among a larger number of farm
families. The net effect of rent reduction and land reform together,
therefore, was to increase sharply the degree of equality in income
distribution in the agricultural sector.
It goes without saying that these beneficial effects of asset
redistribution through land reform could have been at least
partially nullified had agricultural production declined. The
actual increase in production after land reform enabled the
recipients of property income in the agricultural sector also to
enjoy rising income from property ownership. One must therefore
also examine why agricultural output actually increased after
land reform, a point to be discussed elsewhere.
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The overall equalizing effect of greater income equality in the
agricultural sector during 1952-60 was not offset by developments
in the non-agricultural sector where income distribution was more
unequal. Several factors contributed to this outcome. First, the
discrepancy between agricultural and non-agricultural per capita
income which developed later did not widen significantly during
this period. Second, the expansion of production in the nonagricultural sector during this period was probably brought about
by an increase mostly in relatively small businesses, many of
which were established by new immigrant entrepreneurs from the
China mainland. Even in the beginning of the 1970s small firms
employing less than 100 persons each were still responsible for
35% of gross production in manufacturing. 14 Private capital
ownership was not highly concentrated. A number of large
industrial enterprises previously owned by the Japanese had been
taken over by the ROC government and were run as public
enterprises so that income which would have accrued to property
owners of these enterprises went to the Treasury. Third, outside
the economic infrastructure which was expanded by the government and government enterprises, industrial production in
Taiwan during this early phase of the island's postwar economic
development stressed consumer goods production using products
from the agricultural sector as inputs. Thus expansion in the nonagricultural sector had the effect of stimulating production in the
agricultural sector where income distribution was more equal. At
the same time, production in the industrial sector was not capital
intensive; the initial asset distribution did not seem to be highly
14. See Gustav Ranis' essay on Taiwan in Chenery et al., op. cit., 1974.
According to the criteria employed by the ROC government, any firm that is
engaged in manufacturing, processing or handicraft production is officially
designated as a small or medium·sized enterprise (a) if its registered capital and
total assets are below NT$5 million and NT$20 million respectively, or (b) if its
registered capital is below NT$5 million and its employment is below 100-300
persons, the exact cut off being dependent upon the nature of the industry. For
firms engaged in trade, service and transportation the maxima are 50 persons in
employment and NT$5 million in annual sales. Of all these firms, those employing
fewer than one hundred persons are generally regarded as "small businesses."
According to the 1971 Industrial and Commercial Consensus, the small firms
numbered 276,095 or 98.97% of all the reporting firms. Within the manufacturing
sector, they numbered 40,737 or 95.43% of the total. These small manufacturers
were responsible for 35% of gross production, 35.6% of employment, 34% of valueadded, and 45% of export sales, as compared with the entire manufacturing sector.
See C. C. Chao, "Small Business Development" (paper prepared for the US-ROC
Symposium for Small Business Development and Trade Promotion, San Francisco,
March 25-26, 1976).
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concentrated; the small-scale enterprises tended to spread the
benefit of increased production more widely among owners of
industrial property. Also, the most important industrial inputs
used by the agricultural sector at that time, viz., chemical
fertilizers and pesticides, were mostly imported. Their purchase
did not constitute a source of demand for the domestic industrial
sector. Finally, greater industrial employment and the relative
ease of business formation by enterprising persons of low income
were obviously helpful in raising the earnings of the lower-income
groups in the non-agricultural sector.
To sum up, (1) the ROC government's initial emphasis on
agricultural production, (2) asset redistribution through land
reform, (3) the consumer goods and small business emphasis in
the industrial sector, and (4) certain characteristics of asset
distribution of the postwar and post-1949 period were responsible
for the improvement in income distribution in Taiwan during the
1950s and the beginning of the 1960s.

From the 1960s to the early 1970s
Although further improvement in income equality slowed
down during the 1960s and early 1970s, a remarkable phenomenon was that the movement toward greater equality continued in
both the farm and non-farm sectors. This occurred in spite of a
widening gap between farm and non-farm family incomes due to
the failure of agricultural production to keep pace with the
accelerated expansion of industrial production. Several factors are
involved in explaining what happened to income distribution in
the second decade.
First, the crux of the development strategy adopted during
this period was the expansion of foreign trade. In the light of the
preceding expansion of the agricultural sector, export expansion
began very naturally with increased export of agricultural and
processed agricultural products. This was helpful in sustaining
agricultural income.
Second, because of the paucity of its natural resources,
Taiwan's foreign trade orientation involved an expansion of both
exports and imports. By eschewing self-sufficiency as an objective, the rapidly expanding exports were based on progressively
increasing imports which included many capital-intensive products. Any attempt to achieve self-sufficiency by stressing import
substitution at this point would doubtless have reduced the rate of
expansion considerably. The export orientation of Taiwan's
economic development not only increased the rate of economic
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growth, but also reduced the rate at which capital's share of factor
income was to increase.
Third, much of the export expansion during this period took
place in the form of labor-intensive products. Imported raw
materials and intermediate goods were processed into finished
goods for export through the concentrated application of labor
which was much cheaper in Taiwan than in the countries where
Taiwan exports were marketed. The several Export Processing
Zones established to attract foreign capital were especially
illustrative of this practice. The effect on income distribution was
twofold. Within the industrial sector, the very rapid expansion of
labor-intensive exports in the late 1960s and early 1970s, prior to
the 1974 world-wide recession induced by the oil cartel's price hike,
reduced the initial labor surplus and raised wages and employment. The result was to raise the earnings of non-farm families at
the lower income levels. For farm families, participation in the
rapid expansion of the industrial sector took place partly through
access to the new employment opportunities offered. Many women
employees of foreign businesses in the Export Processing Zones
came from farm families. The net effect was to increase the
proportion of non-agricultural income for farm families, especially
those with smaller land holdings. This in turn served to reduce the
income discrepancy between farm and non-farm families, in spite
of the lagging growth of the farm versus the non-farm sector,
while simultaneously increasing income equality in the farm
sector. 15
15. See Chang Han-yu, "Taiwan Nung-chia So-te ti Pien-hua yii Shih-p'ing
Chia-kung chih Fa-chan," (Changes in Taiwan's Agricultural Income and
Development of the Food Processing Industry), Taiwan Ying-hang Chi-k'an
(Quarterly Journal of the Bank of Taiwan), Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 1973). Chang
gives the following data for 1965 and 1971:
Non-agricultural Income as Percent of Agricultural Income
1965

1971

Farm family with cultivated
land under v2 ha.

35.3

53.3

Farm family with cultivated
land exceeding 2 ha.

11.8

22.2

Average of all farm families

19.4

28.2

In 1971, for farm families or under .5 hectare, 34.6% of the non-agricultural
income received came from wages, the rest being property income and income from
other occupations, which presumably included both wage and property income. For
families having more than 2 hectares, the proportion of wages in non-agricultural
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In short, a very rapidly expanding industrial sector oriented
to export that was based on processing of imported materials by
highly labor-intensive methods was instrumental in raising
wages, which also benefited farm families. The latter were
progressively becoming less dependent on agriculture as their sole
source of labor income. Under these conditions income equality
was able to improve further, albeit at a slower rate than before.

Distribution of Wealth between Pre- and Post-1945 Settlers
Aside from the distribution of income between farm and nonfarm families, a related distributive factor of major interest is the
relative economic status of the pre-1945 ethnic Chinese settlers of
Taiwan (often loosely referred to as Taiwanese by Westerners)
versus that of the post-1945 settlers (often referred to as
Mainlanders). Since the "Mainlanders" came to Taiwan in 1945 to
take over the Japanese administration, political power was
initially vested entirely in their hands. During the past 30 years,
they have progressively broadened the participation of government so that more and more members ofthe pre-1945 settler group
are now included in the government hierarchy. This progressively
more equal distribution of political power, more advanced at the
provincial and local government levels than at the central
government level, should be considered in conjunction with the
distribution of economic benefits between the two groups. An
interesting point that concerns us in this paper is whether the
relative economic status of the two groups corresponds to their
relative political positions or whether a different relationship
prevails.
Although income distribution data are not available on the
basis of the dates of immigration of family heads to Taiwan, the
problem can be approached indirectly by examining the distribution of wealth between the two groups. Two major points need to
be borne in mind in this connection. First, the 1953 land reform
which took place not very long after the transfer of the central
government of the Republic of China from the mainland to
Taiwan effectively precluded the existence of absentee landlords.
The earliest group of post-1945 settlers from the mainland
consisted primarily of government officials, members of the armed
forces, officers of public corporations and some businessmen. Few
of them, if any, had either the inclination or time, before the land
reform, to become farm land owners. Thus, land, a form of
income was 11.1•J'n. The corresponding proportions of wages in non-agricultural
income in 1965 were 26.1% and 15.1%, respectively.
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physical asset of dominant importance during the early years of
Taiwan's post-World War II economic development, has remained
entirely in the hands of the pre-1945 settlers. Some of the public
land taken over by the ROC government from the Japanese was
also sold to the farmers as a part of the land reform program.
While the government and public corporations, such as Taiwan
Sugar, still own some of the land, there has not been any
redistribution benefiting the post-1945 settlers. Only to the extent
that land has been transferred from crop cultivation to nonagricultural or other agricultural uses could ownership of landed
wealth outside the urban areas become vested in the hands of
post-1945 settlers.
In view of the above, unless the distribution of wealth outside
the agricultural sector were in favor of the post-1945 settlers, the
distribution of wealth as a whole would tend to favor the pre-1945
settlers who are owners of virtually all private farm land. A most
important factor to bear in mind in this connection, therefore, is
the distribution of ownership of large enterprises in the civilian
sector of the economy. In 1975 there were 35 businesses in Taiwan
whose annual sales exceeded NT$1 billion each. In addition,
another 66 firms had annual sales exceeding NT$400 million each
(see Table 9). Altogether 132 firms had annual sales exceeding
NT$200 million each. If these firms are grouped according to
whether the Chairman of the Board of Directors and the President
of the firm 16 are from pre- or post-1945 settler families, 59% of the
aggregate capital of all the firms is accounted for by enterprises
headed by pre-1945 settlers as against 41% by post-1945 settlers.
Furthermore, if a line is drawn at the level of NT$300 million in
capitalization, there are 47 firms above this line. Of these larger
firms, which are further divided into five intervals (see Table 10),
those headed by pre-1945 settlers account for an overwhelmingly
larger proportion of invested capital than the post-1945 settlers in
four groups, the single exception being the group of firms with
capitalization from NT$500 million to NT$1 billion. In contrast,
for firms capitalized below NT$300 million, a larger proportion of
invested capital is accounted for by enterprises with post-1945
settler heads, the only exception being the group of firms with
capitalization of NT$100 to NT$200 million.
Similarly, one can use annual sales as the criterion. On this
basis, of 10 firms each with annual sales in excess of NT$3 billion,
7 are headed by pre-1945 settlers and only 3 by post-1945 settlers.
16. A few finns had non-Chinese Presidents or Board Chairmen.

Table 9. Business Enterprises in Taiwan
with Annual Sales Exceeding NT $200 Million

~

z

0
0

Aggregate Annual Sales (NT $ million)
Heads
of
Firms
Pre-1945
Settlers
Post-1945
Rettiers
Total
Percent
Pre-1945
Settlers
Post-1945
Settlers
Total

No.
of
Firms

Over
6,000

69

6,147.5
(1)

63
132

9,859.5
(1)
16,007.0

a::
t%J

5,000to
under
6,000

4,000to
under
5,000

3,000to
under
4,000

2,000to
under
3,000

1,000to
under
2,000

500to
under
1,000

Under
500

Total

10,947.3
(2)
(0)
(10)
10,947.3

9,162.7
(2)
4,080.1
(1)
13,242.8

6,163.0
(2)
3,225.4
(1)
9,388.4

4,559.2
(2)
7,477.7
(3)
12,036.9

12,692.8
(10)
13,970.5
(10)
26,663.3

22,203.7
(32)
10,480.0
(14)
32,683.7

6,162.1
(18)
11,995.8
(33)
18,157.9

78,038.3
(69)
()1,089.0
(63)
1:19,127.3

tj

52

38

100

69

66

38

48

68

34

56

48

62

0

31

34

62

52

32

66

44

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

r:n

~
t:J:I
c

-z
'"'3

0

~

z

;?
t%J

~

0

Q

Figures in parentheses are the numbers of firms in each group.
Source: Ching-chi Jih-pao (Economic Daily News) (Taipei), April, 1976.
00
-J

~

Table 10. Business Enterprises in Taiwan
with Annual Sales Exceeding NT $200 Million
0
0

Total Capitalization (1,000,000 NT $)
Heads
of
Finns
Pre-1945
Settlers
Post-1945
Settlers
Total
Percent
Pre-1945
Settlers
Post-1945
Settlers
Total

No.
of
Firms
69
61*

Over
2,000
2,040.0
(1)

-

z
~

1,000to
under
2,000

500to
under
1,000

400to
under
500

300to
under
400

200to
under
300

100to
under
200

Under
100

Total

5,379.3
(4)
2,120.0

5,077.0
(8)
7,430.9

4,493.7
(10)
810.0
(2)
5,303.7

2,425.3
(7)
680.0
(2)
3,105.3

2,717.0
(12)
3,521.8
(15)
6,238.8

2,581.5
(19)
1,907.6
(14)
4,489.1

429.3
(8)
667.8
(15)
1,097.1

25,143.1
(69)
17,138.1
(61)
42,281.2

a:

(2)

(11)

130

(0)
2,040.0

7,499.3

12,507.9

53

100

72

41

85

78

44

58

39

59

47

0

28

59

15

22

56

42

61

41

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

"tt
0

~

~

~

r:n
>--,3

c:

t:l
....
l"'l
riJ

r:n
l"'l

1:1:1
....
l"'l

riJ

*Two of the firms are without data on capital
Figures in parentheses are the numbers of firms in each group.
Source: Ching-chi Jih-pao (Economic Daily News) (Taipei), April, 1976.
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In contrast, of 122 firms each with annual sales below NT$3
billion, 62 are headed by pre-1945 settlers as against 60 by post1945 settlers. Furthermore, within each sales interval above the
NT$3 billion mark, firms headed by pre-1945 settlers account for
an overwhelmingly larger proportion of total sales, there being
only a single exception. In all the sales intervals below the NT$3
billion mark the reverse is true, again with the exception of a
single interval.
An earlier survey in 196917 which divided business firms in
Taiwan on the basis of financial groups shows that of 337 firms
which can be clearly identified in terms of ownership by pre- or
post-1945 settlers, 60% were accounted for by the pre-1945 settlers
while the post-1945 settlers controlled 28% (95 firms), with 12% (41
firms) representing combined ownership. Furthermore, the firms
of the pre-1945 group were responsible for 61% of invested capital
on the basis of capitalization and 59% of business revenue in that
year. On the other hand, the firms of the post-1945 group were
responsible for 30% of invested capital and 31% of total business
revenue. The mixed group accounted for 9% of capitalization and
11% of revenue. These earlier statistics point to the larger
ownership of the pre-1945 settlers in business outside the
agricultural sector, but there was no noticeable disparity in size
between the enterprises of the two groups. Hence the growth of the
relative importance of the pre-1945 settlers in the control of the
larger enterprises in the 1975 survey appeared to be a phenomenon of the early 1970s.
Both the 1969 and 1975 statistics lend support to the
conclusion that the larger Taiwan enterprises are headed by pre1945 settlers while the smaller firms have a larger proportion of
post-1945 settler heads. The more recent growth was in favor of
the pre-1945 settlers for the larger enterprises and the post-1945
settlers for the smaller ones. The exceptions to the rule are
relatively few. Although the 1975 data deal with only the larger
firms, while the 1969 data include a wider spectrum of businesses,
comparison of the more recent findings with the 1969 statistics
suggest that there may have been a trend during the first half of
the 1970s for the post-1945 settlers to move up in their relative
economic standing while some members of the pre-1945 settler
group forged even further ahead. In view of the fact that the post1945 settlers were late corners and few of them had settled in
17. See Chang ChUn-H11ng, Taiwan She-hui-li ti fen·hsi (An analysis of Social
forces in Taiwan) (Taipei: Huan-YU Publishing Co., 1972), pp. 32-42.
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Taiwan with vast personal wealth, it is quite understandable that
they have had to compete very hard in the private economic sector
and are not in a dominant position. This can be contrasted with
the more favorable political position the post-1945 settlers enjoyed.
We have already noted the movement toward greater equality in
the distribution of political power in favor of the pre-1945 settlers.
The present statistical analysis indicates that there may have
been a slight and slower shift toward greater equality in the
distribution of industrial and commercial wealth in favor of the
post-1945 settlers. Fortunately for Taiwan, therefore, the redistribution of political power and material wealth can move in
opposite directions, thus serving to compensate each other. A
priori, one is inclined to conclude that this is a situation favoring
greater social stability.

Future Prospects
We have put the preceding discussion on income distribution
in the past tense although many of the conditions of the 1960s and
early 1970s continue to hold today, because several circumstances
now exist that could significantly alter the course of development.
First, Taiwan is trying to shift toward more capital-intensive and
technology-intensive production. It is also trying to supply
domestically more of the manufactured industrial raw materials it
needs. The relative rates of growth of the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors will change further and the relative share of
capital as factor income will probably also rise. There is a latent
tendency, therefore, toward less rather than greater equality in
income distribution unless capital ownership can become progressively more equally distributed, and unless other corrective
measures are undertaken. Thus the role of government intervention may have to, and probably will, increase in order to forestall
a reversal of the previous trend toward greater equality in income
distribution. Both existing and new measures, fiscal and otherwise, will have to be expanded, but greater government intervention could stifle productivity and economic growth if adequate
safeguards and judicious restraint are not provided.
Within this context some of the measures adopted in recent
years deserve mention. In the first place, the progressive income
tax, although a part of the ROC's long-standing taxes, has been
implemented much more vigorously in recent years as a result of
technical reforms in data collection and reporting. Income tax
collections increased noticeably between 1966 and 1972, especially
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for the higher income brackets. 1 k Secondly, among the more recent
measures, reduction of various hidden taxes levied in the form of
rice collection since 1964, and particularly since 1969, has
contributed to greater income equality, especially in reducing the
disparity between farm and non-farm incomes. These two
categories of measures are clearly focused on income transfers.
In the third place, expansion of the stock exchange, which can
be seen in an increase in the number of listed stocks between 1962
and 1973, has been a welcome development in promoting the
dispersion of property ownership. 19 This development could be
extended if institutions can be developed in the near future so that
farm families can progressively participate in industrial expansion by becoming owners of stocks in industrial enterprises just as
they have already participated by providing labor to the
expanding industrial sector. It may be necessary for the
government to step in by organizing intermediaries in the form of
"mutual funds" which can collect rural savings for investment in
industry, thus altering the distribution of industrial assets which
are growing rapidly.
Another set of government measures has had the effect of
especially accelerating development in the lagging agricultural
sector. Special funds over and above the level of private
investment have been earmarked in recent years for investment in
the accelerated development of agriculture. Central government
funds totalling NT$2.43 billion have been provided for this
purpose in the 1977 fiscal year. As of 1975 year-end, projects
totalling NT$2.58 billion (including central government and other
funds) in expenditure had been approved out of the 1976 fiscal
year program. 20 A portion of the expenditures is channeled
through programs for irrigation, flood control, etc. under the
jurisdiction of the provincial authorities. The bulk of these
expenditures is aimed at expanding the infrastructure of the
agricultural sector. Efforts such as this are aimed at modifying
sectoral balance and income disparity between sectors. There may
be some question about the rate of return obtained from such
special efforts. The issue clearly is one of balancing growth
against distribution and touches upon the central question that
1H. See Kuo, op. cit .. 1974. The income tax, however, does not seem to have
significantly altered the differential between farm and non-farm .incomes.
19. The number of listed stocks increased over 14 times between 1962 and
1973. The increase in their market value was over 43 times. See Kuo, op. cit.
20. See rE!ports in the Central Daily News (Taipei), January 4 and 7, 1976.
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economic development, not to mention the overall development of
a society, may have multiple goals.
Finally, there are two important sets of measures that have
begun to be implemented in 1976. One is the ruling that the heads
of government-related banking institutions must henceforth be
rotated so as to avoid the emergence of financial fiefs. The second
development is the progressive implementation of the law limiting
urban land ownership and taxation of large capital gains derived
from such ownership. This is both to avoid overconcentration of
ownership of urban property and to discourage land speculation
and wealth accumulation based on large "unearned" increments.
Thus the authorities are evidently coming to grips with emergent
issues affecting distribution.

The Anti-Poverty Program (Hsiao-k'ang Chi-hua)
In considering income distribution we must obviously examine not only the relative shares of successive segments of the
population on the income ladder, but also especially the absolute
income levels of the lowest income groups. Another effort aimed at
a particular segment of the population is Taiwan's anti-poverty
program. This effort to reduce the number of persons in absolute
poverty and to elevate the income level of persons at the bottom of
the income ladder deserves closer attention. The issue was
· officially recognized by the provincial government of Taiwan in
October 1972 as a major plank in its program. 21 Already in 1967 a
set of unified standards was adopted by the Taiwan provincial
government in defining and registering "poverty households."
According to these standards the poorest or "Step 1 poverty
households" consist of those households whose members are
"unable to work" and are devoid of all assets or income. 22 They
are therefore completely dependent upon relief and government
21. For reference see Tai-wan-sheng T'ui-hsing Hsiao k'ang-chi-hua Kung-tsoshou-ts'e [Anti-poverty Program Manual, edited and published by the Taiwan
Provincial Government, May 1973) and Tai-wan-sheng Cheng-fu She-hui-ch'u
King-tso-pao-kao [Work Report of the Office of Social Mfairs, Taiwan Provincial
Government before the Seventh Session of the Fifth Taiwan Provincial Assembly,
March 31, 1976].
22. The following twelve categories of persons are defined as "without ability
to work":
·
1. Persons under 16 years of age.
2. Persons in school under 18.
3. Persons under _18 who have no earnings from work and who have
only widowed mothers or grandparents.
4. Parents in active military service.

INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE

ROC

93

aid. The medium or "Step 2 poverty households" are those whose
total income is not more than one-half of the stipulated
expenditure at "subsistence level" and not more than one-quarter
of whose members can work. The minimum or "Step 3 poverty
households" are those whose total income is not more than twothirds of the subsistence level and not more than one-third of
whose members can work. "Subsistence level" is defined as
NT$200 per capita per month or NT$2,400 a year. The "poverty
line," at two-thirds of NT$2,400, is therefore set at NT$1,600 per
person per year. For a family of five persons a total annual
income of NT$8,000 (approximately US$200) would put it on the
poverty line. 23
As of 1967 there were 110,036 poverty households in Taiwan,
outside Taipei. In addition, there were 8,929 poverty households in
the municipality of Taipei. In combination there were 118,965
poverty households in all Taiwan. This total amounted to 5.11% of
total households in Taiwan in that year, 5.28% for Taiwan
province and 3.31% for Taipei. Between 1967 and 1971, as a result
of growing economic prosperity, the number of poverty households
declined steadily, averaging 8.9% a year for all Taiwan. A sharp
decrease was further registered immediately after the inauguration of the anti-poverty program in 1972, and the decline of
poverty households has continued since.
5. Persons serving prison or probationary sentence whose unexpired
term exceeds six months in duration.
6. Persons who are disabled or mentally ill and who have no
earnings from work.
7. Men over 60 and women over 55 without earnings from work.
8. Persons registered as missing for more than six months.
9. Persons who have been seriously ill for more than three months
and cannot work and are without regular income.
10. Widowed single parents who have to care for one or more children
under 6 years of age and are without regular earnings.
11. Orphaned children under 12 years of age who are cared for by
grandparents and are without regular income.
12. Women without regular earnings who are six months pregnant
and have to support their own children under three years of age.
The above stipulations are those of the Taiwan Provincial Government.
Similar regulations with minor ·variations exist in the Taipei Municipality.
23. The Taipei Municipality poverty standard, as revised in November 1973,
divides poverty households into two categories only. Step 1 poverty households are
defined identically as the first step poverty households under the Provincial
Government regulations. The Step 2 poverty households are defined in the same
way as the. minimum poverty households under the Provincial Government
regulations. However, the minimum subsistence level is fixed at NT$300 a month
instead of NT$200.
·
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Statistical data on the anti-poverty program are more readily
available for "Taiwan province" outside the Taipei municipality.
As can be seen from Table 11, the number of poverty households
fell from 74.2 thousand in 1971 to 25.7 thousand in 1975. The total
number of persons in such households declined from 391 thousand
to 104 thousand during the same period. While statistics
concerning Taipei are less current, there was also a decline from
8.4 thousand poverty households in 1971 to 7.0 thousand in 1973.
As of 1973, only 1.59% of all households in Taiwan outside Taipei
and 1.64% in Taipei were still classified as poverty households.
Table 11. Number of "Poverty Households" and Persons
Poorest

Medium Poverty Minimum Poverty

Total

HouseHouseHouseHouseholds Persons holds Persons holds Persons holds Persons
1971

16,992

27,196

18,887

110,822

38,368

253,445

74,247

391,463

1972

17,536

28,634

17,182

100,274

33,250

218,001

67,968

346,909

1973

14,461

23,744

11,006

58,062

17,675

114,556

43,142

196,362

1974

11,587

18,882

9,065

48,191

11,254

70,907

31,906

137,980

25,726

103,952

1975

Source: Department of Social Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Government:

It should be borne in mind that poverty households are
defined on the basis of per capita income. A poverty household of
many persons can therefore have a larger family income than a
non-poverty household smaller in size. Therefore,. one cannot
assume that households below a certain income level in statistics
of income distribution by household would automatically consist
of poverty households. However, most of such households are
probably below the poverty line. Thus the decline in poverty
households and the reduction of the number of households in
lower income levels on the income distribution ladder discussed
earlier go hand in hand.
With the rise of retail prices, the required expenditures at the
stipulated subsistence level have also increased. However, a study
conducted in 1971 showed that even if the subsistence level
expenditure had been fixed at 50% higher, or NT$300 per person
per month outside the Taipei municipality, the number of poverty
households under the jurisdiction of the Taiwan provincial
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authorities would only be raised by 7.8%. This is considerably
below the 36.5% decrease in poverty households registered in 1973
as compared with 1972 when the anti-poverty program was
officially inaugurated. Thus the decline in poverty households
during the first half of the 1970s is quite real and should be
attributed largely to both economic expansion and efforts under
the anti-poverty program. 24 In the post-1973 oil crisis period, price
inflation has further increased expenditures at subsistence level.
However, by defining household income, which is compared with
the fixed subsistence level expenditure in determining the poverty
line, at "standard" wage levels by occupation substantially below
the actual wages received, some, if not all, of the effect of inflation
has been offset.
The anti-poverty program includes nine major activities: (1)
expansion of relief and institution care, (2) aid to production
through small business loans and construction of marketing
facilities, (3) active job placement, (4) expansion of occupational
training in cooperation with factories and vocational schools, (5)
construction of low-cost housing in order to improve environmental hygiene, (6) promotion of family planning including free
family visits and advice, (7) promotion of school attendance by
school age children, as well as vocational and adult education,
from poverty households through such measures as tuition loans,
(8) promotion of community production and welfare activities in
order to expand the base of the anti-poverty program beyond the
level of government effort alone, and (9) integration of the
program as a social movement with education, mass communication, and the establishment and expansion of special relief funds.
The basic approach of the program is threefold: (1) increasing
employment and employability, (2) broadening the movement by
enlisting the resources of the society as a whole, which helps
reduce the fiscal and manpower burden on the government, and
(3) increasing both emergency aid, which helps minimize the
emergence of new poverty households, and long-term aid to those
who really cannot help themselves.
Table 12 shows that the size of the poverty households varies
considerably with the degree of poverty. The poorest, or Step 1
poverty household, averages only 1.6 persons per household while
the average number in the medium poverty household varies from
5.9 persons in 1971 to 5.3 persons in 1974, showing a steady
decline during the period. For the minimum poverty household,
24. Lu Kuang, Tai-wan Ti-ch'il To-P'ing-chung Wen-ti (The Poverty Problem
in Taiwan). She-hui Chien-she Social Reconstruction (Taipei, 1975) pp. 1-24.
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the average number of persons per household varied from 6.6 in
1971 to 6.3 in 1974. These figures suggest that the medium and
minimum poverty households are poor partly because of the large
size of the family. However, since the large family probably
contains persons who could become employed, it may also stand a
better chance of escaping poverty if employment can be found. On
the other hand, the small size of the very poor families indicates
that for them poverty is probably a chronic condition due to old
age, physical disability or, at the other end of the income ladder,
lack of adult care. (See the discussion on single person households
at the end of this chapter.)
Table 12. Number of Persons per "Poverty Household"

1971
1972
1973
1974

Poorest

Medium
Poverty

Minimum
Poverty

All
Poverty
Households

1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6

5.9
5.8
5.2
5.3

6.6
6.6
6.5
6.3

5.3
5.1
4.6
4.3

Source: Department of Social Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Government.

Table 13. Percent Distribution of Poverty Households
by Degree of Poverty

1971
1972
1973
1974

Poorest

Medium
Poverty

Minimum
Poverty

Total

22.9
25.8
33.5
36.3

25.4
25.3
25.5
28.4

51.7
48.9
41.0
35.3

100.0
100.0
1.00.0
100.0

Source: Department of Social Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Government.

An examination of the distribution of poverty households by
degree of poverty as shown in Table 13 indicates that the above
interpretation is essentially correct. In 1971, nearly 52% of the
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poverty households were in the minimum poverty category while
the medium poverty and poorest households accounted for 25%
and 23%, respectively. By 1974 the poorest households were
responsible for 36% of a much smaller total of poverty households
while the medium poverty group accounted for 28% and the
minimum poverty group 35% of the total, respectively. The larger
relative share of the poorest group indicates the existence of a
hard-core poverty category requiring long-term aid. The largest
reduction of the relative share of the minimum poverty group is,
on the other hand, indicative of the increased employment of its
members to which the anti-poverty program has contributed.
One major thrust of the anti-poverty program is to encourage
poverty households to declare themselves as "self-reliant households." Such a declaration entails a pledge to accept vocational
education, employment guidance, etc. that would help uplift the
household above its poverty status. Annual surveys are conducted
to follow up on the current status of the poverty households,
including the self-reliant households. The survey also includes
households that have risen above the poverty line. The 1974
survey showed that 7% of the members of the poverty households
were chronically ill and 6% were physically handicapped. In
contrast, the same two categories accounted for 4.1% and 3.3%
respectively of the self-reliant households, and the ratios were
even lower - 2.8% and 2.6% respectively - for households that
had risen above the poverty status. Furthermore, the proportion of
persons "able to work" increased from 24% of the members of the
poverty households to 32% in the self-reliant households and 35.5%
in households that had risen above the poverty line. Sixty-six
percent of those who were able to work in the poverty households
were burdened by family misfortunes while about 14% were ill or
disabled. The incidence of these two major reasons for poverty
conditions declined to 60% and 8.7% respectively for the selfreliant households and 51% and 7% respectively for households
that had risen above the poverty line. Furthermore, among the
members of these households that successfully escaped the
poverty line, according to the same survey, 15.7% had complained
about loss of employment or lack of employment opportunities
and 13% of lack of training or work experience. These statistics
again indicate that the most effective means .to eliminate poverty
in Taiwan have been increases in employment and employability.
Table 14 shows the percent distribution by type of aid under the
anti-poverty program that has contributed to removing households from the poverty status. Family planning was credited with
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26% of the program's success, followed by vocational training and
employment aid, 24%; medical, surgical and emergency aid, 15%.
Other single categories that have proved significant are family
subsidy, 9%; housing improvement, 7%; and production and
marketing aid, 4%.
Once poverty households have found employment for their
members, their income naturally increases. The 1974 survey
indicates that the median annual income of such households that
had risen above the poverty line was NT$25, 763 (US $678). At the
same time, the median annual income of the self-reliant households whose members had found employment was NT$19,534 (US
$514).
Table 14. Types of Aid Contributing to Removal of Poverty
Status under the Anti-Poverty Program ·
Percent
1.

Family planning

26.3

2. Vocational training and employment aid

24.3

3. Medical, surgical and emergency aid

15.2

4. Family subsidy
5.

9.0

House improvement

6.7

6. Production and marketing aid

4.3

7. Other

14.2

Total

100.0

Source: Department of Social Mfairs, Taiwan Provincial Qovemment.

More recently, Taiwan's anti-poverty effort has begun to focus
its attention on households in certain specific occupations,
notably the salt producers and segments of fishermen families.
The anti-poverty program has also consistently included the
aborigine households living in central Taiwan. The entire antipoverty program is a facet of income distribution that deserves far
more attention and study.

III. COMPARISONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES
Eastern Europe and Mainland China
The experience of Taiwan in income distribution in relation to
its economic policy and socio-political environment can be
compared with that of mainland China and other communist
countries, as well as with that of other non-communist Asian
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countries, both developing and developed. In making the first set
of comparisons, one's interest turns very naturally toward the
PRC as "the other China," although brief reference might be
made to some European communist countries as well. See Table
15.
Table 15.

Income Share of All Households
Year

Yugoslavia
Taiwan
Poland
Hungary
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia

1968
1972
1964
1969
1962
1964

Lowest
Per Capita
GNP /U.S.$)
40%
529
503
850
1140
530
1150

18.5
21.7
23.4
24.0
26.8
27.6

Middle
40%

Top
20%

40.0
39.2
40.6
42.5
40.0
41.4

41.5
39.1
36.0
33.5
33.2
31.0

Source: For Taiwan, see page 13 of text. For the East European countries, see
Chenery et al., Redistribution with Growth, pp. 8-9

According to available estimates (mostly from U.N. sources)
cited above, if comparison is made with several East European
communist countries in the mid to late 1960s, Taiwan in 1972
would find itself situated between Yugoslavia and Poland in terms
of the income shares of the lowest 40% and the highest 20% of
income recipients respectively. The same would be true for Taiwan
in 1964. In a very general way one can speak of income
distribution in Taiwan in 1972 as being slightly more "equal"
than it was in Yugoslavia in 1968 and slightly less "equal" than
in Poland in 1964. Yet, in contrast to both Poland and Yugoslavia,
Taiwan is a market economy with ownership of private property.
Because of inadequate official data from Peking, no such
overall comparison of income distribution can be made directly
between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland. However, several
indicators can be used to make partial comparisons so that a
plausible overall impression can nevertheless be inferred.
First, regarding the income differential between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, we have already noted above the
declining ratio between farm and non-farm family incomes in
Taiwan in 1964-72. The ratio worsened in 1973, a year of
unprecedented industrial boom before the oil crisis. See Table 16.
However, if the municipality of Taipei is excluded, the
corresponding differentials would be significantly lower: 1.23 in
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Table 16.

Change in Ratios of Farm and Non-Farm Family
Incomes
1964
1973
1972
(NT$ per annum, constant
1972 prices)

I. Average farm family income
II. Average non-farm family income
Ratio of II:I

32,013
32,740
1.02

49,090
64,497
1.31

54,544
81,373
1.49

As shown in Table 17, these income differentials are not
significantly affected by comparing the average disposable
incomes after tax.a
Table 17. Average Disposable Incomes After Tax

Average disposable income per
farm household"
B. Average disposable income per
non-farm households
Ratio of B:A

1966

1972

1973

30,423

46,481h

52,123"

32,718
1.08

61,293h
1.32h

77,394 8
1.48•

A.

Sources: (a) These disposable income estimates are calculated by Han-yu
Chang, "Taiwan Ching-chi fan-chan kuo-ch'eng-chung so-te fen-p'ei chih fen-hsi"
(An Analysis of Income Distribution in the Process of Taiwan's Economic
Development), Taiwan Ying-hang Chi-k'an (Bank of Taiwan Quarterly), Volume
26, No. 4, Taipei, December 1975, Tables 2-1 and 2-2, pp. 12-13.
(b) Kuo, op. cit., July 1975, Table 13.

1972 and 1.35 in 1973. This can be seen from the data for Taiwan
Province (i.e., Taiwan excluding Taipei) in Table 18.
When the average disposable income is calculated on a per
capita rather than per household basis, the excess of non-farm
household income would rise to 50% in 1972 and 65% in 1973.
Apparently the larger size of the farm household made the farm
sector even worse off on a per person basis.
If comparison is made between the data for Taiwan including
Taipei and those excluding Taipei, it is quite clear that the higher
income households in the capital city make the income differential
between the farm and non-farm sectors much higher than it would
otherwise be. Furthermore, inclusion of Taipei makes the
worsening of the differential between 1972 and 1973 proportionately somewhat greater (from 1.31 to 1.49) than it would otherwise
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be (from 1.22 to 1.36). This phenomenon points to the greater
concentration of higher income families in the capital.
Table 18. Income Differentials for Taiwan Province
1972

1973

49,033
60,Ql0
1.22

54,352
73,957
1.36

46,429

51,934

57,022
1.23

70,318
1.35

1966

1972

1973

4,244
5,628

7,140
9,348

8,153
12,047

Average income per farm family
Average income per non .farm family
Ratio of B:A
A. Average disposable income per farm
household•
B. Average disposable income per non-farm
householda
Ratio of B:A

A.

B.

Source: (a) Chang, op. cit.

C. Average disposable income per
person in farm households
Estimate
(1)
Estimate
(2)
D. Average disposable income per
person in non-farm households
Estimate
Estimate

(1)
(2)

6,206
8,620

10,776
16,174.

13,472
20,920

Ratio of D:C
Estimate
Estimate

(1)
(2)

1.46
1.53

1.50
1.73

1.65
1.73

Source: Chang, op. cit. Estimate (1) is based on Survey reports on family
income and expenditures. Change also presents an alternative estimate (2) based
on farm household accounts.

While sectoral income disparity between agriculture and nonagriculture, together with the greater disparity attributable to
Taipei within the non-agricultural sector, plagues Taiwan as a
distributional problem, as it does other developing countries, the
disparity is by all counts even greater on the Chinese mainland.
According to one American estimate, 25 the money income of the
25. Charles Hoffman, Work Incentive Practices and Policies in· the People's
Repulic of China, 1953-65 (New York: State University of New York Press, 1967), p.
13.
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average mainland Chinese non-agricultural worker was around
¥560 a year in 1960 or about four times that of the average
peasant, thus inferentially making the latter's income about ¥140
a year. While the -¥560 figure refers to the worker, the average
annual income of the entire worker-employee (chih-kung, or
worker and staff) group was ¥656 in 195826 and remained at the
roughly constant level of ¥650 in 1971. 27 (The official press
compared this 1971 figure with that of 1952, noting that it was a
50% increase, but omitted to compare it with the 1957 or 1958
benchmark level.) It is not clear whether the average worker's
income also remained stationary in 1958-71, although any
increase that may have occurred could not be significant since the
average of the numerically larger worker-employee group, which
includes the numerically larger sub-group of workers, became even
slightly lower, ¥650 instead of ¥656. 28 Peking's policy to keep the
worker's income low is essentially intended both as a means of
maintaining a high rate of capital investment and of keeping the
income disparity between farmers and non-farmers within
bounds.
· According to a British author, a survey of rural-urban income
differentials in Kiangsu suggested that on the average the urban
worker's income in 1957 was probably twice that of the peasant
working on a cooperative farm. 29 Allowing for changes in the
pricing of goods both bought and sold by the urban and rural
workers, some narrowing of this differential may have occurred in
the 1960s and 1970s.
In two production teams whose accounts are used as
illustrations in texts for training financial and accounting
workers, the average per capita annual incomes of peasant
households in 1971 were ¥-108 and ¥-139 respectively (Table 19).
Other per capita figures given for both production brigades and
26. The Ta Kung Pao (Peking), May 24, 1958.
27. NCNA International (Peking), September 18, 1971.
28. In his testimony on the allocation of resources in mainland China,
Michael Field stated that
The average wage of a worker in China now [1975] is about the same as it was
in 1957, . . . . In real terms ... , so there has been no appreciable increase in
the standard of living.
In various times, e.g., 1967, 1968 and 1974, "There were demands for increased
wages and for better times." See "People's Republic of China: An Economic
Assessment" (A compendium of Papers submitted to the Joint Economic
Committee, Congress of the United States, Ninety-second Congress, Second
session, May 18, 1972), p. 72.
29. See Christopher Howe, Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China,
1919-1972 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 50-51.
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communes in six geographically widespread areas, possibly for
different years, vary from ¥94 to as high as ¥176 and are
generally in the same order of magnitude as the two textbook
examples cited before. Still other average annual farm household
incomes in 1957 vary from ¥171 for Kansu province to ¥306 for
Szechwan, ¥399 for Hopei, and ¥454 for Kiangsu. 30 Depending
upon the number of full-time workers and the size of farm and
non-farm households, alternative ratios of non-farm to farm
household incomes can be obtained as shown in Table 20.
Table 19. Annual Income in 1971
A Production
Team in
Liaoning•

A Production
Team in
Hunanb
(in current yuan)

Per farm household
Per farm worker
equivalent
Per capita

475.4

432.0*

369.7 (1.3 persons/household)
138.6 (3.4 persons/household)

108.0

Sources: a. Department of Agricultural Economics, Liaoning Academy of
Finance and Economics, ed., Cheng-yang Tso-hao Shen-ch'an-tui Ts'ai-k' uai
Kung-tso, (How to Do Financial and Accounting Work in the Production Team
Properly) (Shenyang: Liaoning Jen-min Publishers, 1973), p. 105.
b. Hunan Revolutionary Committee, Bureau of Agriculture and Forestry and
the Hunan Financial and Accounting Training Program, ed., Nung-ts'un Jen-minkung-she Sheng-ch'an tui K'uai-chi, (Accounting in the Production Team of an
Agricultural Commune) (Hunan: Jen-min Publishers), p. 84
*estimated.

In spite of the inadequacy of data, one can probably conclude
that the average income of non-agricultural households in
mainland China in the early 1970s was about twice that of
agricultural households and that it might be three to four times as
large, if not more. 31 The differential was in any case significantly
larger than the current ratio in the Republic of China.
30. See People's Daily (Peking), May 5, 1957.
31. According to a U.S. Government analyst, "In 1970-71, industry-related
production had caught up with agriculture-related production, and the 15 percent
of the people in the urban areas were producing six times as much per capita as
their country brethren." Although the differential between urban and rural
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Table 20. Alternative Income Ratios
(I)
Non-agricultural Household
Income

Kansu
Szechwan
Hopei
Kiangsu

1.5

(a) ¥ 975

Liaoning
Hunan

(b)

(b) ¥1300

Annual
income per
full-time
workers
(a)

¥650

X

(II)
Average Agricultural
Household Income
1957

Household
Income
Assumed
number
of full-time
equivalent
workers per
household

(II)

¥171
306
399
454
1971
475
432

Ratio of
(I) to (II)

(a)
5.70
3.19
2.44
2.15
(a)
2.05
2.26

(b)

7.60
4.25
3.26
2.86
(b)
2.74
3.01

2

Within the agricultural sector, the pattern of income distribution among farm households was sharply altered in mainland
China through the initial redistribution of land from former
"landlords" and "rich peasants" to "poor peasants," accompanied
by the reduction of farm laborers. 32 However, inequality has
increased subsequently for several reasons. First, whenever
distribution according to labor is the dominant form of distribution in the PRC rather than distribution according to need, 33
inequality among households can come about as a result of
unequal distribution of labor and skills among them. The relative
emphases of the two forms of distribution have continued to be a
incomes per capita is not the same as average non-agricultural and agricultural
family incomes, this differential is in the same area of magnitude as estimates in
the text suggest. Furthermore, it is also about double the ratio of the nonagricultural sector and the agricultural sector in Taiwan in terms of per capita
value-added in 1972 (3.18:1). See page 18 of text.
The quotation is taken from Arthur G. Ashbrook, Jr., "China: Economic Policy
and Economic Results, 1949·71," in "People's Republic of China: An Economic
Assessment" (A compendium of Papers submitted to the Joint Economic
Committee, Congress of the United States, Ninety-second Congress, Second
Session, May 18, 1972), p. 41.
Ashbrook also thought that the bulk of the new agricultural inputs had gone to
the favored communes and brigades so that an important ideological controversy
dealt with the contrast between "rich brigades" and "poor brigades."
32. See Peter Schran, The Development of Chinese Agriculture, 1950-1959
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1969), for extensive calculations on changes
in class and income distribution.
33. "Need" is presumably defined by the party cadres rather than the income
recipients.
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matter of controversy for nearly two decades. Secondly, under the
system of distribution practiced in 1971, each member of the
production team is rewarded principally according to the number
of work points he earns through labor. However, the value of a
work point depends upon the total number of work points
accumulated by all the team members and the net income
available for distribution among them. The net income is, in turn,
the difference between gross income and the aggregate amount of
taxes, compulsory purchase by the state, production cost,
collective consumption, collective investment, payment to the
higher level production brigade, and addition to the team's
inventory. Since these deductions are of fairly stable proportions,
disparity in the gross income of different production teams is a
source of disparity in income distribution. Differences in gross
income occur regionally due to differences in soil, climate, and the
nature of crops (e.g., industrial crops versus cereals). In 1957,
among the four provinces of Kansu, Szechwan, Hopei and
Kiangsu, the difference varied from 1 to 2.65. In the same year, in
Shensi province, the range of variation among different agricultural regions was from 1 to 6.4. Similarly, the composition of
agricultural production in terms of livestock, fruits, fishery
products, and crops also varies among provinces, and changes in
their respective procurement or market prices would affect relative
income regionally. A final source of income disparity consists of
differences in income derived from private plot and free market
sales.
Within the industrial sector, a rough comparison can be made
between Taiwan and Mainland China in terms of income
distribution in several ways. In the first place, the wage rate
differential between the lowest and highest rates on an 8-grade
scale employed in the PRC appears to be noticeably wider than
the corresponding differential between unskilled and skilled labor
in Taiwan's industrial sector. According to Peking's wage scale of
1955, the highest wage rate (grade 8) was generally a little over
three times that of the lowest. The corresponding ratio of the wage
rate at grade 6 to that of grade 1 was generally around 2.2 to 2.4. 34
Some adjustments in wage rates have taken place since 1955,
especially in the 1963 wage reform, but the differential may not

34. See Charles Hoffman, Work Incentive Practices and Policies in the
People's Republic of China, 1953-1965 (Albany, New York: State University of New
York Press, 1968), Table 2, p. 21.
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have varied greatly. 35 In contrast, the wage differential between
unskilled and skilled labor in manufacturing in Taiwan during
1970 varied from a low of 1 to 1.43 in the cement industry to a
high of 1 to 2.19 in the electronics industry. 36 The Taiwan wage
differential in 12 different manufacturing industries in July 1970
can be seen from Table 21.
Table 21. Average Monthly Wage in Taiwan (NT$)
I
Industry
Clothing
Synthetic fibers
Motor cycles
Cotton textile
Cement
Food Manufacturing
. Plastics
Plywood
Electric Appliances
Pharmaceuticals
Electronics
Wool textiles

Skilled
Labor
3,090
2,960
2,930
2,600
2,520
2,510
2,480
2,460
2,340
2,300
2,280
1,950

II
Unskilled Differential
Labor
1111
1,590
1,760
1,130
1,420
1,910
1,640
1,410
1,470
1,660
1,510
1,070
1,450

1.62
1.56
1.96
1.83
1.43
1.49
1.66
1.67
1.50
1.73
2.19
1.54

Source: Chen Hsi-chao, "Taiwan Ti-ch'ii Ch'an-yeh Yiian-kung Yi-tung Yenchiu" (Turnover of Production Workers in Taiwan), in Li Ch'eng (ed.), Taiwan Jen-li
Ts'u·yilan Lun-wen-chi (Essays on Taiwan's Human Resources), (Taipei: Lien·
ching Publications Co., 1975), p. 484.

What has happened in mainland China is a concentration of
a far larger group of persons in the lower wage grade, and this has
had the effect of yielding a very low income inequality. However,
the average wage rate as well as the total wage bill have been kept
very low through very high profit rates which are, however,
appropriated by the State as a result of nationalization of
35. Cf. Christopher Howe, Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China,
1919-1972 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 96.
36. In mainland China the comparable ratios in 1955 were 2.19 (grade 6 to
grade 1) and 3.00 (grade 8 to grade 1) in the cement industry and 2.22 (grade 6 to
grade 1) and 3.04 (grade 8 to grade 1) in light industry as derived from Charles
Hoffman, Work Incentive Practices and Policies in the People's Republic of China,
1953-65 op. cit. There are also substantial regional differentials in industrial
wages. See Howe, Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China, 1919-1972, op.
cit., p. 52.
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industry. 37 Without attempting to construct income distribution
estimates for all households in mainland China, which cannot be
done for lack of data, especially in more recent years, one can
probably safely assert:
1. that income distribution in the industrial sector, as well as
in the agricultural sector, shows a high degree of equality in the
small geographical and enterprise units, but this is modified by
regional disparity to a degree that we cannot determine;
2. that there is a very wide differential between farm
household and non-farm household incomes, the disparity being a
great deal larger than the corresponding disparity in Taiwan;
3. that the average non-farm worker's income (say at ¥650 a
year, or approximately US$325) at the official exchange rate
would yield more than $650 for a two full-time working member
family, this family income being only 40% of the average nonfarm family income in Taiwan (about NT$64,500 or US$1,612,
also at the official exchange rate). If the average mainland
Chinese farm household has no more than one-half to one-quarter
of the non-farm household's income, while farm family income in
Taiwan is only 30% below that of the non-farm family, the farm
family on the Chinese mainland would probably enjoy an income
varying from 14 to 29%- which one can conservatively place at
30% - of the corresponding farm family in Taiwan. 38

Finally, both Taiwan and mainland China grant subsidies to
individuals and groups, thus altering the distribution of real
income. In the case of Taiwan, the nine-year free schooling
introduced in 1969 has probably benefited the low-income groups
more than those of higher income. It has therefore contributed to a
reduction of real income inequality in Taiwan, both in the short
run and in the long run. While such subsidies also exist in
37. Recent studies of Jung-chao Liu, State University of New York at
Binghamton, have dealt with the comparison of wages and profits between China
and India.
38. If the non-farm family income in Taiwan is denoted by 100, the
corresponding figure for mainland China, as discussed in the text, would be 40.
One-quarter to one-half of the 40 would yield a figure of 10-20 as the corresponding
value of the mainland Chinese farm family's income. If the Taiwan farm family
has an income 30% below that of the non-farm family, its income level can be
denoted by 70. CC)mparing 10 or 20 with 70 we obtain percentages equal to 14.3 and
28.6, respectively. Granted that such comparisons based on official exchange rates
raise methodological issues, they are nevertheless illuminating as rough indica, tions of orders of magnitude.
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Communist China, the effect need not be the same and may even
be in the opposite direction, either because the subsidies to
different groups are not of the same quality- barefoot doctors do
not provide the same medical service as the modern medical
facilities in the cities - or because the subsidy is only granted to a
certain group which may happen to be the higher income group,
thus increasing rather than diminishing the income gap. An
example of the latter genre is the low residential rent in cities,
which benefits only the urban dwellers. Distributive justice in
mainland China is often based on class origin in the precommunist period, thus departing from the criterion of current
economic status. In Taiwan measures to modify income distribution do not contain an element of retribution.

Non-communist Asian Countries
An interesting comparison can be made between Taiwan and
South Korea among the non-communist Asian developing countries.
Both countries underwent asset redistribution in the agricultural sector through land reform. Both did not suffer from initially
large inequalities in the distribution of assets in the nonagricultural sectors inasmuch as Japanese-owned assets were
taken over by the respective governments after World War II. On
the other hand, the destructive Korean war had a further levelling
effect in both the agricultural and the non-agricultural sectors
from which Taiwan fortunately escaped. Like Taiwan, Korea also
went through an initial phase of import substitution before it
turned toward export promotion, and it was after 1964, especially
in the 1970s, when the rapid expansion of labor-intensive exports
began that, again like Taiwan, Korea entered a stage of very rapid
economic growth. Largely because of the war, however; Korean
agriculture did not enjoy the kind of rapid growth simultaneously
with asset redistribution through land reform. Hence the initially
equalizing effect of land redistribution was not compounded by
growth. Furthermore, the disparity between farm and non-farm
income in Korea might be widening more than it has done in
Taiwan.
In combination, these factors have given South Korea an
income distribution resembling but somewhat more unequal than
that of Taiwan. On the other hand, while there probably was little
change in the Korean pattern between 1964 and 1970,39 there was
39. See Irma Adelman on "South Korea" in Chenery et al., Redistribution with Growth (Annex 1974), pp. 280-285.
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continued improvement in the Taiwan pattern as shown in Table
3. It is also possible that the available Korean data have
underestimated the very large incomes. 40 In the absence of post1970 information and Korea's rapid economic and export growth
since 1970, one cannot state unequivocally whether the Korean
and Taiwan patterns of income distribution are now closer or
farther apart than before.
If comparison is made between Taiwan and lndia, 41 a
significantly greater income inequality seems to prevail in lndia. 42
This would seem to be attributable, inter alia, to the following
factors: first, India has been unable to implement its policy of
land redistribution which it has consistently advocated as an
integral part of economic planning. The difference between the
Taiwan and Indian experiences in this respect would seem to lie
both in their disparity in size and in the political conditions facing
the two countries. Second, India has not adopted a foreign trade
orientation in its development strategy as has Taiwan. Nor has
India followed an agricultural emphasis in its initial phase of
development. Again, the very much larger size of the Indian
economy and greater resource availability in comparison with
Taiwan have contributed to the two countries' different approaches. Ideological differences between the political leaders of
the two constitute another important factor. Finally, given its
development strategy, it would be all the more important for India
to resort to government measures to modify asset and income
distribution. Yet for the same reasons as those that have stymied
land reform, it seems that India has been unable to take sufficient
and appropriate corrective measures to redistribute income.
Taiwan, on the other hand, presents a contrasting experience.
Because of the many resemblances the economic development
of Taiwan bears to that of Japan, an interesting comparison can
be made with Japan from the point of view of income distribution.
First, according to the Japanese employment status survey, the
Gini index of the agricultural sector increased from 0.3097 in 1962
to 0.3470 in 1971 during a period of very rapid economic growth.
40. See Hakchung Choo, Review of Income Distribution Studies, Data
Availability and Associated Problems for Korea, the Philippines and Taiwan,
Korea Development Institute, Monograph 7406 (1974).
41. For a brief discussion on the Indian case, see Chenery et al., Redistribu·
tion with Growth (1974), op. cit.
42. Various estimates of income distribution data in India are given in
Chapter III, "Economic Growth and Income Distribution," Economic Survey of
Asw and the Fllr East, 1971, Uniied Nations Publication E/CN.ll/1047, pp. 49-64.
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On the other hand, income distribution in the non-agricultural
sector became more equal during the same period, declining from
0.3231 in 1962 to 0.3199 in 1971. These divergent movements had
the net effect of reducing tte Gini index of income distribution for
all households from 0.3351 in 1962 to 0.3261 in 1971. 43 The
changes paralleled those of Taiwan after 1968 which we have
previously pointed out.
One of the reasons for the improvement in income distribution
in the non-agricultural sector during this period of rapid growth
was the disappearance of surplus labor, especially unskilled labor.
On the other hand, among the factors working for greater
inequality was an increase in the number of "non-standard"
households, that is, households headed by single persons or
persons either just entering or just retiring from the labor force.
The last factor was partly a result of demographic changes in the
age composition of the Japanese population and partly an
outcome of migration from rural to urban areas, accompanied by
the formation of separate households by young workers who tend
to be poorer. In the agricultural sector, greater use of capital
equipment, especially on the larger farms, had the effect of
increasing the importance of property income. On the whole, an
allegedly narrow distribution of property in Japan may also have
had the effect of creating greater inequality. Lastly, the disparity
in the rate of growth of productivity and earned income in
agriculture verses non-agriculture also had the effect of widening
income disparity between the two sectors.
On the basis of Taiwan's experience as discussed earlier, the
disparity of growth between agriculture and non-agriculture, the
shift of rural workers to industry - although young Chinese
women working in the export processing zones have not really set
up separate households and are still regarded as contributors to
the income of the farm households from which they have come and the gradual disappearance of labor surplus all bear strong
43. These data are quoted in Richard Osamu Wada, Impact of Economic
Growth of the Size Distribution of Income: The Postwar Experience of Japan,
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Hawaii (May 1975). Wada's study also
presents an analysis of income distribution adjusted for various understatements
of income. According to his data, there continues to be a widening of income
disparity in Japan although the trend had slowed down during the latter phase of
the 1956-71 period. The phenomenon noted above in the case of Japan is also
discussed by Simons Kuznets as common to developed countries where separate
households headed by young people, including many households of single persons
who leave their parental homes early, tend to increase disparity in income
distribution. See Simon Kuznets, op. cit.
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resemblances to the experience of Japan. It remains, however, to
be seen whether the distribution of property income in Taiwan
will in fact become more unequal or whether governmental
measures to modify distribution will succeed in offsetting this
potential development.

Chapter III

INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS, TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE AND AGRICULTURAL
GROWTH IN TAIWAN
CHI-MING

Hou

In a recent conference on Taiwan's agricultural development,
Walter P. Falcon has remarked, "In the past quarter of a century
we have come to look to Taiwan for innovative policies and
institutions to strengthen the role of agriculture as a supporting
sector in development." 1 How impressive is Taiwan's growth
record in agriculture? What has been the pattern of agricultural
production? What have been the input-output relationships? What
have been the sources of agricultural growth? What role have
government policy and institutional innovations played? What
are the problems and prospects for future growth?
It is obviously not possible in one short essay to offer an indepth analysis of all these issues. I will simply try to examine
them briefly with emphasis on the relationships among institutional arrangements, technological change, and output growth.

AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT
The increase of agricultural production in Taiwan since 1945
has been very impressive (see Table 1), with a growth rate
averaging 6.2 percent a year for 1947-1975. During the recovery
and rehabilitation stage after World War I I - that is, from 1947 to
1952 - the average a:r.mual growth rate was nearly 14 percent
(Table 2). By 1952, the previous peak level reached in 1939 was
restored. (During the years from 1939 to 1945, agricultural
production declined sharply at 12.3 percent a year. In 1945, the
level of production was the same as in 1910.)2
1. Walter P. Falcon, "Lessons and Issues in Taiwan's Development," in T. H.
Shen (ed.), Agriculture's Place in the Strategy of Development: The Taiwan
Experience (Taipei: Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, 1974), p. 284.
2. S. C. Hsieh and T. H. Lee, "Agricultural Development and Its Contribution
to Economic Growth in Taiwan," in Economic Digest, No. 17, JCRR, Taipei, 1966,
as cited in You-tsao Wang, "Technological Changes and Agricultural Development
in Taiwan, 1946-1965," which was first presented at the Conference on Economic
Development of Taiwan, Taipei, 1967. Wang's article was reprinted in Taiwan
Nung-yeh Fa-chan Lun-wen-chi (Essays on Taiwan's Agricultural Development)
(Taipei: Lien-ching Publications Co., 1975), pp. 67-118.
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Table 1. Index of Agricultural Output in Taiwan
(1971 = 100)

Year

Total

Farm
Crops•

Forestry
Products

Livestock
Products

Fishery
Products

1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975

20.3
25.4
32.8
33.5
37.4
39.0
42.3
46.3
47.3
47.6
51.2
54.9
58.6
59.6
60.4
65.7
67.4
67.5
75.6
80.5
83.1
88.3
93.5
98.7
100.0
102.6
108.0
108.5
106.3

26.8
33.5
38.2
44.6
48.7
48.7
52.3
56.7
57.1
56.3
61.1
64.6
68.2
68.0
69.1
74.2
75.2
74.2
83.5
90.2
91.6
95.4
95.3
99.9
100.0
101.1
102.1
107.6
104.7

10.6
16.8
28.1
20.7
25.9
28.5
35.3
36.0
38.0
40.0
37.8
43.8
50.1
64.2
66.6
76.0
77.9
77.6
95.9
97.9
90.3
91.9
91.4
95.7
100.0
93.7
88.5
81.8
74.7

10.3
12.1
14.7
15.0
20.0
26.2
27.3
33.8
34.4
35.7
38.1
42.6
47.8
47.4
45.8
50.7
55.0
56.4
59.9
61.6
68.3
78.0
89.5
98.3
100.0
107.9
127.2
117.5
109.8

7.7
9.3
13.0
12.4
13.2
15.9
18.5
19.0
22.7
26.2
28.1
31.0
31.8
33.9
35.3
40.6
42.2
45.4
49.4
51.4
59.0
66.7
91.2
95.3
100.0
107.1
119.6
114.0
125.0

• Includes food products and other crops such as fibers, tobacco, tea, and
coffee.
Source: For 1946-52, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1975
(Republic of China: Director-General of Budget, Accounting & Statistics, 1975); for
1953-1975, Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1976 (Taiwan Economic Planning
Council, 1976)
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Table 2. Annual Growth Rates of Agricultural
Output in Taiwan
~----

Total

Farm
Crops

Forestry
Products

25.1
29.1
2.1
11.6
4.3
8.5
9.5
2.2
0.6
7.6
7.2
6.7
1.7
1.3
8.8
2.6
0.1
12.0
6.5
3.1
6.3
6.7
- 0.7
5.6
1.3
2.6
5.3
0.5
- 2.0

25.0
14.0
16.8
9.2
0.0
7.4
8.4
0.7
- 1.4
8.5
5.7
5.6
- 0.3
1.6
7.4
1.3
- 1.3
12.5
8.1
1.4
4.1
4.1
4.0
4.8
0.1
1.1
1.0
5.4
- 2.7

58.5
67.3
-26.3
25.1
10.0
23.9
2.0
5.6
5.3
- 5.5
15.9
14.4
28.1
3.7
14.1
2.5
- 0.4
23.6
2.1
- 7.8
1.8
5.4
- 5.7
4.7
4.5
- 6.3
- 5.5
- 7.6
- 8.7

17.5
21.5
2.0
33.3
31.0
4.2
23.8
1.8
3.8
6.7
11.8
12.2
- 0.8
- 3.4
10.7
8.5
2.5
6.2
2.8
10.9
14.2
7.1
7.2
9.8
1.7
7.9
17.9
- 7.6
- 6 ..5

20.8
39.8
- 4.6
6.5
20.5
16.4
2.7
19.5
15.4
7.3
10.3
2.6
6.6
4.1
15.0
3.9
7.6
8.8
4.0
14.8
13.1
9.2
9.2
4.5
4.9
7.1
11.7
- 4.7
9.6

1947-52
1954-60
1961-65
1966-70
1971-75

13.5
4.6
6.0
4.2
1.5

12.1
3.6
5.6
2.1
1.0

26.4
8.7
8.4
0.3
- 4.7

18.3
7.0
6.1
9.8
2.7

16.6
8.6
7.9
13.4
5.7

1947-75
1953-75

6.2
4.3

5.0
3.2

8.4
3.7

9.3
6.9

10.8
9.4

Year
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975

Livestock
Products

Fishery
Products

Average

Source: Table 1.
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After 1952, total agricultural production continued to grow,
but at a lower rate. It increased at an annual rate of 4.6 percent
from 1953 to 1960 and at 5.1 percent in the 1960s. The acceleration
was particularly noticeable for livestock and fishery products. For
farm crops, 3 the annual rate of increase was 3.6 percent for
1953-1960 and 3.8 percent for 1961-70.
But starting in 1971, the rate of growth has declined
substantially for all groups of products. For total agricultural
production, the average growth rate was 1.5 percent from 1971 to
1975; for farm crops, 1.0 percent; and for livestock products, 2.7
percent. Forestry products declined at nearly 5 percent a year from
1971 to 1975. Only fishery products managed to grow at nearly 6
percent a year during this period.
If the average of a five-year period is used, the growth rate
started to decline rather sharply for farm crops and forestry
products since 1961-65. Farm crops grew at 5.6 percent a year in
1961-65, and then only 2.1 percent in 1966-70. Forestry products
hardly increased at all in 1966-70, after an annual increase of 8.4
percent in 1961-65. But livestock and fishery products continued
to increase at an accelerated rate until 1970.
For the 23 years from 1953 to 1975, the average growth rate of
total agricultural production was 4.3 percent, considerably higher
than the growth rate of population, which averaged about 3
percent for the same period. 4
Among the categories of agricultural production, the growth
rates varied substantially. For farm crops and forestry products,
the average growth rates were 3.2 percent and 3.7 percent,
respectively, for 1953-75. But for livestock and fishery products,
they were 6.9 percent and 9.4 percent, respectively.
3. Farm crops include: (a) rice; (b) other dry land crops, such as sweet potato,
barley, wheat, millet, bam-yard millet, sorghum, corn, buckwheat, soybean,
multiflora bean, other beans and fresh edible sugar cane; (c) special crops: tea,
sugar-cane, tobacco, coffee, peanut, sesame, rapeseed, arrow-root, cassava, reamie,
flax, jute, ambai hemp, cotton, tachia rush, triangle rush, perfume plants,
citronella, sisal, derris, and peppermint.
4. Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1975 (Taipei: Economic Planning Council,
1975), p. 4. The growth rate for 1969 is not included because of change of statistical
coverage.
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Table 3. Annual Growth Rates of Production of Farm Crops in
Taiwan
(Percent)

Years
1947-52
1953-60
1961-65
1966-70
1971-74
1947-74
1953-74

Total

Rice

9.9
3.2
3.9
1.0
3.8
3.8
2.2

10.0
2.6
4.2
1.1
3.8
3.8
22.2

Common Crops
Other Dry
Land Food Special
Crops
Crops
Fruits
10.3
5.4
4.3
0.2
4.3
4.3
2.6

27.8
5.0
6.1
-3.3
8.1
8.1
2.7

17.0
7.5
20.6
9.1
12.7
12.7
11.6

Vegetables Mushrooms
11.4
3.9
7.1
14.2
4.4
8.0
7.1

142.1
- 5.1
16.7

Source: Computed from Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China (op.
cit.). (Annual growth rate is calculated by using previous year as base.)

Divergent growth rates also occurred among various farm
crops. For major food grains, the growth rate was substantially
lower than that of fruits, vegetables, and mushrooms, as Table 3
shows. The explanation probably lies at least in part in Engel's
Law and the expansion of external markets.
For the population in Taiwan, Engel's coefficient (food
expenditure as a proportion of total private consumption expenditure) declined continuously in the past two decades. It was 56
percent in 1951, 51 percent in 1961, and 41 percent in 1971. 5 The
income elasticities of demand for major farm products are, in
general, low, though with great variance. They have been
estimated as follows: 6
(1961-69)
-0.0219
Rice
(1952-69)
Fish
0.3069
(1952-69)
0.5921
Pineapples
(1953-69)
Pork
0.5958
(1962-69)
0.6637
Sugar
(1963-69)
0.8032
Duck
(1952-69)
1.0129
Vegetable
(1963-69)
1.0139
Chicken
(1952-69)
1.6934
Citrus fruits
5. T.H. Lee and Yueh-eh Chen, "Change in Food Consumption Patterns," in
T. H. Shen (ed.), op. cit., p. 325.
6. The income elasticity of demand is defined as (6clc) I (6yly), where Cis
per capita consumption (in physical units) and y is per capita real disposable
income. The coefficients given in the text are estimated by Han-yu Chang. See his
"Taiwan Ching-chi Fa-chan Ko-ch'eng-chung Liang-shih Hsu-ch' iu Chieh-kou ti
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For products for which income elasticity of demand was high,
growth rates were also high, namely, fruits, vegetables, livestock,
and fishery products. For food grains, the income elasticity of
demand was low; so was their growth rate.
For certain farm products, foreign markets have helped their
expansion. This is particularly true for fruits and vegetables. The
increase of exports of mushrooms and bamboo shoots, for
example, has been phenomenal. The degree to which a product is
dependent on exports may be measured by the ratio of domestic
production to domestic consumption, which may be called the selfsufficiency rate. A coefficient of less than one indicates imports,
and a coefficient of more than one indicates exports. The
coefficients of self-sufficiency of various farm products are given
in Table 4. It can be seen that, up until the end of the 1960s,
Taiwan was about self-sufficient in rice and meat, had a great
deal to export for fruits, vegetables, and sugar, and was dependent
on imports for wheat, corn, soybeans, and milk. For food crops as
a whole, Taiwan was about self-sufficient.
Table 4. Self-Sufficiency Rates of Major Food Items in Taiwan
(Percent)

Rice
Wheat
Corn
Soybeans
Fruits
Vegetables
Sugar
Meat
Milk
Sea Products
Total Food

1952-56

1957-61

1962-66

1967-71

1952-71

111.9
10.1
95.0
19.4
126.3
99.9
834.3
100.0
7.5
91.6
103.2

106.5
13.4
61.7
31.2
131.5
99.8
823.1
100.7
6.2
99.2
100.0

108.4
7.9
69.4
27.9
197.7
139.4
687.5
100.5
14.3
101.1
03.5

103.8
3.4
17.1
13.6
179.7
156.4
461.7
100.9
14.5
117.6
95.7

107.6
8.7
60.8
23.0
158.8
123.9
701.7
100.5
10.6
102.4
100.6

Source: T. H. Shen (ed.), Agriculture's Place in the Strategy of Development:
The Taiwan Experience (Taipei: Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, 1974).
Pien-hua yU Chan-wang" (Demand for and Supply of Food in Taiwan: Structural
Changes and Prospects) in Taiwan Yin-han Chi-kan (Quarterly Journal of the
Bank of Taiwan), Vol. 22, No. 4 (December 1971).
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But, from 1971 to 1975, farm crops increased at only 1 percent
a year, whereas population increased nearly 2 percent, so the selfsufficiency rate must have declined. According to one estimate,
the self-sufficiency rate of food grains has actually dropped from
100 percent in 1968 to 88 percent in 1974. 7

AGRICULTURAL INPUTS
Agricultural inputs or the factors of agricultural production
are conventionally classified into three categories: land, labor,
and capital. Technological improvements either in production
techniques or in organizational changes may be treated as a
separate input.

Land
Taiwan is very densely populated and has been so for
decades. It has become impossible to increase the area of
cultivated land. From 1946 to 1970 the annual rate of increase of
cultivated land was only 0.4 percent, much less than that of
agricultural population, which was 2.5 percent from 1951-55 to
1956-60, 2.7 percent from 1956-60 to 1961-65, and 1.4 percent
from 1961-65 to 1966-70. 8 As a result, the area of cultivated land
per capita on farm continued to decline, from 0.21 hectare in 1952
to 0.15 hectare in 1970.
Agricultural population, after peaking in 1969, has continuously declined at a rate of 1.56 percent a year for 1970-75. At the
7. See Yu-kang Mao, "Taiwan Nung-yeh Fa-chan Chih Fang-hsiang yii
Tiwei" (Prospects for Agricultural Develpment in Taiwan) in Taiwan Ching-chi
Fa-chan Fang-hsiang chi ts'e lilh yen t'ao hua (Conference on Prospects and
Strategy for Economic Development in Taiwan) (Taipei: The Institute of
Economic Academia Sinica, 1976), p. 10f).
For altemative estimates and discussion on food self-suffiency rate, see Yuyuan Pien, Taiwan Liang-shih Tzu-chieh-Lil chih yen-chiu (On Self-Sufficiency of
Food Grain in Taiwan) in Tsung-hsien Yu and Yu-hsien Yu (eds.), Taiwan Nungyeh Fa-chan Lun-wen-chi (Essays on Taiwan's Agricultural Development) (Taipei:
Lien-ching Publications Co., 1975), p. 610.
8. See Ko-chih Liu, "1945 Nien 1-lai Taiwan Ching-chi Fa-chang Yii J(m-k'ou
Chih Ch'uan-mein Kuan-ch'a" (Economic Development and Population in Taiwan
Since 1945: An Overview) in Tsung-hsien Yu and Cheng Li (eds.), Taiwan Jen-li
Tzu-yuan Lun-wen-chi (Essays on Human Resources in Taiwan) (Taipei: Lienching Publications Co., 1975), p. 37.
Total agricultural population was 3,523,000 in 1946, 4,257,000 in 1952, and
6,152,000 in 1969, the peak year. Thereafter, it declined continuously to 5,598,000 in
1975. It was 5,997,000 in 1970. From 1970 to 1974, the annual rate of decline was 0.8
percent. The 1946 figure is given in You-tsao Wang, op. cit., p. 170. For other years,
see Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1976, p. 53.
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same time, there was also a slight increase in the area of
cultivated land. Consequently, the area of cultivated land per
capita on farms increased to 0.16 hectare in 1975. 9 However,
efforts have been made to increase sown (or crop) areas, thanks to
abundant labor, irrigation, chemical fertilizers, early maturing
varieties, control of crop pests and disease, use of farm machinery,
and favorable weather conditions. Total crop area increased from
about 1,506,000 hectares in 1952 to 1,702,000 in 1966, or about 13
percent over a period of 14 years. It has declined since 1966,
however. In 1975 it was 1,659,000 hectares, only about 10 percent
more than in 1952. 10
The multiple cropping index (ratio of crop acreage to total
cultivated acreage) increased continuously from 118 in 1946 to 172
in 1952, and 190 in 1966. Thereafter, it declined to 175 in 1973 and
went up to 181 in 1975. 11 The decline since 1966 probably reflected
the increasing scarcity of labor, for multiple cropping is a highly
labor-intensive operation at planting and harvesting seasons. The
decline in prices received for winter crops was probably another
contributing factor.
Leading multiple cropping systems in Taiwan include: ricerice-sweet potato, rice-rice-soybean, rice-rice-corn, rice-rice-tobacco,
rice-rice-vegetable, and rice-vegetable-rice. In 1970, practically all
of Taiwan's flax, tobacco, and wheat, and over 80 percent of its
soybeans, 52 percent of its corn, and 61 percent of its vegetables
were grown in paddy fields under multiple cropping. The yield of
rice under multiple cropping is usually only 3 to 10 percent less
than under single cr0pping.12

LABOR
The number of agricultural workers increased at an annual
rate of 3.4 percent in 1946-51. From 1951 to 1970, it increased at
only 0.3 percent a year (Table 5).
9. Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1976, p. 54.
10. Ibid., p. 52.
11. Ibid.
12. T. H. Shen and Y. T. Wang, "Technological Adjustments," in T. H. Shen
(ed.), op. cit., pp. 375-379.
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Table 5. Annual Rate of Growth of Agricultural Inputs in
Taiwan, 1946-70
(Percent)
1946-51

Total input
Cultivated land
Crop area
Labor
Working days
Number of workers
Fixed capital
Current inputs
Fertilizer
Total

1951-60

196D-70

1946-70

7.8
1.0
6.0

2.7
0.0
0.9

3.2
0.4
0.3

3.9
0.4
1.7

6.6
3.4
4.2

1.7
0.3
2.4

0.9
0.3
4.8

2.4
0.9
3.8

32.0
23.0

8.0
8.5

3.5
10.4

10.6
12.3

Source: T. H. Lee and T. H. Shen, "Agriculture as a Base for Socio-Economic
Development" in T. H. Shen (ed.), Agriculture's Place in the Strategy of
Development: The Taiwan Experience (Taipei: Joint Commission on Rural
Reconstruction, 1974).

The number of working days in agriculture increased at a
substantially faster rate than the number of workers. For 1946-70,
the annual rate of increase of working days was 214 percent, but
that of number of workers only 0.9 percent (Table 5). This means
that the average working days per worker increased substantially.
In 1946-47, the number of working days per agricultural worker
was only 73 days a year. It increased to 148 days in 1969-70. For
the female worker, it was 75 days in 1946-47 and 152 days in
1969-70. 13 The increase in the number of working days per worker
per year suggests a more intensive utilization of labor, or possibly
a decline in underemployment or disguised unemployment. 14
13. Wen-hui Lai, "Trend of Agricultural Employment in Postwar Taiwan,"
presented to the Sino-American Conference on Manpower in Taiwan (Taipei: Hotso Jen-li Tzu-yuan Hui-i Lun-wen Chuna-chi (Papers of the Sino-American 1972
Manpower Conference). Lai's estimate of the number of working days per year is
different from what is implied in Table 5.
14. The issue of disguised unemployment is too complicated to be discussed
here. According to one study, the rate of utilization of farm labor was only 46
percent for both 1956 and 1962. (This rate is defmed to be the ratio of labor used in
farm work and side occupations to available farm labor.) This seems to suggest the
existence of large disguised unemployment. See Ch'ing-jung Liu, "Taiwan Nungtsun-chung Chih Ying-ts'ang-hsing Shih-yeh wen-t'i" (Rural Disguised Unemploy-
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The increase of farm labor input (in terms of man-days per
year) was associated with the increase in multiple cropping and a
shift to more labor-intensive crops, such as fruits, vegetables,
mushrooms, and asparagus. Labor input per hectare crop
increased from 97 working days in 1945-47 to 151 in 1969-70.
Labor input per hectare of cultivated land increased from 122
working days in 1945-47 to 272 in 196.9-70. 15
Farm labor has not only increased in quantity; its quality has
also witnessed substantial improvement. In 1956, for example, 39
percent of agricultural workers were illiterate, and 51 percent had
an education at the level of primary schools. Only 3.8 percent had
a high school education. 16 In 1975, 24 percent were illiterate, 55
percent had a primary school education, and 13 percent had an
education at the high school level. 17

CAPITAL
Capital input may be divided into fixed capital (such as farm
implements and equipment, farm buildings, and irrigation
facilities) and working capital (such as fertilizers, feeds, seeds,
pesticides, and insecticides). Farm fixed capital increased at 4.2
percent a year during the recovery period, that is, 1946-51. In the
1950s, it increased at 2.4 percent, and in the 1960s, 4.8 percent.
From 1946 to 1970, it increased at an annual rate of 3.8 percent
(Table 5).
Farm working capital increased even faster. The corresponding annual growth rates were 23 percent (for 1946-51); 8.5 percent
ment in Taiwan), in Taiwan Jen-li Tzu-yuan Lun-wen-chi (Essays on Human
Resources in Taiwan) (Taipei: Lien-ching Publications Co., 1975), p. 426.
But the wage data do not seem to suggest such large-scale disguised
unemployment. Real wages in manufacturing rose at an average annual rate of 3.4
percent and 4.0 percent in 196Q-64. Taking the nonagricultural sector as a whole
(mining, manufacturing, and public utilities), real wages rose at an annual rate of
1.3 percent in 1954-59 and 3.6 percent in 196Q-64. See Chi-ming Hou and Yu-chu
Hsu, "The Supply of Labor in Taiwan," in Conference on Population and
Economic Development in Taiwan (Taipei: Institute of Economic Academia Sinica,
1976), p. 347. It might be that, contrary to the Lewis-Ranis-Fei model, a rising wage
rate might not be entirely incompatible with the existence of rural disguised
unemployment. A rising wage rate might have been necessitated by a rising
"minimum" living standard in the cities. Seasonality of farm work would make
any estimate of disguised unemployment an exceedingly difficult task.
15. Wen-hui Lai, op. cit., p. 129.
16. Ko-chih Liu, "Growth and Utill.zation of Human Resources in Taiwan," in
Tsung-Hsien Yu and Cheng Li (eds.), op. cit., p. 86.
17. Computed from Taiwan Provincial Labor Force Survey and Research
Institute, Quarterly Report on the Labor Force Survey in Taiwan, July 1975, p. 56.
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(1951-60); and 10.4 percent (for 1960-70). For the period from 1946
to 1970, it increased at an average annual rate of 12.3 percent
(Table 5).
Of all farm capital inputs, chemical fertilizer and feeds are
most important. For example, in 1961-65, chemical fertilizers
accounted for 32 percent of all capital imputs, and feeds, 38 percent.
The relative share of various capital inputs are given in Table 6.
Table 6.

Percentage Share of Farm Capital
Inputs in Taiwan (1946-65)
(Percent)

Chemical fertilizer
Seeds
Feeds
Pesticides and
insecticides
Depreciation of farm
building & equipment
Water fee
Total

1946-50

1951-55

1956-60

1961-65

13.77
23.36
36.62

32.12
14.84
34.04

33.90
12.43
36.31

32.45
10.59
37.83

1.19

1.65

3.61

7.89

16.06
9.00
100.00

12.52
4.85
100.00

9.91
3.84
100.00

8.09
3.15
100.00

Source: You-tsao Wang, "Technological Change and Agricultural Development in Taiwan," Taiwan Nung-yeh Fa-chan Lunwen-chi (Essays on Taiwan's
Agricultural Development) (Taipei, Lieng-ching Publications Co., 1975).

Water conservation work and irrigation are extremely
important in Taiwan, as paddy rice is the staple food and monthly
rainfall is very uneven. According to one study, the increase of
rice production was influenced greatly by irrigation; from 1950 to
1960 each 1 percent increase in irrigated area brought about a 2.5
percent increase of paddy rice yield. 18 But the expansion of
irrigated area was rather limited - it has remained around
500,000 hectares, or about 60 percent of the total cultivated area. 19
18. The regression is as follows:

Y = -186.5523 + 0.4971F + 2.47861 - 0.0047P
(0.7273) (0.6880) (0.0036)
R 2 = 0.97
S = 2.4918
where Y = paddy rice yield
F = quantity of fertilizer application
I = irrigated area
P = ice of rice.
The calculation was done by E. L. Rada and T. H. Lee, as cited by T. H. Shen
and Y. T. Wang, op. cit., p. 371.
19. You-tsao Wang, op. cit., p. 166.
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Chemical fertilizers have been used quite heavily in Taiwan.
Table 5 shows that the rate of increase of fertilizers (primarily
chemical fertilizers) was substantially larger than that of
cultivated land or crop area. From 1946 to 1970, the use of
chemical fertilizers per unit of crop area went up by about 9
percent a year. In terms of cultivated area, it went up by more
than 10 percent a year. The trend has continued since 1970.
In 1970, total chemical fertilizer used was 653,545 metric tons.
In 1974, it increased to 1,136,604 metric tons, or 74 percent. Total
crop area actually declined from 1,653,000 hectares in 1970 to
1,645,000 hectares in 1974. Area of cultivated land increased only
slightly from 903,000 hectares in 1970 to 917,000 hectares in 1974. 20
In absolute terms, chemical fertilizer used in 1974 was 0.69 metric
tons per hectare of crop area, or 1.24 metric tons per hectare of
cultivated area.
Farm mechanization has played an important role in
Taiwan's agricultural development. Since the early 1950s, power
tillers have been increasingly used to supplement or replace water
buffaloes. Since the 1960s, when farm wages began to rise
substantially, labor-saving machines have become widely used.
They include power sprayers, power threshers, corn shellers, jute
decorticators, sweet potato diggers, grain dryers, hand soybean
planters, peanut threshers, tea cutters, and rice transplanters. The
rapid increase of farm machines and the decline of draft animals
may be seen in Table 7.
Table 7. Increase of Farm Machines and Decline of
Draft Animals in Taiwan
(1,000's)

Draft Animals
Power tillers
Power sprayer
Hand sprayer
Hand duster
Rice thresher
Pump
Grain dryer

1960

1969

417.1
3.7
0.3
104.2
10.8
177.3
8.4

305.2
24.6
14.8
181.6
22.4
198.5
52.0
1.7

Source: T. H. Shen and Y. T. Wang, "Technological Adjustments," in T. H.
Shen (ed.), Agriculture's Place in the Strategy of Development: The Tawian
Experience (Taipei: Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, 1974).
20. Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1975, pp. 48 and 58.
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FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY
The rate of growth of total agricultural output in Taiwan has
been consistently larger than that of total agricultural input,
implying that factor productivity has increased. As Table 8
shows, total factor productivity increased at 1.7 percent per year
from 1946 to 1970.
Table 8. Annual Rate of Growth of Agricultural Factor
Productivity, 1946-70
(Percent)

1946-51
1951-60
1960-70
1946-70

Increase
in total
output

Increase
in total
input

10.2
4.7
4.2
5.6

7.8
2.7
3.2
3.9

Increase Increase in Productivity
per
in total
input
ha. of
productivity
worker arable land
2.4
2.0
1.0
1.7

6.3
4.4
3.9
4.6

9.2
4.6
3.9
5.2

Source: T. H. Lee and T. H. Shen, "Change in Food Consumption Patterns," in
T. H. Shen (ed.), Agriculture's Place in the Strategy of Development: The Tawian
Experience (Taipei: Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, 1974), p. 298.

As in the case of total output and total input, total factor
productivity increased at a decreasing rate, averaging 2.4 percent
a year in 1946-70. It is not entirely clear why this happened, but,
given the constant amount of total cultivated area, it seems that
the law of diminishing returns asserted itself, despite all the
technological progress that took place.
The rate of increase of average productivity of labor (output
per worker) was about the same as that of the average
productivity of land (output per unit of arable land) from 1950 to
1970. The increase of capital (Table 5) was evidently the main
determinant of labor and land productivity. 21 Total capital per
21. This can be demonstrated as follows: Let Y be output and L, N, K land,
labor, and capital, respectively.
y L
y
- =-.
N
L N
Similarly,
y K
y

--Thus,.

L

K

L

y K L
y
- =-.-.

N
K
L N
Since, in the Taiwan case, both Yl K and LIN have declined (see note 22),
the increase in Yl N must have been due to an increase in Kl L.
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unit of labor as well as per unit of arable land increased
substantially during the period.
According to one estimate, capital investment per unit of
cultivated land increased at a rate of 8.65 percent a year from 1946
to 1965. 22 Capital investment per worker increased at a much
lower rate, because labor increased faster than land. The increase
of capital intensity brought down the efficiency of capital. For the
period from 1946 to 1965, the average productivity of capital
declined at 0.71 percent a year.
The increase of land productivity implies an increase of crop
unit yield. The unit yield of all crops rose by about 26 percent from
1946 to 1951 and by 70 percent from 1951 to 1968. 23 Among
different crops, unit yield increased fastest for fruits and slowest
for vegetables for the period 1946-65. The growth rates of yield for
various crops are given in Tables 9 and 10.
Table 9. Annual Growth Rate of Yield Per Unit of Crop
Area in Taiwan, 1946-65
(By Groups)
Food Crops
Special crops
Fruits
Vegetables
All crops

3.45
4.67
5.39
0.43
3.63

Source: You-tsao Wang, {op. cit., Table 6), p. 105.
22. You-tsao Wang, op. cit., p. 179. For the period 1946-65, Wang's results on
Taiwan's agricultural factor productivity are as follows:
Annual
Growth Rate
(1946-1965)
7.21
Productivity of labor (per worker)
4.16
Productivity of labor (per man-day)
-0.71
Productivity of capital (fixed and current)
Productivity of land (per unit of cultivated area)
7.87
Aggregate input productivity
2.25
Capital-land ratio
8.65
-0.60
Land-labor ratio
23. T. H. Lee and T. H. Shen, op. cit., p. 293.
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Table 10. Annual Rate of Increase of Yield Per Unit of Crop
Area in Taiwan, 1953-1974: By Individual Crops
(Percent)
Crops
Rice (brown)
Sweet potatoes
Wheat
Soybeans
Peanuts
Cotton
Jute
Tea
Bananas
Pineapple
Citrus fruits
Sugarcane
Sugar
Brown sugar
Citronella
Mushrooms
Watermelon

1953-64

1965-74

1953-74

3.3
3.6
5.2
5.4
3.7
7.6
4.1
4.5
6.7
6.0
2.4
3.1
2.2
6.6
-0.3

0.7
1.3
1.5
2.9
2.4
0.2
-2.8
3.9
3.6
0.7
4.0
2.2
0.1
4.0
2.0
8.9
4.9

2.1
2.5
3.5
4.3
3.1
4.2
0.9
4.2
5.3
3.5
2.9
2.7
1.2
5.4
0.8
N/A
2.7

NIA
0.9

Source: Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1975 (Taipei: Economic Planning
Council, 1975), pp. 53-57.
Note: N/ A = not available.

Since the increase of both cultivated and crop area was fairly
small, especially since 1960, the increase in agricultural output
has been brought about largely through increases in unit yield.
The rate of increase of unit yield has declined since 1965 for
nearly all principal crops, as shown in Table 10. For rice, for
example, the average annual rate of increase of unit yield was 0.7
percent in 1965-74, compared with 3.3 percent in 1953-64.

ORGANIZATION AND POLICY
The above analysis suggests that the increase in agricultural
production in Taiwan has been associated with intensive
utilization of labor, more use of capital, and introduction of
modern technology. But what has brought about the changes in
agricultural inputs? Why did the farmer want to work harder?
Who supplied the capital? Who introduced technology? Who was
the agent of technological diffusion? Has all this been a result of
the interplay of market forces alone? Or were there other
instruments of change? What role did the government play?
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While an exhaustive study of all this cannot be made here, the
following institutional arrangements and government policy are
generally regarded as crucial ingredients of agricultural development in Taiwan.

LAND REFORM
In 1949 the government began a rent reduction program for
all private tenanted land, with a ceiling of rental rate being 37.5
percent of total annual main crop yield. The latter was fixed by
the government (or agreed upon by landlords and tenants) at the
1948level. But since actual crop yield has increased substantially
in later years, the effective maximum rate has been much lower
than the fixed 37.5 percent. 2 4
In 1951 the government started to sell farm lands that it had
taken over from the Japanese colonial government and Japanese
settlers and corporations in 1945, and had, in large part, leased to
farmers. These lands were offered for sale to tenant farmers at a
price equal to 2.5 times the annual main crop yield, to be paid in
20 installments over ten years. In 1949, the Chinese government
owned a total of 180,000 hectares of land. It sold 130,000 hectares
to 177,000 tenant families from 1950 to 1973. 25
In 1953, the "Land-to-the-Tiller" program was formally
launched. Under this program, a landlord was required to sell to
the government all his tenanted land in excess of three hectares of
paddy field (of medium grade) or its equivalent, at a price equal to
2.5 times the crop yield; 70 percent of the payments were in bonds
in kind and 30 percent in stocks of government enterprises. The
bonds in kind bore an annual interest rate of 4 percent and were
redeemable in installments over a period of ten years. The land so
purchased by the government was then sold to its original tenants
or farmhands at the same price as that paid to the landlords. The
payment was also in installments over a period of ten years with
an annual interest rate of 4 percent. Under this program, a total of
140,000 hectares of land was purchased from 106,000 landlords
24. For the details, see Chao-chen Chen, "Land Reform and Agricultural
Development in Taiwan," in Conference on Economic Development of Taiwan,
1967 (Taipei: China Council on Sino-American Cooperation in the Humanities and
Social Sciences, 1967), pp. 126-153; Yu-kang Mao, "Population and the Land
System in Taiwan," in Conference on Population and Economic Development in
Taiwan, 1976, pp. 163-191; Anthony Y. C. Koo, The Role of Land Reform in
Economic Development: A Case Study of Taiwan (New York: Praeger, 1968); Yhimin Ho, Agricultural Development of Taiwan (Nashville: Vanderbilt U. Press,
1966).
25. Yu-kang Mao, op. cit., p. 174.
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and sold to 195,000 tenant families. 26 Those farmers who
cultivated their own land were not affected by this program,
regardless of the amount of land they owned.
The land reform programs have had drastic effects on land
tenancy. The rent reduction program lowered the value of the
farm land leased to tenant farmers and encouraged the landlords
to sell the land to their tenants. A total of 66,328 tenant families
bought 34,453 hectares of farm land between 1949 and 1953. 27 The
sale of public land and the "Land-to-the-Tiller" program directly
reduced tenancy and increased ownership.
In 1949, of total farm households in Taiwan, some 39 percent
were tenant farms (as it had been for decades), 25 percent partowner farms, and 36 percent owner-operator farms. The proportion of pure tenant farms was reduced to 21 percent in 1953 and
9.7 percent in 1974. The proportion of owner-operator farms
increased to 55 percent in 1953 and 79 percent in 1974. Before land
reform, about 61 percent of private cultivated land was cultivated
by owners; thereafter, it increased to 85 percent in 1953. By 1974
the ratio was 91 percent.2s
It is generally felt that the sharp increase in owner-operator
farms has been not only politically and socially desirable, it has
also had desirable economic consequences. The owner-operator
may be expected to work harder when he does not need to share
the fruits of his labor with his landlord. It is also likely that what
would be used as payment for rent is now at least in part saved for
capital investment in land. To the extent that the rental income of
the landlords is not used for investment in land, either because it
is used for consumption by the landlords or other farmers
(through loans by the landlords) or because it is used for
investment in nonagricultural sectors, capital formation in
agriculture may be increased.
According to one estimate, the marginal propensity to save of
new farm owners in Taiwan was as high as 49 percent for
1952-62. 29 But there are no data to show how the former landlords
disposed of their income.
It has been suggested that the land reform program has
resulted in smaller size farms, which has resulted in inefficient
26.
702,325
27.
28.
29.

In 1953, there were altogether 872,738 hectares of cultivated land and
farm families. (Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1976, pp. 51 and 54.)
Chao-chen Chen, op. cit., p. 135.
Ibid., p. 144 and Yu-kang Mao, op. cit., p. 175.
Chao-chen Chen, op. cit., p. 148.
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operation. Before the Land-to-the-Tiller program, 58 percent of all
farms had less than 3 hectares of land; thereafter, the ratio
increased to 77 percent. 30 But part of this change must have been
due to an increase in the number of farm households. It must be
remembered that the land reform program did not involve
breaking up the large owner-operated farms. Furthermore, there is
no evidence to suggest that smaller size means less efficiency in
terms of output per unit ofland. On the contrary, one study shows
that in 1965 the value of total output per hectare of cultivated area
was NT$40,900 for farms of less than 0.5 hectare. It was only
NT$26,700 for farms of more than 0.5 hectare. But on a per manyear basis, it was smaller for farms of less than 0.5 hectare:
NT$20,000 compared with NT$25,400 for farms of more than 0.5
hectare. 31
Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR)
This Joint Commission of China and the United States,
created under the U. S. China Aid Act of 1948, has played a
crucial innovating role in agricultural development in Taiwan. It
has assisted the government in planning and coordinating
agricultural programs and has provided technical and financial
assistance to various agencies and organizations, private as well
as public. Its activities have formed an integrated agricultural
and rural development program, including technological improvements and institutional changes and readjustments. 32 It has
introduced new and improved varieties and breeds, better cultural
methods, irrigation, and the scientific application of fertilizers
and pesticides. For organizational developments, it has assisted
the land reform programs and the reorganization of farmers'
associations, irrigation associations, and fishermen's associations. It has also played a role in the improvement of marketing
procedures and facilities, the development of the rural credit
system, and the promotion of family planning programs.
30. Yu-kang Mao, op. cit., p. 176.
31. Hsi-Huang Chen, "Economic Analysis of Small Farms," in Tsung-Hsien
Yu and Yu-hsien Yu, op. cit., pp. 378-379.
32. Wen-fu Hsu, "The Role of Agricultural Organizations in Agricultural
Development in Taiwan," in Conference on Economic Development of Taiwan,
1976, p. 121; T. H. Shen, "Organizations to Promote Agricultural Development," in
T. H. Shen (ed.), op. cit., pp. 346-365; You-tsao Wang, "Agricultural Development,"
in Kowie Chang (ed.), Economic Development in Taiwan (Taipei: Cheng-chung
Book Co., 1968), pp. 217-223; T. H. Shen, The Sino-American Joint Commission on

Rural Reconstruction: Twenty Years of Cooperation for Agricultural Development
(Ithaca, Cornell U. Press, 1970).
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JCRR staff has provided technical assistance in the planning
and implementation for the agricultural sector of the Four-Year
Economic Development Plans which started in 1953. JCRR has
served as a coordinator on matters relating to the overall national
agricultural plan.
JCRR has also provided funds for the agricultural programs.
(The U.S. China Aid Act of 1948 provided that up to 10 percent of
all U.S. economic aid to China could be used to carry out JCRR
programs.) For example, from 1951 to 1965, JCRR approved more
than 6,000 projects carried out by various agencies and spent a
total of NT$4,000 million and US$7 million. A total of NT$13,330
million was used for investment in agriculture in Taiwan from
1953 to 1965. (NT$6,270 million of the total represented private
investment and NT$7,060 million public investment.) 33

The Farmers' Association
The Farmers' Associations are a federation of cooperative
organizations and are operated at the township (district) level, the
county level, and the provincial level. Township Farmers'
Associations are the grass-roots organizations that are directly
controlled by the farmers.
The Farmers' Associations are engaged in a wide variety of
both government-sponsored and self-initiated activities. The
government-sponsored functions have included distribution of
fertilizers and feeds, collection and purchase of rice, and
participation in agricultural extension services. The latter include
not only production technology of crops and livestock, they also
include farm management and organization and training of
young people to become better farmers. Adult farmers enroll in
farm discussion groups, farm women take part in home improvement clubs, and farm boys and girls join 4-H clubs. The Farmers'
Associations have been effective agents of dissemination of
technology. They are also engaged in purchasing farm supplies,
marketing and processing farm products, receiving deposits, and
making loans. They are truly multipurpose cooperatives. 34
33. Chi-tseng Shih, "Real Assets of Farming Households in Taiwan," in
Tsung-hsien Yu and Yu-hsien Yu, op. cit., p. 537.
34. 1'. H. Shen, "Organizations to Promote Agricultural Development," op. cit.,
pp. 354-357; Mao-Ying Chiu, "Farmers' Associations and Economic Development,"
in Tsung-hsien Yu and Yu-hsien Yu, op. cit., pp. 173-196.
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The Rice-Fertilizer Barter Policy
This policy was begun in 1950 for the purpose of raising rice
production by the farmers on the one hand and rice collection by
the government on the other hand. Government-imported fertilizers were given to farmers in exchange for rice, with the exchange
ratio being determined by the government. Thus the government
gained a large supply of rice, which was used for exports. In 1966,
for example, rice acquired by the government under the ricefertilizer barter program constituted 70 percent of all rice obtained
by the government. (Other sources included taxes in kind, rental
in kind, and purchases.)3 5
The advantages to the farmers of the rice-fertilizer barter
program were twofold. First, all farmers were guaranteed a supply
of fertilizers, which were the most important input of rice
production and yielded high returns. Without this program, the
poor and small farmers would probably have been denied such a
supply because of lack of funds and inability to borrow at
reasonable terms. Second, the farmers were free from risks due to
price instability. The rice-fertilizer ratio was fixed in advance.
This system was not without its shortcomings. Farmers had
no freedom of choice regarding quality or quantity of fertilizers
used, nor could they grow other crops without losing their
fertilizer supply. All the inconveniences of barter trade existed.
And the rice-fertilizer exchange ratio was not adjusted to reflect
changing market conditions and worked to the disadvantage of
the farmers. 36 The system was finally abolished in 1973. (In the
early 1970s, the government-owned fertilizer industry became
well-established.)

A New Agricultural Policy
Agricultural production increased at a rapid rate in the 1950s
and 1960s, but the rice-fertilizer barter system effectively transferred part of the increase out of agriculture. When this was
combined with the fact that nonagricultural production grew even
faster than agricultural production, the gap between per capita
farm and nonfarm incomes and living standards widened. In
1968, for example, per capita income of farm people was only 58
percent of that of nonfarm people. In 1954, the ratio was 75
35. Yu-hsien Yu, "An Analysis of Prices of Farm Outputs and Inputs in
Taiwan," in Tsung-hsien Yu and Yu-hsien Yu, op, cit., p. 201.
36. Tso-yung Wang, "Rural Reconstruction," in Tsung-hsien Yu and Yu-hsien
Yu, op. cit., pp. 443-446.
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percent. 37 To cope with this and other problems, a new agricultural policy was adopted by the Chinese government in 1969.
The main objective of the new policy was to reduce costs of
agricultural production and marketing by such measures as
reduction of fertilizer price and irrigation fees, farm mechanization, lower interest rates, and lower taxes. In 1972, it was
announced that the government was prepared to earmark in two
years a total of NT$2 billion in grants and almost an equal
amount (NT$1.8 billion) in loans to improve agriculture. Specific
measures included establishment of specialized agricultural
production areas, improvement of farming techniques (including
farm mechanization), and strengthening of rural infrastructures.
(A specialized agricultural production area means that all farms
producing certain items in a locality are urged to form a large
production and marketing unit to facilitate joint purchases and
joint production operations.)
The adoption of the new agricultural policy reflected the
changing role of agriculture in the economy. The agricultural
sector may no longer be regarded as a crucial source of financing
economic development, and the rural people may now equally
share in the fruits of economic growth. In 1953, agriculture
contributed 34 percent of gross domestic product and 87 percent of
total exports. By 1970, the corresponding shares had become 15
percent and 12 percent. 38
But all the above does not mean, of course, that there had
been no increase in farmers' income and living standards. Per
capita income of farm families rose, in 1952 prices, from NT$1,375
in 1954 to NT$1,836 in 1970, or about 1.8 percent a year. 39
By 1970, 93 percent of farm families had electric lights, 70
percent had electric fans, 53 percent had radios, 70 percent had
sewing machines, 17 percent had a television set, 36 percent had
running water, and 50 percent had water from sanitary wells. In
1970, 70 percent of the persons working on family farms had a
primary school education, or higher. 40 These were no small
achievements.
37. T. H. Shen, "A New Agricultural Policy," in T. H. Shen (ed.), op. cit., p. 39.
38. Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China 1975 (Republic of China:
Directorate General of Budget, Accounting & Statistics, Executive Yuan), p. 191;
Kuo-shu Liang, "Taiwan's Agricultural Trade and Economic Development," in T.
H. Shen (ed.), op. cit., p. 117.
39. Per capita income data at current prices are from T. H. Lee and T. H. Shen,
"Agriculture as a Base for Socio-Econovic Development," in T. H. Shen (ed.), op.
cit., p. 299. Index of Consumer Prices is from Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1975,
p. 157.

40. Ibid., pp. 433-435.
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ISSUES AND PROSPECTS
The rate of increase of agricultural production has slowed
down since 1971, averaging 0.98 percent a year for the five years
from 1971 through 1975. This may be compared with the average
annual rate of increase of 5.6 percent during the five years from
1961 to 1965. 41 This slow growth in recent years has occurred at a
time when the following phenomena have also occurred.
First, agricultural employment has declined continuously in
absolute numbers since 1969, with the exception of 1974 when
there was a decline in industrial production and some industrial
workers returned to the countryside. From 1969 to 1973, the
average annual rate of decline was 1.53 percent. 42 Such a rate of
decline, if continued, implies that an increase of agricultural
production at, say, 4 percent a year (roughly the historical rate),
would require an increase of labor productivity of nearly 6 percent
a year. This may be compared with the annual rate of increase of
labor productivity (agricultural output per employed person per
year) of 1.91 percent for the five years from 1971 to 1975. 43 For the
period 1946-70, the annual rate of increase was 4.6 percent (Table
8). The rate of increase of productivity of the agricultural worker
has also declined sharply in the past few years.
Second, the average size of farms in Taiwan was never large
and has been getting smaller. In 1925 it was 1.97 hectares. By
1950 it was reduced to 1.36. It continued to decline and reached
1.03 in 1970. In 1974, it increased to 1.05. 44 What is worse is that
the percentage share of the smallest farms has increased over the
years. In 1955 some 34 percent of all farms had less than 0.5
hectares of land. In 1970, the ratio reached 44 percent. In 1955, 53
percent of all farms had less than 1 hectare; by 1970, nearly 72
percent had less than 1 hectare. 45 As noted earlier, labor
productivity in small farms (less than 0.5 hectare) is substantially
lower (by more than 20 percent) than that in larger farms.
Factors affecting farms size are complicated. Aside from the
increase in the number of farm households, the land tenancy
system probably has also been important. The small farmers are
41. Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1976, p. 56.
42. Calculated from Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1976, p. 16. Employment
data are from the Quarterly Report on the Labor Force Survey in Taiwan (Taipei:
Taiwan Provincial Labor Force Survey and Research Institute, 1974).
43. Calculated from Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1976, pp. 16 and 55.
Agricultural employment data are from the Labor Force Survey in Taiwan.
44. Yu-kang Mao, op. cit., p. 167.
45. T. H. Shen (ed.), op. cit., p. 419.
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reluctant to sell their farms because of the risks involved in
nonagricultural jobs. They are also reluctant to lease their land to
others for fear of losing their land to the tenants under the land
reform regulations.
As a result, part-time farming has increased. Many farmers
find it necessary to supplement their incomes with nonfarm jobs
locally or in near-by towns or cities. Friends or relatives are asked
to take care of their farms during their absence, which may last
from several days to several weeks. This arrangement often leads
to inefficient operation. 46
In 1960, 52 percent of all farms were part-time farms. By 1970,
the ratio increased to 70 percent. For farms of less than 0.5
hectares, 70 percent were part-time farms in 1960 and 83 percent
in 1970. 47 The productivity of part-time farms is substantially
lower than that of full-time farms, as shown in Table 11.
Table 11. Productivity of Full-time and Part-time Farms
in Taiwan, 1967
Full-time
Farms
Income per house·
hold (NT$)
Income per manequivalent (NT$)
Rate of return on
capital investment
(%)

Returns per NT dollar
input (NT$)

Part-time Farms
(A)
(B)

26,004

23,360

13,727

17,248

12,990

5,935

7.13

6.03

1.86

1.94

1.89

1.46

Source: Terry Y. H. Yu, "Economic Analysis of Full-time and Part-time
Farms in Taiwan," as cited in T. H. Shen (ed.), Agriculture's Place in the Strategy
of Development: The Taiwan Experience.

The problems for agricultural development in Taiwan today
seem clear. To increase farm output and to reduce income
inequalities between agricultural and nonagricultural sectors,
which is a stated goal of the government, farm labor productivity
would have to be increased. One model of raising farm labor
productivity would be the American approach: development of
highly capital-intensive techniques (farm mechanization), but
that would require a much larger farm size than is found today in
Taiwan. Land consolidation would, in turn, require a set of
46. Yu-kang Mao, op. cit., p. 180.
47. Ibid., p. 177.
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institutional innovations whereby the inefficient part-time
farmers would be willing to sell or lease their land to others and
find employment in nonagricultural sectors. This is probably
what should or would happen. Agricultural employment still
accounts for 30 percent of total employment (1975)- a very high
proportion by the standards of industrially advanced countries.
Rapid industrial development would surely require a shift of labor
from the agricultural to the nonagricultural sectors. The question
is how to make such a shift without undesirable social consequences. Reliance on market forces alone for such a shift would
probably mean an increasing disparity between farm income
(especially for the small, part-time farms) and nonfarm incomesomething the government tries to prevent. Innovative jobtraining and reallocation programs for small, part-time, and lowproductivity farmers would thus be called for.
Another approach to raising farm labor productivity is to
retain the present dispersed farm ownership and part-time
farmers but to find ways whereby the small farms could form
cooperative and large operating units. Such large operating units
would make it possible to introduce mechanical technology. The
Chinese government has apparently already taken steps to
encourage this path of development: cooperative purchasing and
marketing, joint operations and management, and specialized
production area. But farm mechanization means labor-saving. If
it is deemed desirable to keep part-time farmers on the farm,
plenty of part-time nonfarm jobs have to be provided. This would
require a pattern of industrial development with highly dispersed
locations. It would also require a pattern of industrial management whereby jobs may be performed by part-time workers. It
might be argued that socially, morally, or ecologically, it is
desirable to combine farm and nonfarm work and minimize urban
growth, but whether this is economically desirable or feasible
remains to be studied.
It would not be an easy task to accelerate the increase in farm
labor productivity when the separation of land ownership and
operation is to be avoided, when a structural transformation of
labor from farm to nonfarm employment is to continue during a
period of declining agricultural labor force, and when income
inequalities between agricultural and nonagricultural sectors are
to be reduced. Aside from an increase in capital investment in
agriculture, a new set of institutional arrangements, or even an
industrial development strategy would have to be innovated. But,
in the past two or three decades, Taiwan has never lacked for
innovative policies and institutions.

Chapter IV

MANPOWER, INDUSTRIALIZATION AND EXPORT-LED
GROWTH-THE TAIWAN EXPERIENCE
HENRY

Y.

WAN, JR.

I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past 30 years, the economy of Taiwan has
experienced one of the best records of continuing development in
the world. This record is usually considered in one of two contexts:
1. As an exceptional observation in a cross-country study.

The superior performance of Taiwan is usually attributed
to some "atypical conditions." No in-depth follow-up is
offered in that context.
2. As a single-country case study, where the interactions
between Taiwan and the other economies are not emphasized. This approach tends to gloss over those conditions
without which a resource-scarce economy like Taiwan can
never prosper.
The more recent papers by Balassa 1 and Cole, 2 and the book
by Pauuw and Fei3 have remedied some of the omissions. The
present study is intended to close the gap further.
The story of the Taiwan "economic miracle" is one of
sustained rapid growth. Despite its meager resources and heavy
defense burden, the Taiwan economy exhibits a growth rate of per
capita gross domestic product that ties with South Korea and
Japan as the highest for the entire world outside of the oilproducing countries. Both the rich and the poor have gained in the
development process, and income distribution did not worsen as
rapid expansion took place. Without industrial strikes, real wages
have been rising rapidly, and unemployment is negligible. The
monetary authority has accumulated a sizable foreign reserve,
and the exchange rate has always been firm. Price stability is
attained in most years and domestic saving has risen to 25
1. Bela Balassa, Changing Patterns in Foreign Trade and Payments (New
York: Norton, 1964).
2. D. C. Cole, "Market Penetration by Asia's Super Exporters," in Hong
Wontack and Krueger, eds., Trade and Development in Korea (Seoul: Korean
Development Institute, 1975).
3. D. Pauuw and John C. H. Fei, The Transition in Open Dualistic Economies
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).
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percent or more of national income. Taiwan is nearly selfsufficient in food grain and the industrial sector is expanding very
fast. Life expectancy at birth is 66 years for men and 72 years for
women; the birth rate has fallen to less than 2 percent per year.
With 16 million people crowding on an island where population
density exceeds that of the Netherlands, residents are amassing
modern consumer durables briskly: one TV set per 17 individtlals
and one motorcycle for every 13. Postal service is the best in Asia,
and high-rise buildings transform the skyline.
No economist anywhere has seriously challenged the broad
outline of such a record. Moreover, no other developing economy is
superior to that of Taiwan on all dimensions. South Korea may
have grown faster recently but has heavier foreign debts and
frequent devaluations. Israel has a worse balance of payments.
Singapore has a worse employment situation, and Hong Kong is
not training enough skilled workers. Given the international
situation as well as the initial economic conditions, even critics
would be hard-pressed to suggest a policy alternative that would
guarantee a much better overall growth performance.
Manpower appears to be the single most important factor
underlying the development process. It is the availability, the
continuous upgrading, and the effective use of such manpower
that characterizes the Taiwan experience. With some modification, this experience should be applicable to all economies,
developing or developed, market oriented or otherwise.
II. A BACKGROUND SKETCH 4

Taiwan: A Rapid Survey
Taiwan is an island of 13,885 square miles, slightly smaller
than either Switzerland or the Netherlands, or the combined area
of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. Less than one
third of this is arable. Irrigation and much chemical fertilizer are
required for good crops. The rest of the area is mountainous,
covered by forests of indifferent commercial value. Coal, limestone, and natural gas are present in quantities insufficient for
local needs. The same holds for hydroelectric energy. For "The
Beautiful Island," nature has not been bountiful.
Under Japanese rule, 1894-1945, Taiwan supplied tropical
produce and rice to fulfill the import-substituting goal of the
Japanese Empire. Japan left three legacies: (1) good roads and
4. Unless otherwise stated, data on Taiwan came from Taiwan Statistical
Data Book of various years (Taipei: CIECD and Economic Planning Council).
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port facilities, (2) some food processing industries, and (3) a
peasantry conducive to technical change. The naval blockade and
aerial bombing in World War II reduced (1) and (2) to pale
shadows of their old selves.
The postwar years, 1946-1952, were a time of turmoil and
trial. During the first three years, the government of the Republic
of China at Nanking was locked in desperate civil strife. The best
administrators and technicians went to Manchuria; all resources
were mobilized for war. Nothing could be spared for Taiwanese
reconstruction. War damage was noticeable in Taipei until 1949.
Railroad shipping reached its prewar peak only by 1951. 5 The
recovery has not been rapid. From 1952 to 1956, both Japan and
Mainland China were no longer sheltered markets. About 1.2
million evacuees had to be absorbed in an economy of less than 7
million. Military preparedness assumed top priority to stop any
invasion forces across the strait of Pescadores. Inflation raged:
3400 percent in 1949, 306 percent in 1950, 66 percent in 1951, and
23 percent in 1952. 6 The currency reform in 1949 failed to stem the
tide, and the government deficit was financed by money issue. As
a last resort, a multitude of controls were clamped down on trade
and foreign exchange to preserve the remaining foreign assets. By
late 1950, much needed U.S. aid came on the heels of the Korean
War. Yet the repeated reversals suffered by the UN Command in
the first year of the war did not inspire investors anywhere off the
Asian mainland.
The decade 1953-62 was one of consolidation and stabilization. With U.S. aid, both the double-digit inflation and exchange
rate devaluation came to an end by 1960. Import substitution
policies were adopted to secure supplies of chemical fertilizer,
textiles, and cement. Under the 1953 land-to-the-tiller program,
shares of state enterprises were distributed to landlords to secure
their titles. Titles were given to tenant farmers against their
installment payments in grain over a decade. A series of trade and
foreign exchange liberalization measures were adopted between
1958 and 1963. 7 Per capita real income grew at the average annual
rate of 3 percent, a creditable but average record for other LDCs.
5. N. H. Jacoby, United States Aid to Taiwan (New York: Praeger, 1966), p.
82.

6. C. Y. Lin, Industrialization in Taiwan, 1946-1972 (New York: Praeger,
1973), Table 2-3, p. 46.
7. Much credit is due to the late Professor T. C. Liu and to Professor S. C.
Tsiang, See M. H. Hsing, "Taiwan," in J. H. Power, G. P. Sicat and M. H. Hsing,
The Philippines, Taiwan: Industrialization and Trade Pulicies (London: Oxford
University Press, 1971 ), p. 200 footnote.
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Some structural change of the economy also occurred. The
percentage of rice and sugar-traditional staples exported from
Taiwan-in total exports fell steadily, reaching 50 percent in 1960.
The changing structure of the economy is depicted by the
following figures:
Percent
of Employment

Percent
ofGDP

Agriculture Industry Agriculture
(1953)
(1962)

61
55

9

12

38
29

Percent
of Export

Industry
18
26

Agricultural
Good and Products
93

49

Industrial
Products
7
51

The years 1963-73 represented a period of sustained growth.
Various fiscal schemes- e.g., tax holidays and tariff rebates on
imported material processed for exports - were adopted to
encourage foreign investment and export. Export cartels for farm
products, export processing zones for manufactured exports,
industrial parks designed for land purchases and setting up
infrastructure were all adopted. The government recognized that
close international economic contacts may promote both economic
prosperity and international support to forestall or offset diplomatic reversals. In this period, population growth slowed down
from 3.2 percent to under 2 percent. Per capita real GDP grew at
an average rate of 7 percent per year. The changing structure of
employment, GDP, and exports has continued. The data on
employment and GDP will be shown later. The structural change
of exports continued, the percentage of agricultural goods and
products fell from 43 percent to 17 percent and the percentage of
industrial products went from 55 percent to 83 percent. Within the
"industrial exports," 90 percent were manufacturing products.

Structural changes also took place. 8
The fastest growth between 1966 and 1971 belonged to the
electronics industry. This industry attracts most of the foreign
investment and exports most of its output. Its subsectors,
telecommunication and generators/motors, grew at annual rates
of 80 percent and 54 percent. In 1971, 60 percent of textile products
were exported. The subsectors of knitted products and processed
apparel also grew at 65 percent and 41 percent per year between
8. The only data available in that period are from "Household registry", a
record believed to be biased in overstating the farm population, as people leaving
farms may not register. The trend shown is probably correct.
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1966 and 1971. Another industry that attracted foreign investment
and exported much of the output is rubber, chemical, and
petroleum products. Its output growth in 1963-72 kept pace with
the industrial sector as a whole -i.e., its output rose by five times.
Finally, food, beverages, and tobacco industries increased their
output by a factor of 2.5 in that decade. Consequently, their
weight among all manufacturing outputs fell over time. During
this period of rapid growth, the average increase of wholesale
prices was 3.5 percent. The official exchange rate to the U.S.
dollar remained at 40:1 throughout, and there was scarcely any
difference between the official and black market rates. Unemployment was insignificant, but the real wage was rising. The ratio of

exports to GDP rose to about 50 percent. 9
The years 1974-76 were a period of external disturbances and
internal adjustment. Near the end of 1973, the rise of world prices
over Taiwan prices caused an explosive export boom. Stock-intrade was quickly depleted and export revenue was instantly
transformed into domestic money supply. The shortage of
soy beans was followed by the oil crisis. The government briefly
subsidized imported farm produce at an untenable fiscal cost.
When this measure was finally abandoned, it was coupled with a
sharp increase of public utility rates. In early 1974, prices rose by
more than 50 percent in one year. By then the recession in the
developed world deepened. Export markets for a while disintegrated and factories started laying off workers. Per capita GDP
fell but prices stabilized under a tight monetary policy. As
recovery in Japan and the United States finally came, the Taiwan
economy also started to recover, a process that is going on today.
The surprising resilience of the economy shows that even during
an acute international recession Taiwan could weather the storm
without resorting to quotas and controls. This study will focus on
the period before the Yom Kippur War, since the worldwide
stagflation in its aftermath is still not quite over and it is too early
to analyze the events.

Japan And The Far East Four:
The Perspective
The industrialization of Germany, Russia, and Japan is by
now a familiar tale. Rapid tempo, gigantic scale, basic industrq,
and special institutions designed to mobilize savings characterize
their development process. 10 Attempts to exulate such examples
9. Perspective on Industrial Development in Taiwan (Taipei: Ministry of
Economic Affairs, 1973), pp. 73-74.
10. See, for instance, Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in
Historical Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962).
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were made after World War II by India, Indonesia, and others in
starting with heavy industries of modern design, but with poor

results.u At the other end of the spectrum, when the export-·
propelled growth of Latin American states suddenly ended during
the Great Depression and World War II, they took up the theory
and practice of import-substituting industrialization. 12 The experience was frustrating: initial success and heightened hope,
followed by stagnation and disillusion. The same was true for the
Philippines. 13
In fact, in the late 1950s, the Taiwan economy was in a
similar plight: overvalued exchange rate and underutilized plant
capacities. 14 In the past 20 years, four Far East economies Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan -have had the
highest observed sustained growth of per capita GDP (Tables
1-4). Yet there are important variations. To understand the
development process in Taiwan, one may conveniently consider
the development process of this group. (See Chart 1.)
11. See, for instance, J. Bhagwati and P. Desai, India: Planning for
Industrialization: Industrialization and Trade Policies since 1951 (London: Oxford
University Press, 1960).
12. See, for instance, Albert 0. Hirschman, A Bias for Hope (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1971), Chapter 3.
13. G. P. Sicat, Economic Policy and Philippine Development (Manila:
University of Philippines Press, 1972).
14. Kuo-hsu Liang, "Trade and Employment in Taiwan," in Proceedings of the
Sino-American Conference on Manpower in Taiwan, Academia Sinica, Taipei,
1972, p. 240, reported that factories producing tennis shoes, paper, etc. in 1959 had
utilization rates from 23 to 67 percent. With few exceptions, improvements were
dramatic by 1969. Pauuw and Fei, op. cit., proposed a theoretic explanation about
why import-substituting industrialization must fail.

Table 1
Average
Annual Growth
of
% GDP constant prices

Facts at a Glance
1973

South Korea
Taiwan
Hong Kong
Singapore
Japan
West Germany
United Kingdom
Italy
France
Netherlands

Average
Annual Growth
of
The Export/GDP Ratio

Population
(million)

Density
per km 2

%GNP
(U.S.$)

196Q-65

1965-70

197Q-73

196Q-65

1965-70

1970-73

33
16
4
2

334
429
3980
3761

378
655
1416
1890

3.6
6.4•
8.1
2.5

9.0
7.0"
5.9
10.9

8.7
9.7
5.9
10.5

14.4
13.2
0.5
N.A.

25.3
17.1
5.8
N.A.

2H.6
24.6
1.0
N.A.

55
108

291

3782

9.0

10.6

7.4

4.5

4.0

l.:J

62
56
55
52
13

249
229
182
95
329

5671
3088
2515
4797
4435

-

Other non-oil producers with rapid sustained growth of % GDP

-Cyprus
Israel
Greece
Spain
Portugal
Tunisia
Brazil

196Q-65

- 6.6
--

4.9
7.1
7.3
5.5
2.3
1.2

5.6
7.0
5.2
5.1
1.5
3.9<

---

1965-70

197Q-73

--5.5
6.1
8.lb
6.2
7.9
7.6
7.2•

• Average of the% annual growth rate.
b 197Q-72.
c 1965-67.
Source: Economic Planning Council, Republic of China, Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1974, pp. 4, 19; United
Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1969, New York, 1970, Vol. III, pp. 175-177, and Yearbook of National
Accounts Statistics 1973, 1975, pp. 152-153; United Nations, Demographic Yearbook 1970, New York, 1971, pp. 128·131, and
Demographic Yearbook 1973, 1974, p. 103; Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, China: A
Reassessment of the Economy, Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975, pp. 42-43.
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Table 2. Percent Distribution of GDP (Employment)
Singapore
Agr.
1960
1965
1970
1973

4

3
2(.5)
2(.5)

South Korea

Taiwan•

Japan

Mfg.

Agr.

Mfg.

Agr.

Mfg.

12
15
23(30)
27(36b)

37
39(59)
28(51)
26(5Qb)

14
18(9)
22(13)
26(14b)

33
27(44C)
19(37)
16(31)

17
20(17C)
24(20)
30(27)

Agr.

Mfg.

13
10(25)
7(17)
6(13)

33
32(24)
36(27)
38(28)

Q

0

z

~

:::
'"tj

0

~

• Percent of NDP.
b Percent in 1972.
c Percent in 1966.
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Table 3. Percent Distribution of GDP from Mfg. Industries

00
~

South Korea
Fd.
1960
1965
1970
1973

40
33
29
23

Taiwan

Text.
29
23
21
30

CWM/M
17
27
35
34

Fd.
44
35
24
17

c::
t:l

Japan
Text.
15
15
14
18

CH/MM
22
33
43
50

Fd.
13•
12
10
8

Text.
8•
7
6
6

CH/MM
53"
57
62
61

• Percent in 1963.
Source: See note to Table 1; George J. Staller, "Fluctuations in Economic Activity: Planned and Free-Market
Economics, 1950-1960," American Economic Review (June 1964), p. 391.
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Table 4.

Ch/M/M - Chemical Products, Basic Metal and Machinery

~

Share of U.S. and Japan in Exports (%)
South Korea
U.S.

1962
1965
1968
1971

22
23
52
50

Japan

Taiwan

Japan

43
25
22
25

Sum

65
60
74
74

u.s.
24
22
36
43

z
'tl

Japan

24
21
16
12

Sum

48
53
51
56

u.s.

Japan

21
28
34
35

5
6

Sum

:;;

t>l

6

7

26
:l4
40
42

Source: David C. Cole, "Market Penetration by Asia's Super Exporters," in Hong Wontak and A. 0. Krueger (eds.),
Trade and Development in Korea (Seoul: Korean Development Institute, 1975); Economic Planning Council, Executive
Yuan, Republic of China, Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1974, Taipei, 1974, pp. 157, 272-273; United Nations, Statistical
Yearbook 1960, New York: United Nations, 1967, pp. 535-537; Statistical Yearbook 1970, New York, United Nations, 1971,
pp. 556-568.
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Briefly speaking, the Far East Four and Japan all have
meager natural resources and very high population densities. (In
fact, all the Far East Four have higher population per square mile
than Japan.) But the Far East Four have less capital per head,
lower per capita income, and a far smaller domestic market than
Japan. There is scarcely any R&D capability and all have large
numbers of displaced or unemployed persons to support. The
dependance ratio was high and population pressure was strong in
the early stages. None of these economies are self-sufficient in
food, yet they all have had rapid growth in per capita GDP and all
enjoy fast growing export markets. In fact, exports increase faster
than GDP in all cases. The structures of their GDP, employment,
and exports have all undergone profound transformations, such
that the manufacturing sector has increased by any of these three
indices in all of the four economies. Within the manufacturing
sector, the industry group of chemicals, basic metals, and
machinery has gained over time relative to food processing, while
textiles and apparel hold their own, relative to the aggregate
manufacturing output. These structural transformations are
similar to those experienced by Japan. All these economies have
little difficulty in negotiating private loans or attracting private
foreign investment, yet they all have high savings/income ratios,
approaching that of Japan. All these economies have succeeded in
displacing Japan in labor-intensive products on the American
market, and the combined markets of America and Japan loom
large in all these economies' exports.
These four economies all enjoy domestic peace and order and
are free from industrial disputes. Real wages steadily rise through
the competitive market force, and they all maintain "realistic"
exchange rates. Interest rates are all kept either equal to the
international rate or sufficiently high to encourage domestic
saving in the form of saving deposits. They all have liberal
regulations regarding trade and foreign investment. They all have
a high ratio of literacy and widespread education, especially
among the young females who form the backbone of the textile
and telecommunication labor forces. Public enterprise has a low
profile outside the utility fields, and American and Japanese firms
are the main foreign investors.
Needless to say, they all face the contemporary world where
(1) technology has made transportation and communication fast
and cheap, (2) institutions (IMF, GATI, etc.) have facilitated
international movements of goods and capital, (3) the world
economy has provided long periods of steady expansion with only
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short and mild recessions where "mass high consumption" in the
developed "center" demands high-value, low volume goods such
as radios, TV sets, minicomputers, plastic toys, etc., and (4)
politics have made resources easily available (due to decolonization), markets open (since the United States cannot afford to
pauperize countries by prohibitive trade restrictions) and boundaries closed for Japan and the United States regarding "foreign
workers" (of South Africa, West Europe, and Israel). They may
also explain, at least in part, the "trend acceleration" of the
Japanese growth observed by Ohkawa and Rosovsky.
The diversities among the Far East Four are equally telling.
Historically, Taiwan and South Korea specialized in agriculture
before industrialization. Hong Kong and Singapore specialized in
entrepot trade. Singapore and South Korea originally received
income from foreign garrisons; Hong Kong and Taiwan did not.
South Korea and Taiwan enjoyed U.S. aid until 1971 and 1965,
respectively. South Korea and Taiwan produce the bulk of their
foodstuffs, and they also have sizable defense burdens, while
Hong Kong and Singapore have little defense expenditure and
must import food. Hong Kong has always been on a floating
exchange rate. Taiwan has tied its exchange rate with the U.S.
dollar, and South Korea has had a series of devaluations. South
Korea, alone of the four, has had quite a bit of inflation. Singapore
alone has still some unemployment, while Taiwan and Hong
Kong have absorbed migrants from Mainland China since
1949-50. Hong Kong pursues a strict laissez-faire ·doctrine, while
the other three first adopted import-substituting industrialization,
followed by export-promotion, investment-inducing policies. Politically, Hong Kong has no government, while in the other three,
strong government guidance pervades in all spheres. Except for
South Korea, all have Chinese populations and investors shift
investment funds among the three.
The combined population of the Far East Four is one-half that
of Japan, or equivalent to any of the big four in the EEC: West
Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, or France. Hence, if their
growth trends continue, these economies will be of considerable
significance in their own right.
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Table 5. Inter-Asian Market Transfer in U.S. Imports (%)

Textile (SITC 8411)
1962
1965
1968
1971
Footwear (SITC 8510)
1962
1965
1968
1971
Clothing Ace. Knit (SITC 8414)
1962
1965
1968
1971
Radio (SITC 7242)
1962
1965
1968
1971
Telecommunication (SITC 7249)
1962
1965
1968
1971

Taiwan Hong Kong

Japan

Korea

35.3
35.3
31.9
21.8

.3
3.8
5.8
12.9

3.7
3.8
5.3
10.0

27.7
27.4
29.1
28.2

43.0
32.5
20.6
12.5

0
2.3
2.5
3.5

0
.9
4.0
8.7

0.3
0
0
0

17.0
14.9
11.4
13.2

0
1.1
10.9
13.5

0.9
1.3
7.9
26.4

11.5
23.0
25.2
20.8

71.2
74.2
67.6
65.5

0
0.8
0.6
0.8

0
1.7
5.0
6.8

0.3
9.1
10.0
14.3

0
38.1
34.0
42.4

0
0
0
0

0
0
4.7
6.6

0
4.1
2.2

Sources: Cole, op. cit, EPC, op. cit., 1974, p. 28.

The relationship between Japan and the Four is complex,
partly competitive and party complementary (Table 5). Their
displacement of Japanese products is based upon differential
wage trends. 15 Since 1960, the rise of the Japanese wage rate
outranks all other OECD countries. 16 By 1972, its wage rates were
way above all other Asian economies, as shown in Table 6. The
efficiency differences between these economies are not too great,
as Table 7 illustrates. However, Japan plays various complementary roles to the Far East Four. As a trailblazer, Japan's success·
has encouraged the Far East Four by example. Japan shares the
15. See M. Y. Yoshino, "Japanese Direct Investment," in Frank Isaiah, ed.,
The Japanese Economy in International Perspectives (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1975).
16. See, for instance, Walter Galenson and Konosuke Ldaka, in H. Patrick and
H. Rosovsky, eds., Asia's New Giant (Washington: The Brookings Institution,
1976).
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same disadvantages of lack of natural resources and dense
population, and in fact, planners in Taiwan and possibly in South
Korea use the Japanese experience as a reference. Japan is the
major source of petrochemicals for synthetic fiber textiles and
plastic products. It is also the major source of specialized alloy
steel for the machinery industries. Moreover, Japanese components are used in fabricating transportation equipment and
electronic appliances throughout the Far East. 17 For the Taiwan
electronic industry in 1971, 53 percent of the material and
components for exported products came from Japan, 10 percent
from America, and the rest were produced locally. The reason for
favoring Japanese intermediate products is their high quality and
low cost. In 1973, for example, silicon steel from Belgium was 30
percent more expensive than Japanese and American steel was 50
percent higher. 18 During the exploration of alternative supplies by
experts in Taiwan, when Japan was under pressure from
Mainland China to discontinue Taiwan trade, alternative sources
were available for all inputs, but they were all costlier.
17. See A. D. Little International Co., The Outlook of the Petrochemical
Industry in Taiwan, The Outlook of the Non-Electrical Machinery and Equipment
Industry in Taiwan, and The Outlook of the Electronics Industry in Taiwan
(Taipei: MOE, 1973).
18. A. D. Little International Co., The Outlook of the Electronics Industry in
Taiwan, p. 47; The Outlook of the Electrical Machinery and Equipment Industry,
pp. 36-37 (Taipei: MOE, 1973).
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Table 6. Monthly Wage Rates for Various Types of Labor Force, 1972 (in U.S.$)
Japan
Engineers
Craftsmen
Skilled workers
Semiskilled workers
Unskilled workers
Assemblers
Quality inspectors
Management

537
262
272
240
120
180
257
901

Singapore Hong Kong Taiwan
762
133
183
87
60
39
82
869

451
142
122
84
82
72
87
647

200
99
73
73
45
25
35
467

South Korea

Philippines

Indonesia

India

213
96
102
66
68

134
50
63
47
42
57
76
486

314
47
53
32
26

207
45
54

42
388

53
-

16
120
15:3
:360

0
0

z
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l'l
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0
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Sources: The Outlook for the Electrical Machinery and Equipment Industry in Taiwan, op. cit., pp. 42-44; EPC, op.
cit., 1974, p. 28: United Nations, op. cit., 1970, pp. 91-93; United Nations, op. cit., 1974, pp. 574-575; JEC, 1972, p. 42; JEC,
op. cit., 1975, pp. 42-43.
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Table 7. Cross-Country Efficiency Comparison of Female Semiskilled Worker in Electronics

t:l

t;j
Ul

Japan
Productivity

1

Singapore Hong Kong Taiwan
0.7-0.8

1

0.8-1.0

South Korea

Philippines

0.7-1.0

0.8

Indonesia
Malaysia Thailand
0.65-0.8

0.7-0.8

Source: A. D. Little International Co., The Outlook for the Electronics Industry in Taiwan (Taipei: MOE, 1973), p. 35.
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As distributors and buyers, Japanese firms often either
purchase components from the Far East Four to fabricate in
Japan (e.g., Taiwan electric motors) or procure the outputs and
resell them under their own well-established brand names,
through their well-developed marketing channels (e.g., canned
food from South Korea and Taiwan). However, the Japanese
government discourages the importation of labor-intensive products for domestic consumption, for fear of the pressure on smaller
Japanese firms.
Table 8. Change of Real Wage in Four Economies (1963=100)
Hong Kong
1962
1965
1968

96
124
154

Taiwan

South Korea

Philippines

98
111
131

105
98
131

101
86
88

Source: Sicat, G. P. Economic Policy and Philippine Development, op. cit.
Table 17-4, p. 426.

As an investor, Japan entered the Far East Four with two
different motives: (1) to end-run American quotas on textiles 19 and
(2) to procure cheap labor (see Table 8) and meet the "American
challenge" through their own offshore production strategy. The
latter deserves some elaboration. Japan experienced a labor
shortage for the first time about 1960, particularly for young
females. American firms seized the initiative and invested in
Taiwan to compete against Japanese products on the basis of the
low wage, efficient semiskilled female labor in Taiwan. As a
countermeasure, the Japanese followed suit. Subsequently, Mainland China pressure induced the Japanese to diversify investments to South Korea and Singapore. 20 Japanese direct investments are usually more numerous in the number of projects but
smaller in total amount in both South Korea and Taiwan, 21 but
more "pervasive" in penetrating all sectors, compared with
investments from other countries.
As a source of technology, Japan plays a major role. Lacking
capabilities for engineering design as well as an industrial base,
the Far East Four must import their production technology and
19. C. Y. Lin, op. cit., p. 141.
20. M. Y. Yoshino, op. cit.
21. Wan-son Tae, Development of Korean Economy (Seoul: KDI, 1972), p. 80
for South Korea, and A. D. Little International Co., Perspective on Industrial
Development in Taiwan (Taipei: MOE, 1973), p. 41.
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often their equipment as well from abroad. Since the Japanese
wage rate (relative to the cost of capital) is in between that of the
LDCs and the United States or West Europe (see Table 9),
Japanese processes are usually more applicable to the Far East
Four. In fact, the obsolete production processes from Japan are
often transplanted to the Far East Four under license. In 1973,
product designs of the Taiwan electrical machinery and equipment industry were often five to ten years old. Of the 16 major
firms, 14 received their technology from Japan in 1972-73. 22
Table 9. Hourly Labor Cost for Electronic
Products in 1973

Semiskilled assembler
Skilled technician
Junior engineer
Electronic engineer

Taiwan

Japan

0.19
0.62
0.75
1.00

2.50
2.75
3.50

1.28

Europe
2.02
3.38
4.05
7.76

United States
3.30
4.80
6.60
9.60

The last cited point is of most interest. During its own
industrialization, Japan enjoyed a large domestic market and a
population that excelled in assimilating technocultural influences
from abroad. Production technology in the late 19th and early
20th centuries was also fairly simple. None of the Far East Four
has had any of these advantages. Their present mode of
industrialization is a two-edged sword. In the short-run, by
cooperating with foreign business, these economies can safely
attain access to modern technology. They have successfully sidestepped the do-it-yourself hurdle encountered by the Mainland
Chinese in their backyard steel-making experiment. They also
have avoided the gambles wagered and lost by India in its heavyindustry strategy. But in the long-run, if they cannot break out of
the habit of turnkey factories and licensed technologies, they can
never join the ranks of advanced, small-sized industrial powers
such as Scandinavia, Benelux, and Switzerland.
To some extent, a competitive-complementary relationship
also exists between the Far Bast Four. There is competition in
their struggle for export markets and foreign investments.
Shortages of labor and land make Hong Kong less competitive
than Taiwan for certain industries. Table 8 depicts the faster rise
22. The Outlook for the Electrical Machinery and Equipment Industry in
Taiwan, op. cit., pp. 5, 30-31, and 34.
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of real wages in Hong Kong during the 1960s. The upheaval in
Hong Kong in 1967-a spillover of the Red Guard movement-also
led some industries to migrate to Taiwan. 23 Much ofthe "overseas
Chinese" investment was Hong Kong-based and Japan-based. 24
The rise of the textile and garment industries in Singapore is
partly due to the transfer of capital from Hong Kong and
Taiwan. 25 Rising wages in Taiwan also make the competition
from South Korea much more effective. The demonstration effect
certainly operates among the Far East Four. The success of the
Hong Kong economy in the 1950s stimulated trade and foreign
liberalization in Taiwan. 26 The success of the Kao-hsiung Export
Processing Zone encouraged similar developments in South
Korea 27 and Singapore (i.e., Jurong City).
The development process in Taiwan is not coincidental; its
experience deserves more attention than has been accorded it. The
Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand are currently
considering climbing on the bandwagon, with varying degrees of
success. As ProfessorS. Ichimura remarked to this author, several
years ago, there must be certain conditions in Taiwan conducive
to development, otherwise, the same international circumstances
should allow all Southeast Asian economies to grow equally well.
The inquiry into those conditions will be pursued below.

III. CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE TAIWAN
EXPERIENCE: PRELIMINARIES
Various explanations have been posited to account for the
successful development in Taiwan:
1)
2)
3)
4)

The modernization of Taiwan agriculture.
The import-substitution policy in the 1950s.
The infusion of capital from U.S. aid.
The infusion of technical and managerial labor force from
Mainland China.
5) The sagacity of economic policies.
6) The availability of cheap, efficient manpower.
23. E. H. Phelps-Brown, "The Hong Kong Achievements and Prospects," in
Keith Hopkins, ed., Hong Kong, the Industrial Colony (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1971).
24. C. Y. Lin, op. cit., pp. 139-141. Of the 152 firms in the Kao-hsiung Export
Processing Zone in 1969, 52 were from this category.
25. You Poh-Seng and Lim Chong Yah, eds., The Singapore Economy
(Singapore: The Eastern University Press, 1971), p. 203.
26. M. H. Hsing, op. cit., pp. 189-190.
27. Bong Jong Choe, "An Economic Study of the Masan Free Trade Zone," in
Hong and Krueger, eds., op. cit.
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History never repeats itself and available data rarely permit
the settlement of a controversy beyond a reasonable doubt. But if
the Taiwan experience is to provide any information for LDCs, at
other places, other times, some scrutiny of the above six theses is
essential.

The Role of Agriculture
The agriculture sector contributed in three ways to the
development process: (a) it provided a reservoir of labor for
industrialization without reducing agricultural output; (b) it
provided foreign exchange revenue in the earlier years and made
the economy self-sufficient in rice, vegetables, and meat (even
though some feed has to be imported) so that valuable foreign
exchange need not be spent on food imports; and (c) it provided
capital formation in 1951-55 and 9 percent of NDP, or 40 percent
of capital formation in 1956-60. 278 Certainly the role of agriculture
in Taiwan's development has been most helpful. But is its role
indispensable? I doubt it. The close resemblance of the development modes within the Far East Four was noted in the last
section. Of these four, Taiwan is the only economy where
agricultural modernization preceded industrialization. Hong Kong
and Singapore have no agriculture to speak of. Their development
was not hampered by the "import gap" or the "savings gap." True
enough, because of points (b) and (c), the Taiwan economy
overcame those two gaps; but the experience of Hong Kong and
Singapore have shown there are other alternatives. The case of
South Korea is also illuminating. An agriculture slow in its
modernization, like that in South Korea, would imply a faster
outpouring of manpower to the industrial sector. 2s Under the
conditions prevailing for the other three economies in the Far
East Four, export-oriented industry would quickly mop up the
released labor, financed by domestic savings, if possible, by
foreign investments, if necessary. To argue that agricultural
modernization is indispensable for Taiwan is tantamount to
arguing that the nonagricultural sector in Taiwan would fail
where the same sectors in South Korea, Hong Kong, and
Singapore have succeeded. So far, no one has come up with the
proof.
Caution is required in generalizing this observation. It is
possible for some LDCs to industrialize without raising agricultur27a. T. H. 'Lee, Inter-sectoral Flows in the Economic Development of Taiwan,
1895-1960 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971).

28. Pauuw and Fei, op. cit.
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al output first. It is not possible for a collection of LDCs, with
sizable population to pursue such a strategy. Otherwise, massive
reversals would be suffered in the terms of trade. 29

Import-Substitution-Industrialization (lSI)
By now, most economists agree that it was wise for Taiwan to
take its "outward looking" posture in the late 1950s and early
1960s. But did import-substitution-industrialization serve an
essential purpose along the "infant industry" lines? Quite a few
economists have answered in the affirmative. Since both South
Korea and Singapore had their own import-substitution phase
before their rapid growth, the thesis deserves careful consideration. The beneficiaries of the import-substitution policy in Taiwan
were the textile, fertilizer, and cement industries. The textile
industry is by far the largest and it has more linkages (with both
petrochemicals and apparel) than cement and fertilizer. Consequently, the issue can be settled then and there, if we can prove
that the textile industry in Taiwan has gained or lost because of
protection. Luck provides us a natural control sample-the textile
industry of Hong Kong. Hong Kong has a miniscule domestic
market and no tariff protection whatsoever. With less than 30
percent of the Taiwan population, it has a much larger textile
output. Moreover, its textile industry emerged in 1949-50 as some
Mainland Chinese arrived with their equipment and capital. All
the fiber has to be imported. These circumstances are similar to
those of Taiwan. (See Table 10.) It has more modern equipment
than even Japan and a higher intensity of utilization than
anywhere else. 3° From the textile industry, the forward linkage led
to the establishment of the apparel industry. Together they
employed half of the manufacturing manpower in Hong Kong. To
argue that import-substitution was helpful in Taiwan, one must
argue that the textile firms in Taiwan did not stagnate behind the
protective barriers relative to their Hong Kong counterparts.
Proponents of the historical usefulness of lSI have still far to go to
document their case. 31
29. W. Arthur Lewis, The Development Process in the Case for Development:
Six Studies (New York: Praeger, 1972).
30. See Table 10.
31. C. Y. Lin, op. cit., pp. 113-114 observed that in late 1953, a Taiwan
producer of cotton yam would earn 42 percent more out of each bale by selling his
product domestically rather than abroad, thanks to lSI. By early 1966, under
export promotion, he would gain 30 percent more by selling abroad than selling at
home. Over the years, the U.S. government has restricted imports of low grade
textiles but exempted higher grade outputs. The entry into the high-grade market
involves new equipment, new process, and the uninsurable risks including the loss
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Table 10. Asian Loom Activity, 1965
No. of Looms
(in thousands)
Japan
South Korea
Taiwan
Hong Kong
Philippines
Thailand

371
9
16
20
16
12

%Automatic

Hrs. Worked per
Loom per yr.

34
52
63
100
100
71

4,786
6,401
4,864
8,161
5,143
4,149

Sources: N. C. Owen "Economic Policy" in K. Hopkins (ed.) Hong Kong, the
Industrial Colony (Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 148; EPC, op. cit., 1974, pp.
79-80; Statistical Yearbook 1975, pp. 2, 117, 168-169, 208-209; Economic Planning
Council, Social Welfare Indicators, Republic of China 1975, Taipei, 1976, p. 46.

The U.S. Aid Factor
Between 1950 and 1965, Taiwan received US$1.5 billion in
economic aid. This amounted to 10 percent of GDP in the mid1950s and 4 percent in the early 1960s. 32 Without this timely
assistance, both economic and perhaps even political stability
would be in doubt. Jacoby speculated that without aid, recovery
and growth would still be feasible but would be more painful and
delayed-an assessment biased on the generous side regarding the
viability of the politicosocial fabric.
The interesting question for the other LDCs is somewhat
different: the political conditions called for a defense burden
around 10 percent to 12 percent of the GDP, in monetary value.
This exceeds the magnitude of U.S. aid. With an adopted Harold
Domar model, Jacoby asserted that the no-aid, no-defense effort
would be worse off than the observed situation. This conclusion
seems unwarranted. Jacoby's view is based upon the premises
that rapid expansion of exports is impossible and the export/GDP
ratio must remain quite low-assumptions contradicted by later
events. He then argued that without defense efforts, the manpower under arms would simply be unemployed and could not
contribute to export revenue. In view of the latter events as well as
of costly trained employees to competitors (Chinese do not share the Japanese
custom of "one boss the whole life"). No doubt technical stagnation results under
lSI.
32. M. H. Hsing, op. cit., pointed out even those figures understate the benefits
of U.S. aid since they were computed at overvalued local currency for the early
period.
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the performance of Hong Kong and Singapore, his conclusion is
hardly tenable. In fact, the monetary value of the defense
expenditure definitely understates the actual burden. In the early
half of the period with aid, the armed forces represented a
manpower equivalent to the combined employment of all industrial and commerce sectors. In the latter half, the armed forces
still freeze up a manpower equal to that of the industrial sector:
manufacturing, construction, utilities and mining all included. 33
In other words, in equivalent numbers, such a civilian labor force
produced about one-third of the national income. All in all, I
submit that a no-aid, no-defense Taiwan would grow at least as
fast as it did, other things being equal.

The Technical/Managerial Manpower Arriving From
The Chinese Mainland
Japan did not encourage Taiwan youth to seek higher
education during colonial days. Most of the students enrolled in
the Taihoku Imperial University were Japanese. Taiwan students
had to go to colleges in metropolitan Japan, which few could
afford. Only half of high school enrollments were Taiwanese,
studying in segregated schools of inferior quality. The repatriation of Japanese at the end of World War II left Taiwan with
administrative and technical anemia. The first wave of Mainlanders dispatched to Taiwan as well as Taiwanese returning from
Japan did not improve matters much. By 1948, three years after
Taiwan's retrocession from Japan, there were 37,000 persons with
a college education in a population of 6.8 million-less than six
per thousand-which is low even by the standard of many LDCs.
The evacuation from the Mainland increased the total population
to about 8 million, but the number of college graduates reached
68,000 by 1949. (The difference need not be all due to arrivals from
Mainland China, since the annual increases between 1946 and
1947 and between 1947 and 1948 were 7,000 and 11,000 respectively.) There is little debate that the increase in educated
manpower exerted a positive influence on the development
process. However, up to 1963, the growth performance in the
period of consolidation and lSI was by no means spectacular
compared with other developing countries such as the Philippines
or Brazil. An average 3 percent per year growth of per capita GDP
was grounded down below 1.5 percent. By 1963, there were 207,000
persons with a college education in a population of 11.9 million, or
33. Ibid, Chapter 9.
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17 per thousand. Quite a few of the original 30,000-odd college
graduates from the Mainland were by that time retired or dead.
Historically, one can hardly deny that those technical/managerial personnel from the Mainland performed their mission -to fill
the gap before the next generation could arrive at the scene, and
to educate, train, and lead the younger cohorts until they swelled
the ranks for the industrialization task. But it would be grossly
misleading if any LDC with an average complement of educated
manpower would explain away their lagged performance behind
Taiwan by the fact that no tide of educated emigres had hit their
shores. The comparable initial condition is Taiwan, 1963, and not
Taiwan, 1949. By 1963, the thinned ranks of the original educated
emigres no longer supplied the wherewithal of the economic takeoff.

The Sagacity of Economic Policies
As the economic policies of the government changed over
time, the broad question stated above is hard to answer. We shall
focus on four classes of economic policies:

A. Import-Substitution Policy. As we argued before, the
import-substituting policy cannot be proved to be beneficial to the
development process. On the other hand, the protection of the
textile, fertilizer, and cement industries was designed to reduce the
value of the import bill needed for producing clothing, food, and
housing. With backward integration, the reduced import demand
can be met out of reserves in case the export revenue declines. The
policy is quite rational for promoting sociopolitical stability, in
view of the volatility of sugar exports, which accounted for 60
percent of the export value, in those days.
B. Exchange Rate Stabilization Policies. The complicated trade and foreign exchange control in Taiwan was imposed
to protect the overvalued domestic currency. As an emergency
device, these measures may be justifiable against public panic.
After all, the United Kingdom went on and off "convertability"
after World War II. It is the persistent defense of an untenably
overvalued exchange rate and the bureaucratic abuses caused by
a complex control scheme that did real harm. There are few who
favor those control measures in their original forms.
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C. Policies Encouraging Foreign Investment and
Export. These measures are generally agreed to be necessary
for the growth record since 1963. Basically, they stimulate
technological transfer and spur domestic firms to adapt continuously to the dictates of the world market. On the other hand,
residual administrative red tape remains. In principle, if material
imported for producing exports is entitled to tariff rebate, which
should be equivalent to tariff-free imports of such material, then
the export processing zones (EPZ) should offer no discernible
advantage. The fact that firms favor EPZ sites testifies to the
bureaucracy outside these enclaves.
Most of the observed growth performance is attributable to
items (a) through (c). In my view, (a) and (b) are possibly harmful
for development. The liberalization measures made progress. But
they have not gone far enough for firms outside the EPZ to enjoy
conditions as favorable as inside the EPZ in which the situation
approximated the laissez-faire situation in Hong Kong where
economic policy is absent.
However, all these are valid only relating to the observable
performance of Taiwan to date. There is another class of policy.

D. Selective Inventives To Promote Skill-Intensive
Industries. Excepting Hong Kong, all the other three in the Far
East Four are actively pursuing such measures. With high wages
and scarce land, Singapore adopts "skill-promotion" policies by
sheer necessity. Both Taiwan and Korea are acutely aware of the
potential limitations of expanding labor-intensive industries. As a
South Korean officer observed, 34 if and when all LDCs in the
world produce labor-intensive products, the terms of trade are
likely to swing decisively against economies like those of the Far
East Four. In comparison, Hong Kong persists in specializing in
textiles and apparel as well as plastic products. These are
industries with low barriers to entry. The philosophy appears to
be: no point in worrying about sharing the pie, if the pie grows
fast enough. Since such industries as instrumentation, precision
tools, etc. offer high value-added per worker and broad scope for
efficiency increases but also call for skills with a long gestation
period, Hong Kong may conceivably be left behind by the rest of
the Far East Four in the future.
34. Wan-son Tae, op. cit., p. 58.
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In short, the economic policies adopted in Taiwan have some
justification. The observable performance cannot be attributed to
the superiority of such measures, if pitted against the laissez-faire
of Hong Kong. Yet the skill-promoted policy in operation now may
finally prove to be superior to laissez-faire in the future.

The Availability of Cheap, Efficient Labor
By the process of elimination, the availability of cheap,
efficient labor appears to be the common initial condition causing
the sustained rapid growth of all the Far East Four. Of course,
there must be certain permissive conditions. Externally, cheap
transportation and communication, relatively free movements of
goods and capital, prosperity at the developed "center" and
political conditions for some industrial powers to allow factories to
emigrate but not workers to immigrate must be present. Internally
the government must provide peace and order and control
debilitating corruption and bureaucracy. (As the Lockheed case in
Japan showed, not all corruption is debilitating to growth, a topic
I shall not explore here.) Firms must also be spurred to compete
internationally in order to keep their competitive edge undimmed.
However, all these do not explain the mechanism of development. Mter all, the cheapness of labor may lead to a once-for-all
upward adjustment of the wage rate. Institutions may keep the
adjustment process to approach completion for, say, two or three
years. What accounts for sustained rapid growth must be found
elsewhere. Capital accumulation is hardly an admissible answer.
In the Far East Four, an adequate inflow of investment can take
the place of domestic savings. R&D is not a suitable explanation.
Currently, none of the Far East Four has much designing
experimentation going on, to say nothing of organized research.
An in-depth analysis will be offered in the next section.
Such studies may appear superfluous at first sight. Would not
laissez-faire take care of matters all by itself, judging from the
"openness" of all the Far East Four who have attained rapid,
sustained growth? History shows this is not so. If rapid sustained
growth is the invariable lot for every practitioner of laissez-faire,
the wind would be long since taken out of the protectionists' sails.
Mter all, the quintessence of export-propelled growth before 1929
did not witness indiscriminate rapid industrialization all over the
world. A thorough understanding of the development mechanism
may reveal the preconditions for development for the Far East
Four, as well as the road ahead for skill promotion.
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IV. CAUSAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAIWAN
EXPERIENCE: THE ANALYSIS
For developed economies, the growth of per capita output is
conventionally decomposed into causal factors of "capital deepening" and technical progress. In the context of the Far East Four,
the upgrading of the labor force is the ultimate source for both
elements.
First, consider technical progress, by and large, a synonym
for the borrowing of technology. Turnkey factories and license
arrangements are open to all comers, provided locally favorable
conditions warrant. For the Far East Four, natural resources are
conspicuous by their absence and domestic markets are quite
modest, at best. Cheap and efficient labor forms the only possible
condition that may favor a particular industrial location. But
wages rise with economic development, and continuously improving efficiency of labor is indispensable for technological transfer.
Next, consider "capital-deepening". Parsimony is characteristic of not all Asians. What spells the difference between risky,
usurious consumption and hoarding of precious metal, land titles
or beaux art on the one hand, and productive investment on the
other hand, is a matter of investment opportunity. In the
traditional industries of the Far East Four-be it entrepot trade in
Hong Kong and Singapore or intensive farming in South Korea
and Taiwan-precious little scope is present to absorb much
domestic savings. In fact, even the textile industry appears to
have been insufficient to absorb the "overseas Chinese" capital
before Japanese and Westerners introduced new industry and
technology into the area. Consequently, either the mobilization of
domestic savings or the attraction of foreign investment into more
capital-intensive undertakings requires the attraction of new
industries. An efficient, cheap labor supply is indispensable in
this regard. But the labor in the Far East Four is by far not the
cheapest in the Far East, as efficiency again holds the key.
In what follows, we shall consider in turn, (a) the supply of
various types of labor in Taiwan (b) the demand for labor by
various types of industries, (c) the form of labor upgrading that
has occurred in Taiwan so far, and (d) the future prospects.
The Supply of Various Types of Labor in Taiwan
We shall use the various labor types required by the
electronics industry as a concrete example. Broadly equivalent
labor types are needed by other industries as well. Table 11
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summarizes the requirement of formal training or experience for
seven types of labor force. 35
Table 11. Training and Experience Requirements
for Various Types of Electronics Industry
Requirements
Labor Types
Unskilled workers
Semiskilled workers
Inspectors
Skilled workers
Craftsmen
Supervisors
Superintendents
Technicians
Junior engineer
Graduate engineer

Formal Training

Experience

Junior High (general)

and 1 month on·job training
Several Years of on-job
Vocational High School or training for the selected
semiskilled workers

College Education
Technical Junior College and 2 + years of experience
Bachelor Degree in
Electronic engineering and 1 year of experience
Bachelor Degree in
Electronic Engineering and 5 + years of experience

Although different industries differ in their manpower needs,
these classifications are broadly applicable. The various volumes
of A.D. Little Reports summarize the strengths and weaknesses of
the manpower supply in Taiwan:
1. The supply of unskilled labor is of little significance. No
industry of prospective expansion potentials relies heavily upon
unskilled labor. Farming may be the only major vocation where
formal education plays an essential role. However, neither in
Taiwan nor elsewhere does the development process rely upon
intensive labor application on the farm.
2. The supply of labor force readily trainable into semiskilled
labor is the main strength of Taiwan for industrialization. The
same points hold true for Hong Kong and for South Korea.
Hardworking and intelligent, these workers attract industries to
these economies. 36 The main source of such labor is the
"traditional sector"- i.e., the agricultural sector in South Korea
and Taiwan and the refugee families in Hong Kong. These
35. A. D. Little International Co., Minicomputers, and Opportunity of
Investment in Taiwan (Taipei: MOE), 1973.
36. See C. Y. Lin, op. cit., K. Hopkins, ed., op. cit.; and Wan-son Tae, op. cit.
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workers are mostly young men and women newly joining the
manufacturing industries after 6 to 12 years of general schooling.
The effect of such education will be considered below.
3. The supply of skilled labor, craftsmen, and technicians
falls short of their supplies, partly because of biased education
priorities in earlier years and partly because of the inability of the
existing small firms to train such labor on the job. This bottleneck
is also acutely felt in South Korea and Singapore. 37 This problem
has been addressed in Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea.
4. The supply of "junior engineers" is paradoxically abundant. Social preference favors engineering rather than technician's
training for well-to-do youth. The universities also tend to be able
to raise more money than technical junior colleges and vocational
high schools. In the end, since the economy is not yet highly
industrialized, engineering students have little chance to gain
experience to become "graduate engineers." Since they are not
accompanied by an adequate complement of technicians, craftsmen, and skilled workers, they have difficulties in obtaining
suitable industrial employment. Brain-drain through migrating
overseas and "promotion" into managerial/executive ranks
further diminishes those who would be able to upgrade their own
capability through experience. The same problem hurts South
Korea to some degree.
5. The supply of "graduate engineers" is usually very short.
However, inasmuch as the demand per firm for such expertise is
usually very small and high-skill industries are not yet in
blossom, the shortage is not acutely felt. The hiring of "expatriate" specialists from developed countries is still possible,
although very costly.

Demand for Labor by Various Types of Industries
Obviously, most industries need all labor types, and interindustry dependence is also important. It is not our intention to
delve into the manpower requirements of all industries: references
for such information are available. 38 However, the availability of
cheap, efficient labor of certain types is crucial for the operation of
certain industries, either because wage costs for that category
loom large in the cost structure, or because the product quality
critically depends upon the presence of certain expertise. The
following listing is illustrative only: 39
37. Wan-son Tae, op. cit., p. 166; and You and Lim, op. cit., pp. 30D-301.
38. E.g., M. A. Horowitz, M. Zyrnelman, and I. L. Herrnstatt, Manpower
Requirement for Planning (Boston: Northeastern University, 1966).
39. This is largely based upon the various volumes of the A. D. Little Reports,
op. cit.
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1. The textile industry and telecommunication assembly
industry. Cheap and efficient semiskilled labor is essential
because the proportion of such wage cost is large in the cost
structure.
2. The petrochemical industry. Formally trained technicians
and engineers are essential because of the character of the
operations, even though their wage bill is not important in this
capital-intensive sector.
3. Industries producing high quality electric appliances.
Experienced engineers are needed for product design, etc., so that
elements of originality and utility can be balanced by technical
and economic feasibility.
4. The precision equipment industry. The reputation of the
entire firm, or the image of the workmanship of an entire
economy, is needed to market the product among the industrial
buyers.
The Taiwan economy, along with Hong Kong, Singapore, and
South Korea, currently enjoy a comparative advantage in
industries of type 1. For social reasons, presumably, Pakistan is
capable of producing textiles for export, but cannot assemble
television sets competitively. The A. D. Little team did not find it
difficult for Taiwan to expand its petrochemical production.
Apparently, the junior engineers and technicians, with perhaps
some infrequent assistance from more experienced personnel, can
handle such standardized operations quite well. This covers
industries of type 2. For products of type 3, Taiwan has not
seriously entered the market yet. The production of machinery
and equipment of medium or lower quality is thriving in Taiwan.
The shortage of experienced, skilled workers is easing over time
and there are institutions providing specialized training. However, the shortage of senior engineers is much harder to alleviate.
Industries of type 4 are largely a matter of the future. Only time
and continued superior performance can make progress.

The Upgrading of the Labor Force in Taiwan
The improvement of labor efficiency in Taiwan is attributable
to the following factors:
1. The spreading of secondary education facilitates the
rural-urban migration of the peasant youth. This increases the
supply of an efficient semiskilled labor force.
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2. The sociocultural values encourage young female workers
to accept factory jobs at wage rates lower than the male
semiskilled workers and possibly what they themselves could
command in the service industry.
3. The cumulation of experience under the Taiwan environment, and
4. The gradual expansion of the industrial vocational
education, the on-the-job training programs.

The Role of Secondary Education
Education has been expanded in Taiwan at all levels during
the last 25 years. The percentage of school-age children in school
and the percentages of primary, junior high, and senior high
graduates admitted to the next higher level of schooling have
either increased or remained the same. But the fastest increase
belongs to the percentage of primary school graduates admitted to
secondary schools. It went from 32 percent in 1950 to 84 percent in
1973, i.e., more than doubling. (See Table 12.) The numbers of
individuals with a junior high level of education (but not above)
went up by a factor of 3.5 for the males and 4.4 for the females
between 1953 and 1972, while the population has not quite doubled
itself. 40 The junior high education seems to be of special
significance. A student with 9 years of schooling at 15 years has
more influence over his or her future than a primary school
graduate at 9; the latter is likely to go back to the original family
environment. The former has a high tendency to migrate to
"greener pastures": the urban area for the rural youth. Even in
1955, only 33 percent of the Taiwan population resided in cities of
more than 20,000. The ratio rose to 46 percent by 1972. The figure
may be somewhat low, as migrants may fail to report their
movements. At any rate, Taiwan is still not highly urbanized, so
that migration into urban areas, which secondary education

encourages, is significant. 41
40. Statistical Yearbook and Explanatory Notes (Taipei: DGBAS, 1975).
41. Ibid.

......

~
~

0
0

~

Table 12. Taiwan School-Age Children in School and
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Migrants into urban areas often lead to shanty-town squalor
and urban unemployment in other developing countries. But
armed with 9 years of education of the type prevalent in Taiwan,
these youths have acquired such attitudes and habits that they
become readily trainable as semiskilled workers. These are
precisely the types of workers intensively used in textiles and
electronic assembly operations, which supply the major exports
from Taiwan.
Semiskilled labor is not hard to train, provided the warder
has the appropriate work ethic. In my opinion, the single most
important factor transforming a youth of the traditional sector
into an effective worker in the manufacturing sector is junior high
school. Due to the young age of the students, primary school is
usually less demanding on the children. Hence the marginal effect
of 3 junior high school years appears to be considerable. Through
these 9 years of education, a youth is conditioned to a structured
life style, the habit of fulfilling the task under a reward system,
and a capacity to attend to details. This is especially true under
the types of schools in Taiwan where all schools use the same
texts, and 89 percent of the subjects are "required" rather than
selective. 42 The peer pressure is strong, reinforcing where no
formal system can hope to reach. Intense homework is done for
competitive admission tests into schools of higher level. Finally,
boys' and girls' schools are ranked by group academic scores.

The Discriminatory Wage Structure by Sex
Table 13. Age Distribution in Percent (1974)

Agricultural labor force
Manufacturing labor force
Female labor force

15-19

2G-24

25-29

30-34

35 +

12
33
46

8
20
29

8
11
6

11
10
5

61
26
14

Source: Quarterly Report on the Labor Force Survey in Taiwan, Republic of
China, Taipei, Taiwan Provincial Labor Force Survey and Research Institute,
July, 1974.

The age distribution of the labor force, shown in Table 13, is
particularly revealing. Manufacturing has a much younger
distribution than agriculture. Hence, the young are recruited by
manufacturing and the old remain on the farm. The spread of
42. Education in the Republic of China (Taipei: Ministry of Education, 1974).
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education thus makes the manufacturing workers better educated.
The female manufacturing laborers are much younger than the
males, corroborating the observations that female workers in
Taiwan often start work at 15, the graduation age of junior high
school. They work for at most six years and get married.
Subsequently, they rarely return. The youthfulness of these
workers and the brevity of their working life make such a labor
force full of vitality and relatively immune to boredom. Moreover,
since they support no family members and only earn their own
living with some contribution to their dowry, they do not insist on
high pay. In fact, performing semiskilled tasks, these women
receive wage rates only about half of that of an unskilled (male)
worker. Their alternative options are idling at home, working very
long hours at retail shops, or serving as socially ·less desirable.
domestic servants. Reputedly, girls prefer a factory job to a maid's
position at twice as much pay. Their marriage prospects are
supposedly much better if they work in factories.
The situation is in sharp contrast with India. There,
apparently by custom, assembly work is done by men who
demand higher wages. The monthly wages in U.S. dollars during
1973 for assemblers and unskilled workers were as follows: 43

India
Taiwan

(1)

(2)

Assembler

Unskilled worker

(1)/(2)

120
25

16
45

7.50
0.55

It is understood that the recent effort by Pakistan to assemble
telecommunication equipment has not been successful because of
high costs. In Pakistan, by custom, females who are qualified
would not work in factories.
In 1973, exports of textile products and electrical machinery
and apparatus are the two most important items among all export
products. 44 In September of that year the sex composition of three
industries was as listed below: 45

Percent of women in labor force

Textile Apparel
and Leather

Electric
Generators

Communication
Equipment

70

63

72

43. A. D. Little Co., Perspective on Industrial Development in Taiwan, op. cit.
44. Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1974, op. cit.
45. Statistical Yearbook (Taipei: DGBAS, 1975).
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This strongly suggests the importance of the wage differential by
sex and export competitiveness.
The wage differential by sex provides the Taiwan economy a
comparative advantage for industries intensively using the
semiskilled female labor force, and the expansion of education
provides an expanding supply of labor force emigrating out of the
traditional rural sector. This, of course, is only part of the story.
The great majority of the working women in those export-oriented
industries do not stay long. The growth of labor efficiency which
offsets the increasing Taiwan real wage must be largely explained
by other factors.

Learning-By-Doing
Given the opportunity, efficiency may be acquired through
experience. The upgrading of the individual labor in Taiwan is
assisted by the following conditions:
1. With a large and growing manufacturing sector, there is
much opportunity to "manufacture up". 46 In other words,
experience can facilitate an industrial worker to shift to products
of higher value-added (e.g., from bicycle to motorcycle to
automobile). This is not usually the case with either farming or
mining, where resource endowment plays the dominant role in
product selection.
2. Export emphasis causes the firms to take uninsurable
risks to upgrade their products in meeting international competition. In doing so, workers also must upgrade their skills.
3. Direct investments of foreign firms bring the economy
face to face with modern productive and managerial methods.
Either through learning-by-doing of the middle-layer executives,
or through the experience of local firms in supplying parts or
intermediary goods to foreign firms, the technical competence of
the Taiwan labor force rises over time.
Much of such learning takes the form of "doing other things."
There is no convenient measure for such improvements. However,
the continuous diversification of Taiwan's exports 47 is indirect
evidence, even though the formula measuring such diversity is
admittedly ad hoc, dependent upon the classification scheme used
for commodity classification.
46. See Owen, op. cit.
47. See Liang, op. cit.
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The Expansion of Technical Vocational Education
The conventional way of training skilled workers is on-the-job
training. However, in Taiwan, most local firms are too small to
provide effective training. The average employment per plant for
the nonelectrical equipment industry was 17.3 in 1973. 48 Public
enterprises and some large firms do have their own training
programs, yet supply falls short of demand. Although it is
desirable for new firms to undertake their own training programs,
without an adequate supply of skilled workers and technicians, it
is hard to attract new firms. This jus::ifies the expansion of the
vocational schools. The number of students going into senior high
schools and senior vocational schools in 1950 and 1963 were as
follows: 49
Percent Distribution of
Senior Vocational
School Students

Students in ('000)
Senior High Schools
1950
1963

19
191

Senior Vocational Schools

Agr.

Com.

Ind.

Other

11
233

33
6

38

26

42

44

7
7

The Road Ahead
Now that junior high school is free for all students (since
1968) and with the rural population declining, the influence of the
spreading of junior high school education is likely to recede in
importance. Those intending to leave the rural sector would be
largely gone pretty soon.
If the international environment remains the same, the
upgrading of skill in Taiwan should continue. The speed of such
upgrading depends upon several factors, not the least of which are
those sociocultural aspects that are hard to quantify. Certain
cultural characteristics of the Chinese are not favorable to rapid
development.
1. As workers, the Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan tend
to be "employer satisfaction-oriented" rather than "task-oriented"
like the Japanese or the Koreans. In other words, the latter devote
full attention to performing the specified tasks. The Chinese
48. A. D. Little International Co., The Outlook for the Non·Electrical
Machinery and Equipment Industry in Taiwan, op. cit.
49. Educational Statistics of the Republic of China (Taipei: Ministry of
Education, 1974).
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workers try to do what they perceive as the best interest of the
employer rather than the letter of the instruction. This makes the
Chinese workers slightly less productive, if task-fulfillment is the
measuring rod. 50
2. As entrepreneurs, Chinese businessmen exhibit strong
herd instincts and are reluctant to venture into new fields with
technology unfamiliar to them. In both Hong Kong and Singapore, it is the foreign investors who break into industries outside
the familiar fields of commerce and textile products. Also, the
Chinese firms seem to be slow in merger movements. Fragmented
industrial structure means weakness in finance, workers' training,
etc.
3. The Chinese engineering practice seems to emphasize the
strict emulation of licensed processes. Few attempts are made on
new product designs. In licensing arrangements, they do not
purchase "development analysis" as the Japanese do. Hence, the
Japanese can often modify their borrowed techniques and plunge
ahead on their own.
As the Taiwan economy is leaving the labor-intensive phase
for the skill-intensive phase, attitudinal changes in these three
aspects appear to be of considerable importance.
50. A. D. Little International Co. Reports, op. cit.
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Chart 1. The Far East Quartet
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Chapter V

TAIWAN'S EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
YuAN-LI Wu AND KuNG-CHIA YEH

Foreign trade has been crucial to Taiwan's economic growth
and will probably remain so in the future. This essay examines
Taiwan's evolving trade policy and external economic relations in
an attempt to identify some of the key policy issues and lessons of
development in the past and to assess its prospect for the future.
Section I reviews the growth of trade and development in the last
two decades. Section II discusses certain long-range policy
problems at the present stage of development.
I. STAGES OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS

AND IMPORTS
A statistical overview of the growth of Taiwan's foreign trade
since 1952 (Fig. 1) suggests that its historical record can best be
divided into four distinct periods: (1) from 1952, when postwar
rehabilitation was about completed, and 1959, when foreign
exchange and other economic reforms were instituted; (2) from
1959 to 1965, when U.S. economic aid was officially terminated; (3)
from 1965 to the outbreak of the oil crisis in 1973; and (4) the post1973 period. 1 Developments in these four periods were markedly
different in several respects: The first major difference is in their
rates of growth. There was hardly any growth during 1952-59.
The average annual growth of exports was only 4 percent. During
the period 1959-65, an upward trend in exports began, rising at an
average rate of 22 percent per year. Growth of exports accelerated
to an unprecedented rate of 33 percent per year during the third
period, 1965-73. In the fourth period, 1973-76, the growth rate
dropped to 22 percent per year. 2 If allowance is made for price
increases, the recent decline would have been even more marked.
Developments in imports generally followed the same pattern.
1. Volume of imports and exports shown in Fig. 1 are in current U.S. dollars.
For source of data, see Economic Planning Council, Republic of China, Taiwan
Statistical Data Book, 1976 (Taipei, Taiwan, 1976), p. 177. (Hereafter cited as Data
Book, 1976).
2. For data on exports and imports in 1976, see Monthly Bulletin of Statistics,
The Republic of China. Vol. III, No. 2 (February 1977), p. 11.
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Fig. 1. Growth of exports and imports, 1952-75.
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The second major difference over the periods is in the relation
of exports to gross domestic product (GDP). The changing role of
exports in the growth process is indicated by the rise of the share
of exports in gross domestic product, from 9 percent in 1952 and
1959 to 17 percent in 1965 and 46 percent in 1973.3 The increase in
the incremental ratio of exports to GDP is even more striking,
reflecting the increasing significance of exports to output
expansion. In 1952-59, the ratio of the absolute increase in
exports to that in GDP in constant 197 prices was 10· percent; it
rose to 28 percent in 1959-65 and to 71 percent in 1965-73.
The third major difference in the various periods relates to the
balance of trade. Taiwan had a persistent trade deficit during
1952-70, financed largely by U.S. aid. 4 An export surplus resulted
during 1971-73, but the balance turned adverse in 1974-75.
Why did the pattern of development vary and how was it
related to the changing trade policies and development strategies
in these periods? What were the rationales and consequences of
these policies? What major lessons of development policy can be
drawn from Taiwan's experience? These questions can best be
discussed in terms of the challenges and opportunities Taiwan
faced and its responses in each of the four periods.

Trade and Import Substitution Policies in the 1950s
To a large extent, the lack of growth of trade during the 1950s
was caused by the government's adoption of a development
strategy built around import substitution rather than export
promotion. 5 Theoretically, there are obvious advantages in
choosing an import substitution policy. The most important is
that it will foster infant industries and generate externalities for
future development. 6 In addition, a protectionist policy, which is
3. Percentage shares are based on totals in 1971 prices, given in DirectorateGeneral of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, the Republic of
China, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China 1975, Taipei, Taiwan, 1975
(Hereafter, Statistical Yearbook, 1975), pp. 194-195.
4. With the exception of the trade balance in 1964, which showed a small
surplus. Data Book, 1976, p. 177.
5. Some economists would have preferred to call these inward-looking and
outward-looking policies for the simple reason that import substitution will occur
even in the case of export promotion. See, for example, Donald B. Keesing,
"Outward-looking Policies and Economic Development," Economic Journal, Vol.
LXXVII, No. 306 (June 1967), pp. 303-320. In the present case we use these
concepts interchangeably.
6. United Nations, The Economic Development of Latin America and Its
Principal Problems, New York: United Nations, 1950.
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essential for the import substitution strategy, may raise the rate of
return to capital in the import-competing sector and thereby
induce an inflow of capital. 7 It is mainly on these grounds that
many Latin American countries adopted such a policy. But there
are also serious drawbacks. Protectionism may encourage the
establishment of uneconomical plants, weaken the incentives to
introduce modem techniques, and slow down the rise in productivity.s By contrast, developing manufactures for export would
promote industries that can compete efficiently on the world
market. World price competition would compel the producers to
keep attuned to changing market conditions as well as changing
technology, product design, and quality control. 9 For an island
economy like Taiwan's, there are additional reasons for adopting
an outward-looking strategy. Since Taiwan has limited natural
resources, its growth and economic viability must be predicated
upon its ability to draw upon available resources in other
countries. These external resources have to be paid for. Accordingly, the sustained growth of the economy requires the concomitant growth of exports. Indeed, the rapid growth of exports and
GNP in the 1960s demonstrated the case quite clearly. The
question then arises whether a policy stressing home markets for
manufactures was misplaced and whether the expansion that
began in the 1960s could not have started earlier. By the same
token, one might ask whether the increasing emphasis· we find
today in Taiwan on the development of the domestic sector by
building up certain capital-intensive industries is a reasonable
and wise policy.
The answer to the question regarding the earlier period is that
the range of options open to Taiwan in the 1950s was narrower
than is commonly recognized. It is most unlikely that expanding
exports of manufactures could have taken place even if it were the
primary goal during the period, given the severe internal and
external constraints Taiwan faced. at that time.
7. For other possible benefits, see Richard E. Caves and Ronald W. Jones,
World Trade and Payments, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973, pp. 554-557.
8. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Towards a New
Trade Policy for Development, Geneva: United Nations, 1964, p. 22; John H.
Power, "Import Substitution as an Industrialization Strategy," and Santiago
Macario, "Protectionism and Industrialization in Latin America," in Gerald M.
Meier, Leading Issues in Economic Development, Second Edition, London: Oxford
University Press, 1970, pp. 52D-527 and 528-533.
9. See Keesing, op. cit., and Jagdish N. Bhagwati and Anne 0. Krueger,
"Exchange Control, Liberalization and Economic Development," American
Economic Review, LXIII:2 (May 1973), pp. 419-427.
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The most serious economic problems in Taiwan in the late
1940s and the early 1950s were inflation and a severe shortage of
foreign exchange. In part, the inflationary pressure had its origin
in the postwar shortages of materials, but it also reflected some
structural imbalances in the economy. On the demand side, there
had been an abrupt and substantial increase in population as a
result of a large influx of people from the mainland. Furthermore,
the move of the central government and the military forces to
Taiwan imposed additional demands on the economy. On the
supply side, the fundamental problem for Taiwan was that its
industrial capacity was ill-equipped to meet the abrupt change in
economic conditions. Under Japanese rule, the semicolonial
economy became a source of supply of foodstuffs and raw
materials to Japan and a market for Japan's manufactures.
Consequently, Taiwan's agriculture was highly commercialized,
and overhead capital was developed to support agriculture, such
as irrigation networks, transportation and port facilities, and
hydroelectric power supply. The limited productive industrial
capacity was designed mainly to process food for export to Japan.
In the 1930s, some heavy industries were built to assist Japan's
war effort, such as aluminum and copper refining, chemical
fertilizers, cement and petroleum refining. But nondurable
consumer goods industries were conspicuously absent, because all
along Taiwan had relied on imports from Japan. The return of
Taiwan to China cut off this relationship. It was the upsurge of
demand for these consumer goods that fueled inflation and put
pressure on the balance of payments.
To stabilize prices the government imposed controls on
inventory speculation and the export of rice. At the same time,
import and foreign exchange controls were tightened to stop the
rapid drain of foreign exchange reserves. But these were
essentially stopgap measures. A solution to the long-term problem
had to be found. At this point, there were three options. The first
was to return to the prewar policy of exporting primary products
and importing manufactures. At first glance, existing conditions
seemed to favor this approach. As noted earlier, the Japanese left
behind substantial overhead capital in the agriculture sector so
that output could be expanded with little additional investment.
Moreover, the highly commercialized agricultural sector would
readily respond to export opportunities. But several considerations
made such a policy unattractive.
First, Taiwan's traditional exports included rice, sugar,
bananas, pineapples, and tea. These agricultural products went
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largely to Japan. The rice surplus available for export was greatly
reduced because of the abrupt increase in population and a slow
growth in productivity. As a result of the return of Taiwan to the
ROC, Japan was no longer the assured market for the other
agricultural products. Some items, such as sugar, could have
found a ready market in Mainland China but the political
situation made that infeasible. Second, world demand for primary
products is rather inelastic with respect to price so that expansion
in exports is not likely to increase foreign exchange earnings fast
enough to meet the growing needs. Third, even if the policy were
successful, the high degree of commodity concentration would be
risky. The concentration also would contribute little to initiating a
balanced growth in the economy. Finally, the emphasis on
agricultural expansion alone would not help to solve the
unemployment problem.
A second alternative was to develop industries for export and
to promote development through trade. Again there were opportunities for Taiwan to follow this route. The inflow of technicians,
managers, and entrepreneurs helped to fill the gap left by the
evacuation of Japanese technical manpower. The population
influx, discharged military manpower, surplus labor from the
rural sector, and large numbers of high school graduates all
contributed to the labor supply and kept the wages low. The high
degree of literacy of the labor forces was also an advantage.
However, these factors by themselves were not sufficient to
provide Taiwan with a distanct comparative advantage in the
production and export of manufactures. Social overhead capital in
support of industrialization was short. So were domestic savings.
The labor force, while highly literate and ample in supply,
consisted entirely of farm labor at this stage and had yet to be
trained to become a disciplined and skilled work force. Also, the
entrepreneurs lacked experience in export marketing. Political
uncertainties, excessive bureaucratic controls, inflation, and
overvalued exchange rates all tended to discourage the inflow of
private foreign capital, which could have filled part of the gap in
savings, technology, and marketing skills. In such circumstances
it would have been impossible for any new industries to compete
effectively in world markets with such industrialized nations as
Japan.
A third alternative was industrialization by developing
import substitution industries. This was the policy that the
government adopted. Apparently, the choice was based on the
following considerations. The separation of Taiwan from Japan
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after the war and the restriction of imports created opportunities
for the development of domestic manufacturing industries,
particularly nondurable consumer goods such as textiles and food
processing, the production of which required little capital and
technology. Inefficient as these industries might be at the initial
stage, they could survive in a protected domestic market whereas
they would probably fail in international competition. Development of these industries could absorb a large number of the idle or
semi-idle into productive employment and utilize agricultural
resources more fully. Moreover, output of these industries could
help to stabilize prices and conserve foreign exchange.
To carry out this strategy, a series of measures was introduced
to provide incentives for entrepreneurs to enter into production of
import substitutes. The first was the tightening of foreign
exchange controls for infant industry promotion and protection.
Because the exchange rates overvalued the Taiwan currency,
there was an acute shortage of foreign exchange and it had to be
rationed. Incentives for industrial investment were provided
through preferential allocation of foreign exchange. The multiple
exchange rate system adopted in April 1951 was structured to
favor the import of plant equipment and U.S. aid-financed goods,
including raw materials for import substitution industries.
Meanwhile, part of the proceeds from exports of primary products
controlled by the state - such as rice, sugar, and salt- was used
to subsidize the development of industries in the public sector,
such as fertilizers and petrochemicals. SiQ'lilarly, because of price
inflation and other factors, the interest rate was rather high.
Credit was made available at below market interest rates to
private investors involved in import substituting activities.l 0
Another policy instrument to induce import substitution was
tariff protection and import controls. The tariff schedule enacted
in 1948 was designed primarily to protect domestic production of
semifinished products rather than manufactures. It was therefore
not compatible with the development strategy. In 1955, the tariff
was revised to raise the effective rates on manufacture imports,
but the revised schedules were still quite low and the government
had to rely mainly on import controls to protect the infant
industries.
During this period, a land reform program was put into effect.
While the objective of land reform was primarily political (to
10. For details, see Lin Ching-yuan, Industrialization in Taiwan, 1946-72,
New York: Praeger, 1973.
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prevent widespread social unrest in rural areas), it nevertheless
indirectly benefited the industrial development. The fixing of land
rent at 37.5 percent of the main crops harvested and the low price
policy for farm products left the former landlords with little
incentive to reinvest in farming. In effect, there was a compulsory
transfer of the former landlords' capital from land to other forms
of assets more readily available for redirection of investment. The
low price policy also contributed to the development of urban
industrial centers by keeping workers' cost of living fairly low.
In addition to all these measures, the continued inflow of U.S.
economic aid was also a key factor that made the import
substitution policy feasible.u During 1951-65, Taiwan received
over US$1.4 billion in economic assistance. As noted earlier, the
most serious problem that Taiwan faced at this time was
inflation. The U.S. aid played a crucial role in bringing it under
control through augmenting the supply of critically short
resources, but the massive U.S. aid also contributed directly to the
implementation of the development strategy in a number of ways.
Like most developing countries at the initial phase of
development, Taiwan depended heavily on external sources for
capital, equipment, and raw materials. So far as capital formation
was concerned, Taiwan faced a twofold problem. On the one hand,
domestic savings were inadequate to finance the development
program. The rate of gross domestic capital formation was about
15 percent of GDP in the early 1950s, of which net national
savings accounted for less than one-third of the total.I 2 The
difficulty in mobilizing savings arose partly because of a sizable
military burden and partly because of an underdeveloped money
market in Taiwan. Under the circumstances, the U.S. aid
contributed indirectly to development finance by providing part of
the defense support, and directly to Taiwan's supply of savings by
providing development loans or grant and aid-generated local
currency funds. 13 During 1952-60, about 40 percent of total gross
11. See H. T. Lin, "U.S. Aid and Taiwan's Economic Development,"
Conference on Economic Development of Taiwan, Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1967,
pp. 295-322; Neil H. Jacoby, U.S. Aid to Taiwan, New York: Praeger, 1966.
12. Economic Planning Council, Republic of China, Taiwan Statistical Data
Book, 1974, Taipei, Taiwan, 1974, pp. 30, 41 (Hereafter, Data Book, 1974).
13. Under the aid program, the Chinese government was required to deposit
Taiwan dollars equal in amount to the sales of U.S. aid commodities (mainly PL
480 commodities or those financed by Defense Support). The original purpose was
to sequester monetary claims on Taiwan resources and place them under joint USChinese control, in order to curb inflationary tendencies and to use local funds to
support other parts of the aid program. However, about one-half of the total was
used for development finance.
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domestic capital formation was financed by U.S. aid, foreign
capital, and loans. 14 A substantial portion of the foreign capital
was allocated to the mining and manufacturing sector, and an
even larger share to such infrastructure facilities as electric power,
the Shihmen Dam, transportation, health and sanitation, and
education. 15 The construction of social overhead capital benefited
not only the import substitution industries being developed but
also the new industries yet to emerge in the subsequent period.
Apart from a savings gap, Taiwan also faced a foreign
exchange gap mainly because most of the capital goods needed for
investment had to be imported. 16 During 1952-60, capital goods
acquired through the U.S. aid program amounted to some 44
percent of the total capital goods imported. 17 A second and
perhaps more fundamental cause for the foreign exchange gap
was the shortage of raw materials for the development of the
domestic industries. This was because Taiwan, as an island
economy, had few natural resources. Most raw materials and fuels
had to be imported. Not surprisingly, over 70 percent of Taiwan's
imports during 1952-60 consisted of raw materials. 18 Of this total,
U.S. aid commodities accounted for 42 percent. 19
Mainly as a result of the import substitution policy, there had
been a discernible change in the economic structure. The share of
manufacturing in GDP rose from 16 percent in 1952 to 22 percent
in 1959, indicating a much faster rate of growth of manufacturing
relative to other sectors. 20 As may be expected, the most important
branches of manufacturing included (a) food, beverages, and
tobacco; (b) textile, wearing apparel, and leather industries; and
(c) manufacture of chemicals, and chemical, petroleum, coal,
rubber, and plastic products. These three branches accounted for
78 percent of total manufacturing in 1952, and their share
remained as high as 72 percent in 1959. 21 Industrial growth,
however, was not confined to nondurable consumer goods. Some
other branches also expanded rapidly, such as nonmetallic
14. Data Book, 1974, p. 41. Foreign private capital inflow during this period
was negligible.
15. Ibid., pp. 201, 203.
16. H. T. Lin, op. cit., p. 303.
17. Data Book, 1974, p. 205; Data Book, 1976, p. 183.
18. Data Book, 1976, p. 183.
19. Data Book, 1974, p. 205.
20. Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan,
Republic of China, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1975, Taipei,
Taiwan, 1975 (Hereafter, Statistical Yearbook, 1975), p. 191.
21. Ibid., p. 206.
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mineral products (except coal and petroleum products), basic
metal products, and fabricated metal products, machinery, and
equipment. The share of these industries rose from 8 percent in
1952 to 17 percent in 1959. 22 Some new industries also emerged,
such as monosodium glutamate, rayon fiber, plastics, and sheet
glass.
By and large, import substitution was highly successful. By
the late 1950s, the percentage of imports in total supply (domestic
output plus imports) was reduced to less than 10 percent for a
number of industries. 23 However, for inddstries requiring advanced technology and a sizable scale of production, such as
heavy machinery and chemicals, the import ratio remained above
30 percent of total domestic demand. 24
Meanwhile, export of agricultural products still accounted for
an overwhelmingly large share of total exports in 1969. 25 The
principal agricultural exports included sugar, rice, bananas, tea,
and canned goods. These five items alone accounted for 87 percent
of total exports in 1952 and as much as 69 percent in 1959. 26
Because Taiwan was previously tied to Japan, it was natural that
Japan remained the largest market for Taiwan's agricultural
products.

SHIFT TOWARD AN OUTWARD-LOOKING STRATEGY.
1959-1965

Toward the end of the 1950s, the government's priority goal of
restoring economic stability by and large had been achieved,
although the shortage of foreign exchange remained acute. Per
capita income was considerably higher than in 1952, but new
problems emerged. Growth of some major industries slowed down
as the domestic market for their products became saturated. 27
22. Ibid.
23. See Hsing Mo-huan, Taiwan: Industrialization and Trade Policies, London:
Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. 18Q-181.
24. Ken C. Y. Lin, "Industrial Development and Changes in the Structure of
Foreign Trade," International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, No. 15 (July 1968), pp.
29Q-321.
25. Data Book, 1976, p. 182.
26. Ibid., p. 197.
27. The growth rates for textiles and food, the two major industries, were 24
and 16 percent per year in 1952-55, compared with 6 and 4 percent per year in
1955-59. Statistical Yearbook, 1975, p. 118. Many industries (woolen textiles,
plywood, paper, rubber goods, soap, iron rods and bars, insulated wires, sewing
machines, and electric fans) were operating at 4Q-70 percent capacity. Lin, 1968, p.
303.
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Labor supply was expanding faster than employment. 28 It was
clear that the government must now decide on a new development
strategy.
Again the range of policy choices was limited. First, a shift
back to primary exports was out of the question, despite
substantial increases in the output of rice, pineapples, tea, and
sugar. 2 9 This was mainly because demand in Japan, the principal
market for Taiwan's agricultural products, had declined. Moreover, the long-term considerations against heavy reliance on
primary exports was as valid as before. Second, the prospect of
pushing forward with the import substitution policy did not seem
very promising. In the 1950s, this policy was quite successful (by
almost any standards) when carried out in industries producing
nondurable consumer goods and their inputs. Extending import
substitutions to intermediate products, machinery, and durable
consumer goods, would be rather costly because of heavy
requirements of new capital and technology and because of the
small domestic market for these products in Taiwan.
Meanwhile, an outward-looking policy appeared the most
attractive alternative because of favorable conditions at home and
abroad. 30 With massive U.S. aid, in the 1950s the government had
been able to construct large-scale overhead capital in support of
industry, as distinguished from the overhead left over by the
Japanese that was primarily designed to serve the agricultural
sector. A large well-motivated labor force with a high educational
level and fairly low wages had been trained. The entrepreneurs
had accumulated considerable experience in technical management. Expansion of the nonendurable consumer industry in the
1950s had created a sizable productive capacity. Interestingly, it
was the import substitution policy of the 1950s that brought into
being some favorable factors that were not previously available,
providing Taiwan for the first time with a competitive advantage
in international markets for labor-intensive products.
28. Population 15 to 59 years of age increased 2.9 percent per year during
1952-59, but employment (age 12 and over) increased at only 1.6 percent per year
over the same period. Data Book, 1974, pp. 8, 11.
29. See Data Book, 1974, pp. 53-56.
30. For an incisive analysis of Taiwan's trade policy, see Kuo-shu Liang,
"Trade and Policy in Taiwan 1952-1965," Conference on Economic Development
of Taiwan, Taipei, Taiwan: Academia Sinica, 1967, pp. 239-277; Bela Balassa,
"Industrial Policies in Taiwan and Korea," Welwirthschaftliches Archiev, Vol. 106,
No. 1, 1971, pp. 55-77; Kuo-shu Liang and Teng-hui Lee, "Taiwan," in Shinichi
Ichimura (ed.), Economic Development of East and Southeast Asia, Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 1975, pp. 209-346.
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External conditions in the 1960s also favored such a change.
In Japan, the economy just began its phase of sustained rapid
growth. Consequently, its industrial and export structure shifted
toward more capital- and technology-intensive products, thus
opening the markets for labor-intensive products to countries like
Taiwan. Meanwhile, the imports of many developed countries
began to accelerate toward the end of the 1950s.31
At this point, the government adopted several major economic
reforms designed primarily to promote export growth. The first
was a major foreign exchange reform in 1958. Before this time,
Taiwan had a complicated multiple exchange rate system. 32 The
exchange rate grossly overvalued the Taiwan dollars in terms of
foreign currencies. In 1958 a single exchange rate set at a more
realistic level replaced the old system. The real significance of the
reform was the devaluation of the currency, which helped to
reduce the excess demand for foreign exchange and to encourage
exports.
The second major policy change was the liberalization of
tariff and import controls. In 1959, tariff rates for a number of
finished goods and their principal imported raw materials were
reduced. Import controls, an important instrument for infant
industry production, were now relaxed somewhat; a number of
items were removed from control. 33 The liberalization of controls
heightened external competition and compelled the domestic
producers to pay more attention to world market conditions and
efficiency.
A third policy change was the introduction of a set of
measures to stimulate exports directly. These included an
extension of the foreign exchange entitlements, preferential tax
treatment of exports and raw materials for export industries, and
low-cost export loans. Subject to certain restrictions, exporters of
manufactured goods now could retain all the export earnings for
most items for use in importing raw materials ~approved by the
authorities) or for sale to other users. Import duties, defense taxes,
31. Economic Report of the President, January 1967, Washington, D.C. 1967,
pp. 17G-175.
32. The system included special exchange rates applicable to negotiable
foreign exchange certificates given to exporters, tax rebates to manufacturers for
import duties on raw materials used in the manufacture of export products, and
foreign exchange entitlements that permitted manufacturers to retain certain
portions of their foreign exchange earnings for use in the purchase of imported raw
materials. See Ching-yuan Lin, Industrialization in Taiwan, 1946-72, New York:
Praeger, 1973, pp. 74-76.
33. Ibid., p. 93.
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and harbor charges (and subsequently the salt tax and slaughter
tax) on imported raw materials used in production for exports
were now refundable. In 1957, the Bank of Taiwan introduced lowcost loans to exporters, 6 percent for loans payable in fcreign
exchange, 11.88 percent for those payable in local currency, very
much below the current interest rate on loans to other borrowers.
Other policies include export insurance by a government organization, direct subsidies to a few industries, and market research by
government institutes.
Finally, and perhaps most important, was the set of measures
to promote foreign investment in Taiwan. The attempt to attract
foreign investment was not new. In 1954 and 1955 investment
laws were enacted to encourage inflow of capital. Foreign
investors were permitted to import plant and equipment and raw
materials for their own use and other goods to be sold in domestic
markets to generate local currencies needed for the investment
projects. But as the margin between the official and the black
market foreign exchange rates narrowed, the advantages to the
foreign investor gradually disappeared. Beginning in 1959 the
government relied more on tax incentives to attract foreign
capital. A maximum income tax of 18 percent and a five year tax
holiday for new investments were applicable to foreign capital.
Other concessions included deferred payment of import duties on
plant and equipment, payments to be made in installments after
the plant began operation, and charges up to 7 percent of their
annual dividends to allow for possible loss from exchange
devaluation.
Another measure to attract foreign investment was the
establishment of export-processing zones (EPZ) in 1965. Foreign
firms that set up production facilities within the zones were given
certain advantages: plant sites with easy access to harbor and
warehouse facilities and water and power supply were made
available. Costs qf some of these services were reduced to levels
competitive with those of other ports in the Far East. No import
duties were to be imposed on plant and equipment. Red tape
connected with applications for licensing of investment, imports
and exports, and remittance was cut to a minimum.
The shift of emphasis from an inward-looking to an outwardlooking strategy had important effects on the growth, structure,
and direction of Taiwan's foreign trade. Exports rose at an
impressive rate of 19 percent per year during 1959-65, compared
with only 4 percent during the import substitution period
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1952-59. 34 Growth of exports was accompanied by a dramatic
change in its commodity structure. The share of manufactured
products in total exports averaged 41 percent during 1959-65, far
above the average of 12 percent for 1952-58.35 The export of
import substitution products accounted for a large proportion of
this growth. Increases in the exports of food, beverage, and
tobacco preparations, and production of textiles, leather, wood,
paper, and related products constituted 58 percent of the total
increase in exports in 1959-65. 36 With the change in the
commodity structure of exports, the direction of exports also
shifted.
Broadly, Taiwan's exports during this period were of three
types. The first was the group of labor-intensive products (apparel,
plywood, electronics) for markets in developed countries. Among
these countries, Japan remained the most important, but its
relative share declined. The share of total exports to such
developed countries as the United States, Germany, Australia,
and Canada rose sharply, from 11 percent in 1959 to 31 percent in
1965. The second group consists of capital-intensive products such
as cement, metal and metal products, and electrical machinery,
which were sold to the developing countries. A third group was
primary products, such as sugar and tea, which were exported to
both the developed and developing countries. Of the three groups,
the first expanded the fastest, especially since 1962.
The growth of imports during 1959-65 (16 percent per year)
was also much faster than during 1952-59 (3 percent per year). 37
That this was so should not be surprising, for Taiwan's imports
and exports were highly interdependent. Growth of exports
generated the need for more imported capital equipment and raw
materials and at the same time increased the capacity to import.
Thus, during the period of rapid growth in 1959-65, capital goods
imports constituted 25 percent of total imports, compared with
only 17 percent for 1952-58. 38 As for the sources of imports, about
70 percent of all imports came from Japan and the United States
during 1959-65. This pattern was little different from that of the
previous period.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Data
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Data
Ibid.,

Book, 1976, p. 177.
p. 182.
p. 180.

Book, 1976, p. 177.
p. 183.
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Capital Inflow and Export Growth, 1965-73
As exports grew after the exchange reforms of 1958, U.S.
economic aid began to phase out and in 1965 the aid program
officially came to an end. Throughout this period Taiwan had a
persistent trade deficit. 39 To cushion the impact of the termination
of U.S. aid, Taiwan obtained a loan of US$150 million from
Japan. But the really significant factor that permitted a continued
net import of resources was the inflow of private foreign capital.
The foreign exchange reform and the tax incentives introduced
around 1960 evidently initiated an upward trend in the inflow of
foreign capital. The trend accelerated after the establishment of
the export-processing zones. As of March 1977, there were 10 U.S.
firms, 68 Japanese firms, and 68 firms jointly owned by U.S.,
Japanese, and other investors in the EPZs. Investments of these
146 firms totalled US$109.0 million. 40 Still other investors, many
from Hong Kong, were also located in the EPZs. Inflows of capital
since 1965, however, were by no means confined to investment in
the EPZs. 41 The following figures clearly show how foreign
investment rapidly grew since 1960: 42
Foreign Investment Approvals
1952-59
1960-65
1966-73
Cumulative totals
Investments (million US$)
Number of cases
Average per year
Investments (1,000 US$)
Number of cases
Investment per case
(1,000 US$)

20.1
72

114.6
224

962.7
1.639

2.5
9

19.1
37

120.4
205

280

516

587

Not only did the number of cases and the amount of investment
increase sharply since 1960, the average size of investment per
case was also larger.
Apart from improving Taiwan's balance of payments situation and increasing employment, the inflow of foreign capital was
39. The only exception was the small surplus in 1964 due to the sugar price
boom at that time.
40. These data are provided by the Economic Planning Council, Executive
Yuan, Republic of China.
41. For example, of the U.S. investment in Taiwan up to 1976, totalling $418.8
million. 96 percent were outside the EPZs. Data provided by Industrial Economic
Cooperation and Development, Taipei, Taiwan.
42. Data Book, 1974, p. 212.
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instrumental in solving two key problems on which export
expansion and economic growth depended.
The first was the infusion of new technology needed to
restructure Taiwan's output and exports in the face of changing
market conditions in the late 1960s. The foreign investments were
concentrated in such new industries as electronic and electrical
products, chemicals, machinery equipment and instruments, and
metal products. 43 These have been among the fastest growing
industries since 1965. 44 Along with textiles and apparel, they were
also the fastest growing exports. 45 By 1973, industrial products
dominated the export structure, accounting for 85 percent of total
exports, and the commodity composition of manufacturing
exports also changed markedly in favor of such items as electrical
machinery and apparatus and high-quality textile products. 46
Unlike the principal exports of the earlier years, these products
were developed primarily for exports rather than as import
substitutes.
Mainly as a result of these developments, the degree of export
commodity concentration declined appreciably. 47 This trend is in
line with the development experience of other countries. As the
economy becomes more industrialized, exports become more
diversified.
The other important problem that foreign investments helped
to solve was that of marketing. A substantial portion of the
investments was from Japan and the United States, the purpose
of which was to utilize the labor in Taiwan to assemble and
package parts into finished products for export directly to the
United States. Foreign investment thus automatically provided
marketing channels for Taiwan's exports, which was of enormous
value to Taiwan where the supply of international marketing
skills was still rather short.
The close relationship between Taiwan's exports and foreign
capital in general and between U.S. foreign investment and
43. Data Book, 1976, p. 231.
44. Statistical Yearbook, 1975, p. 119.
45. Data Book, 1976, pp. 180-181.
46. Ibid., p. 182.
47. According to calculations by Lee and Liang, op. cit., p. 280, the index of
commodity concentration dropped from 56 percent in 1955 to 22 percent in 1970.
The index is measured by 100VE(X 1/X2 , where X1 ; represents exports of commodity
i, and X, Taiwan's total exports. The higher the index, the higher the degree of
commodity concentration.
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exports to the United States are shown in Figures 2 and 3. 48
Mainly as a result of the increase in direct investments, the share
of Taiwan's exports to the United States surpassed its share to
Japan since 1967, and the United States became Taiwan's most
important market. To be sure, neither effective marketing with the
aid of foreign investors nor unilateral reform on the part of
Taiwan would have sufficed had not the demand for Taiwan's
exports expanded considerably during this period. Between 1966
and 1973, U.S. total imports increased fourfold. During the same
period, U.S. imports from Taiwan rose nearly fourteenfold. This
sharp increase of Taiwan's exports to the United States was
partly a reflection of the greater competitiveness of Taiwan
products on the U.S. market, but the increase was also aided by
the general expansion of U.S. imports. Furthermore, Taiwan's
exports to the United States had been so small that the large
increase during this period could in most cases be better tolerated
by Taiwan's competitors. Given the competitiveness of Taiwan's
products and the increasing U.S. demand for imports, the
existence of U.S. as well as Japanese firms in Taiwan, both
making exportable goods for the American market, contributed
significantly to Taiwan's expanding share in U.S. imports.
As exports expanded, so did imports, albeit at a lower rate.
During 1965-73, imports increased by 27 percent per year. 49 The
composition of imports remained more or less unchanged during
this period, with the share of capital goods stabilized at around 32
percent, raw materials at 63 percent, and consumer goods at 5
percent. 50 The degree of import commodity concentration also
remained at a fairly low level. 51

Problems in the Post-Oil-Crisis Period
At the time the worldwide energy crisis broke out, Taiwan
ranked among the highest of the developing countries in the rate
of economic growth and per capita income. But its very success of
development through trade also created serious problems because
Taiwan was now so dependent on trade that the economy became
increasingly sensitive to abrupt changes in the outside world. The
48. Data for exporti[! used for these calculations are from Data Book, 1976, and
Chung·yang jih·pao (Central Daily News), Taipei, January 12, 1977. Data on
foreign investments are provided by the Economic Planning Council, Executive
Yuan, Republic of China.
49. Data Book, 1976, p. 177.
50. Ibid., p. ·183.
51. Lee and Liang, op. cit., p. 280.
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following ratios of exports and imports to gross domestic product
in selected years since 1952 show the extent of Taiwan's
dependency on external markets and sources: 52
52. Ratios are based on totals in current prices. Statistical Yearbook, 1975, p.
190; Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, the Republic of China, Taipei, Taiwan, Vol. III,
No. 1 (January 1977), p. 18.
Fig. 2. Correlation of the cumulative value of total overseas direct investments in Taiwan and Taiwan's exports to the world, 1952-76 (t = 1953-75).
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Fig. 3. Correlation of the cumulative value of U.S. direct investments in
Taiwan and Taiwan's exports to the U.S., 1953-76 (t = 1953-75).
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Exports/GDP

lmports/GDP

8
12
18
49
52

14
21
21
43
50

1952
1959
1965
1973
1976

The problem of high trade-GDP ratio is further compounded by
heavy reliance on trade with Japan and the United States, as
demonstrated by the following figures showing exports to and
imports from the United States and Japan as percentage of
Taiwan's total exports and imports: 53
Exports
Year

To U.S.

To Japan

1953
1959
1965
1973
1975

4.2
8.6
21.3
37.4
34.3

45.6
41.5
30.6
18.4
13.1

Imports
From U.S.
From Japan
38.7
36.1
31.7
25.1
27.8

0

30.7
40.3
39.8
37.5
30.4

Taiwan's exports to these two countries accounted for about 50
percent of its total exports. The degree of heavy reliance on these
two markets as a whole has remained unchanged in the last two
decades. However, the share of exports to the United States rose
sharply since the 1960s, while that to Japan declined for the
reasons given above.
Taiwan's dependence on these two countries for imports was
even greater than its dependence for exports. About 70 percent of
total imports came from these two countries in the period up to
1965. The proportion fell to about 60 percent in the early 1970s.
The decline was due to a reduction of the U.S. share after the
termination of the U.S. aid in 1965. Japan's share, however,
remained fairly high. The concentration of trade with Japan and
the United States means that Taiwan's economy would be highly
vulnerable to changes in these countries.
The immediate effect of the oil crisis on Taiwan was an
enormous trade deficit of US$1.3 billion in 1974. Taiwan's deficit
with the oil-producing countries (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran)
53. Data Book, 1976, pp. 189, 191.
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totalled US$0.7 billion, actually much less than its deficit with
Japan, US$1.4 billion. 54 In 1975, both total exports and imports
declined for the first time since 1969. The total trade deficit was
reduced to US$0.6 billion, but the deficit with Japan remained as
high as US$1.1 billion. 55
In fact, for decades before the oil crisis, Taiwan had persistent
deficits with Japan, for various reasons. Taiwan's exports to
Japan consist largely of agricultural products, partly because the
geographical proximity of the two countries lowers the transportation costs for bulky agricultural products, partly because of the
similarity in the Chinese and Japanese diets, and also because of
Japan's restrictive policy toward its imports of manufactured
products. The growth of such imports has been slow despite
Japan's rapid economic growth, because the income elasticity of
demand for these products was rather low. Taiwan's demand for
imports of capital goods (steel, machinery, chemicals) however,
expanded by leaps and bounds. Again because of lower transport
costs and the sizable Japanese investment in Taiwan, together
with the traditional ties between the Japanese and the Taiwanese
business community, imports of these capital goods were largely
from Japan. 56
Another serious problem in the post-1973 period was the effect
of worldwide inflation on domestic prices. Wholesale prices in
1974 rose by 35 percent and the consumers price index by 47
percent over 1973. 57 The sharp increase in prices inevitably forced
the labor costs to go up despite the rise in unemployment. 58
By 1976 the situation had improved. The rate of inflation was
greatly reduced. Exports and GNP turned upward again, and the
rate of unemployment was much lower. However, the economic
recovery does not necessarily mean a return to the smooth sailing
of the last decade, for Taiwan now faces some new economic and
political challenges. Competition from Hong Kong and South
Korea has become keener as these countries have moved into
textiles and electronics. Wages in Taiwan rose faster than in other
countries so that Taiwan lost some of the advantages in low labor
cost. Moreover, in the developed countries, the slowdown in
economic growth and high rates of unemployment gave rise to
54. Data Book, 1976, pp. 184-189.
55. Ibid., p. 184.
56. As of 1972, imports of transportation equipment, chemicals, electrical
machinery, and equipment from Japan accounted for 53, 60, 75 and 64 percent of
Taiwan's total imports of these products. Data Book, 1976, pp. 21Q-211.
57. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Republic of China, Vol. III.
58. Ibid., p. 5.
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protectionist sentiments. More serious still, changes in the
relations between Peking and Washington in recent years
renewed fears about Taiwan's future. The political uncertainty
could have adverse effects on the economy. In the first place,
insecurity on the part of Taiwan might force the government to
divert more resources from investment to defense preparations.
Second, economic viability and growth depend heavily on foreign
investment, which is apparently very sensitive to changes in the
political climate. The rate of U.S. and Japanese investment in
Taiwan dropped in 1971 and 1972 probably as a result of the
ROC's international setbacks during those years and investors'
concern over its future status. Another decline in new Japanese
investment in Taiwan occurred in 1974 and 1975 following
Japan's transfer of diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Peking
in 1973, although the cause of the decline is somewhat ambigious
because it coincided with the worldwide recession. Without the
continued inflow of foreign capital that brings in new technology
and marketing skills, it would be difficult to sustain high rates of
export growth. Once again Taiwan has reached a critical stage, as
it did in the late 1950s and early 1960s; however, the conditions
are different, but so is Taiwan's economic capability. The
economy's productivity and capacity to save and the stock of
physical and human capital have grown tremendously over the
last two decades. Of the ten major investments now under
construction, seven are new additions to the infrastructure, which,
when completed, will greatly increase the power-generating
capacity and transportation facilities needed for future export
growth. Above all, the government and the business community
have accumulated substantial experience in adapting themselves
to changing conditions. At each critical juncture in the past, the
government had been able to take appropriate measures to
promote the transition from one stage of growth to the next.
Although Taiwan now faces many problems, the central question
remains essentially the same as in the past: how to identify,
develop, and exploit new areas of comparative advantage in the
future international environment. In the search for solutions,
political, economic, and strategic issues are inevitably involved.

II. LONG-TERM EXPECTATIONS
As an economy develops, the commodity composition and
country distribution of its external trade are bound to change. In
the case of Taiwan, the rate of adjustment required is enhanced by
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the speed of economic change inherent in the continuation of
fairly rapid economic growth that the ROC authorities plan to
maintain. There certainly are strong noneconomic reasons cailing
for steady economic growth at an at least moderately high rate.
Given Taiwan's island economy, this means continued large
imports that must be paid for. Thus, exports must continue to rise,
and it would be necessary, not merely desirable, to have a given
amount of resources devoted to exports to earn an increasing
amount of imports. Exports based on low wage, labor-intensive
production methods will increasingly lose their edge in competition with the products of other countries as wage rates rise in
Taiwan and as other countries with a much larger labor supplye.g., South Korea and several countries in Southeast Asiaexpand their manufacturing and export industries further.
Taiwan's import demand for intermediate products can be
progressively reduced through domestic production in what is
sometimes described as the backward linkage process. However,
both the production of intermediate products at home and
expansion of more capital and technology-intensive exports of
higher unit value will still require the inflow of technology from
overseas and of some foreign capital in the case of "embodied
technology." In addition, there will be a need to expand other
sources of foreign exchange earnings than current exports. This
need will still be there even if raw material imports become
relatively more important as the proportion of intermediate
industrial products in imports recedes. In light of the world's
recent experience concerning the pricing and availability of
primary commodities (including both raw materials and energy
products), security of imported raw material supply is one aspect
of its future trade pattern that Taiwan cannot ignore.
Changes in the direction of Taiwan's foreign trade are also
becoming increasingly necessary as the volume of trade increases.
In some commodities, such as low-priced footwear and textiles and
black-and-white TV sets, Taiwan products now account for a very
large portion of certain markets, e.g., the United States. This
phenomenon has evoked the usual outcry from local producers
demsnding import tariffs and quotas, countervailing duties,
"voluntary" restraint on the part of Taiwan exporters, etc. To
some extent, this roadblock to Taiwan's export expansion can be
bypassed through limiting sales of any specific commodity in any
one market to a share of the total supply that would be regarded
as tolerable by local competitors. (What would constitute such a
share is another question.) This can be done by trying to sell in
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more markets and by selling a larger number of exports in any
given market. Diversification by commodity and by market must,
therefore, be regarded as a most urgent task facing Taiwan's
foreign traders.
This and the following section will explore these issues further
with particular attention to some of the more uncommon aspects.

Augmenting Natural Resources Supply from Overseas
The pattern of external trade of any country will change in
the long run as its comparative advantage changes. Since
comparative advantage is a reflection of the relative scarcities of
resources, of tastes and preferences, and of given technologies, all
of which are subject to change, the crucial question is how these
factors might change for Taiwan, especially how resources and
technologies might change. In the long run, in spite of its small
size, Taiwan may turn out to possess new natural resources,
hitherto undiscovered, that can be utilized in external commerce
as a result of changes in technology and demand. However, in t~e
absence of the emergence of radically new technologies, major
new discoveries of hidden resources (such as off-shore oil and gas)
in quantities sufficient to alter comparative advantage are
fraught with greater uncertainty than some other developments
that simply augment available resources through investment. In
this regard, Taiwan's resource augmentation can proceed in
several ways. As a matter of fact, a small beginning has already
occurred in what could turn out to be a trend.
In the first place, natural resources located overseas can be,
and have been, acquired through investment. Like the Japanese,
businessmen in Taiwan who have developed certain enterprises
and technical expertise have begun to establish similar undertakings in foreign markets. For instance, this has been done through
investment in outlets and facilities for foreign sales. Manufacturing facilities have also been located overseas to promote sales in
local foreign markets, in industries in which the investors have
already gained considerable experience at home-e.g., textiles,
petrochemicals, and construction materials. In addition, overseas
investment to provide for the supply of resources for domestic use
in the future has also started, as yet only on a very small scale.
The types of foreign investments by the Japanese are, of course, of
far greater magnitudes. For example, timber land in Indonesia,
corn-growing farms in Thailand, etc. have been developed by
Taiwan-based investors. In due course, such acquisitions will help
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assure Taiwan producers and consumers of continuity of supply
and access to raw materials on potentially more advantageous
terms. Most such direct investments will also present possibilities
of exporting to third countries from overseas locations.
All types of foreign investment by Taiwan investors will,
directly or indirectly, provide foreign earnings that can be used to
promote export sales or to increase imports, which again may
either be for domestic production (or consumption) in Taiwan or
for the production of exports. In short, the historically common
case of a developing country itself becoming an investor country
can and will be repeated in Taiwan. One might state even more
emphatically that such developments must take place if Taiwan's
economic growth is to continue. One of the effects of these
developments is to alter the pattern of comparative advantage in
the long run.
From 1959 through 1975, 91 applications by ROC businessmen for investment in foreign countries, totalling $26.5 million,
were officially approved. Their distribution by sector and by
country is shown in Table 1. Forty percent of such investments
are in various manufacturing industries; 19 percent in construction and construction materials; 13 percent in textiles; 10 percent
in foreign trade; 8.5 percent in machinery and metal products.
Only a little over 3 percent are for the development of mineral and
agricultural resources.
The accompanying data represent only officially approved
investments from Taiwan. Some investments, however, have been
made in the form of joint ventures in partnership with business
interests in the host countries or third countries. Some "third"
country (e.g., Hong Kong) interests conceivably may also be
beneficially owned by Taiwan investors. At any rate, Taiwan
exporters are permitted to retain, in foreign exchange, a small
amount of their export proceeds for purposes of their overseas
business operations. With annual exports currently (1976) running
at the rate of about $8 billion, even 5 percent would come to $400
million.
There is some evidence that Taiwan investments abroad are
substantially larger than those shown in Table 1. Obviously, one
important source of such capital consists of residual export
earnings retained abroad, as shown in Table 2.
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Table 1. Overseas Investment by Taiwan Investors, Distribution by Country and Industry, 1959-75
(Value in US $thousand based on approved investment applications)
Machinery
Agriculture
Construction
Mining and
and Metal
and
Miscellaneous
Foreign
PetroMaterial and
Manufacturing
Total
Percent
Chemicals
Fisheries
Engineering
Lumber
Textiles
Products
Trade
Refining
No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount
Southeast Asia
ASEAN
Malaysia
Thailand
Singapore
Philippines
Indonesia
Other
Hong Kong
Japan
Okinawa
Republic of
Korea
Australia
U.S.A.
Guam
Canada
Latin America
West Germany
United Kingdom
Middle East
Africa
Total
Percent

0
0

z

>-3
1':1

s;:

3
1
I

179

956
354
-

1
2

1 2,128

-

3

-

1,336

-

-

9 4,953
19.3

-

201
379

1

1
80
-

-

-

-

-

580

3
2.3

160

2

-

240
0.9

1

129

5 1,272
1
60
1
215
2
180
1
34

1
1

1

-

-

412
4
4 1,154
251
2
I
1

90
500

15 3,355
13.1

194

-

-

-

80
460
408
69
270

1

-

-

-

-

-

6

1,287
5.0

-

1

-

13

-

-

-

12 2,191
8.5

Source: Data provided by Economic Planning Council, Taipei, Taiwan.
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1
2
1
1
1

13
0.05

10
1
1

2,098
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1,500

I

2
I
I

1
4
2
I
2

1
1
1
1
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-
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2
I

-

5

-

25

-

240
187
25
1,063

I
3,125
1
463
29 10,275
40.1

I

2
1
I

-

16
96
100
225
103
50

4.6
16.3
12.7
2.2
10.7
4.7
9.1
0.2
0.02

1
25
I
90
1,640
6
5 1,523
I
25
5 2,613
1
22
35
I
3 3,613
484
2
91 25,625
100.0

0.09
0.3
6.4
5.9
0.9
10.2
0.08
0.1
14.1
1.9
100.0

I

900

1,050
22

35

113
21
14 2,731
10.5
I
I

1,190
4,187
3,261
559
2,744
1,212
2,347
50
5

13
19
10
5
6
5
5
1
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Table 2. Other Foreign Investments by Taiwanese (US$ million)

Host Country
Indonesia
Philippines

Thailand
Malaysia

Investments
Reported
by Host Country
as Taiwan
Period and Remarks
Investments
Approved investments cumulative
to 1975
Investment by
Board of Investment approved
firms, 1968-75
Total registered
capital, 1960- May 31,
1975
1974-75 only

Approved
Investments
in 1959-75 as
Reported by
the ROC

16.0

2.7

85.1

0.5

22.6

4.2

2.8

1.2

126.5

8.6

These data are obtained from the Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM),
Jakarta; the Board of Investment, Manila; the Board of Investment, Bangkok; and
the Federal Industrial Development Authority, Kuala Lumpur.

If the data in Table 2 are correct, actual investments are at
least 14-15 times the value of approved investments that have
been made directly by Taiwan investors in four of the ASEAN
countries during 1959-75. Since investments in Singapore and
Hong Kong are bound to be sizable in view of the close relations
maintained by businessmen in the three areas, one might hazard
the guess that $200 million would be the minimum value of
Taiwan's direct foreign investments in Southeast Asia to date.
Since the official data on approved investments indicate a
predominant concentration in light manufacturing and foreign
trade, activities in overseas resources development accounting for
a very small share, the majority of these investments appear to
have been motivated by efforts to support and supplement
external trade activities, as well as to extend established
manufacturing to production in foreign markets. Investments for
resource development, however, present an opportunity that
Taiwan can ill afford not to exploit, and more should be expected
in the future, the present small beginning notwithstanding.
Geographically, Taiwan's existing approved foreign investments are concentrated in Southeast Asia, where manufacturers
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from Taiwan frequently enjoy a technical advantage over local
enterprise and where joint ventures with local ethnic Chinese
interests are quite common practice. The ASEAN countries, for
example, accounted for 46.5 percent of such approved investments
through 1975, while Hong Kong took another 9.1 percent. Since
Southeast Asia is a logical source of raw materials for Taiwan, as
it is for Japan, it will probably take precedence over other areas as
Taiwan businessmen increase their investments for resource
development in the future. However, other major exporters of
resources, such as Saudi Arabia, Taiwan's principal source of
crude oil, and Bahrain, have also attracted Taiwan businessmen.
Expanding bilateral trade and economic relations have arisen as
a result of Taiwan's need to secure an oil supply from the Middle
East, and growing trade relations have in tum fostered investment. (However, no investment in Middle Eastern oil has been
attempted so far.)

The Potential of Ocean Fishing
A second method for an island nation to expand its supply of
natural resources is to increase its access to the surrounding
waters. "Farming the sea" in an ever-widening area, a natural
development in these circumstances, is a function of the
development of the fishing industry. Taiwan's fishing fleet today
is no longer confined to the island's coastal waters or even the
South China Sea. The Indian Ocean, the waters near Australia,
and the American Pacific fishing grounds are frequented by
fishing vessels from Taiwan. Perhaps the farthest these vessels
have ventured is the exploratory shrimping trip to the South polar
region undertaken by an experimental vessel in 1977, which used
Capetown as its staging point. The potential of ocean fishing can
be illustrated by the data in Table 3. 59
59. Taiwan Fisheries Bureau, Fisheries Yearbook, 1975, Taipei, May 1976, pp.
80 and 222 also report on activities in 1976, February 1977.
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Table 3. Composition of Taiwan Fishery Production
Total Production
(thousand metric tons)
1976
1965

Index
1965 = 100

Deep Sea
Inshore
Coastal
Aquaculture

325,327
317,327
31,961
135,450

135,949
160,924
30,655
54,160

239.3
197.4
104.2
250.0

Total

810,475

381,688

212.3

Of the total volume reported in Table 3, 157,800 tons, valued
at $314.2 million, were exported. Between 1965 and 1976, the
increase in production was more than 2 times while that of export
was nearly 28 times in volume and 11.4 times in value. These data
are indicative of such overseas development as we have postulated.

Investing in Human Resources Overseas and
Deferred Returns
Any upgrading of exports by increasing their technological
content will require a continuous increase in the supply of
technicians, engineers, scientists, and modern managerial personnel. Better coordination of vocational, scientific and managerial
education with (a) the specific manpower requirements of
development, (b) domestic research and development, and (c)
technological imports is extremely important. This topic is usually
discussed in coimection with education and manpower planning
for economic development. Our concern at this point is, however,
with investment in · human resources overseas, which could
subsequently rebound to the economic benefit of Taiwan.
During the past 25 years, large numbers of Chinese graduate
students have left Taiwan for advanced training abroad. The
majority have chosen to specialize in the physical sciences and
engineering, and many have subsequently remained abroad
instead of returning to Taiwan. This P.henomenon is. generally
thought of a "brain drain" to Taiwan. (See Table 4.)
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Table 4. Distribution of Chinese Students in the
United States by Field of Study, 1970
Field of Study

Engineering
Natural sciences
Social sciences
Health professions
Business
Agriculture
Humanities
Other (including law,
education, etc.)

U.S. Graduate Students
Chinese Students
1973
1970
(in percent)
7.94
9.39
11.91
1.74
10.72
1.06
4.60

27.25
33.59
8.57
3.59
6.96
2.35
11.44

52.64

6.25

100.00

100.00

Sources: These data are originally from U.S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, Digest of Educational Statistics, 1973, p. 81; and
Department of International Cultural Affairs, Chinese Ministry of Education,
Taipei. They are taken from a paper on "The Professional Chinese-American"
contributed by John Y. Ma of the Sinologisch Institut, Leiden, The Netherlands, in
a forthcoming study on the economic condition of Chinese Americans.

Between 1950 and 1974, 30,765 Chinese students were
approved for advanced study abroad by the ROC Ministry of
Education. The annual figure reached a peak of 3,015 in 1969 and
averaged about 1,900 persons in the first half of the 1970s. An
overwhelming majority of these students came to the United
States, so that, as shown in Table 4, a comparison of their
distribution by field of study with the corresponding distribution
of U.S. graduate students as a whole would be illuminating.
Thus, the United States is the principal focus of overseas
investment in human resources in the technological fields by
Taiwan investors. Utilization ofthis reservoir of human capital as
its productivity increases with appropriate "maturing" will,
therefore, be of vital importance in the long-run evaluation of
Taiwan's comparative advantage.
Understandably, if a person educated in Taiwan at considerable private and public expenditure emigrates, earns his living
abroad, sends no money home, and otherwise contributes little to
the Taiwan economy, the resources invested will be a loss to
Taiwan. In general, a university graduate from Taiwan who
moves to a foreign country spends additional funds on education,
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and the total investment he represents is even larger. However,
whether there will be a waste of resources is by no means a
foregone conclusion. Analogous to the installation of a valuable
piece of equipment in a factory located abroad in an overseas
investment project, such an overseas investment in human
resources leads ultimately to waste from Taiwan's point of view
only when there is little or no return. The crucial question,
therefore, is whether a number of the graduate engineers and
scientists might not at some future date become channels of
communication in introducing new technology as well as
managerial and business know-how into Taiwan that would not
otherwise be available. They may not have returned in the past to
participate in the island's regular labor force; they could, however,
return in the future as investors and partners in joint ventures
with resident Taiwan interests in new industries.
A good example of this kind is the series of biennial seminars
that Chinese engineers in the United States have organized since
1966 for the benefit of Taiwan industry. The seminars began in
response to specific queries initiated by major Taiwan industrial
enterprises. The dialogue, once begun, soon extended to the
introduction of new ideas from abroad and to a wider exchange of
ideas in technological and management areas. In the early 1970s
these seminars were establishing new industrial undertakings in
which specific foreign firms were selected to provide for the
further training of specialists and the installation of pilot plants.
This development began with the electronics industry and will
probably expand into other sectors such as precision machines
and certain chemicals. It is a reversal of the process represented
by the emigration of trained Chinese human resources. However,
the counterflow of technological and managerial know-how is at a
technical level substantially above that attained by the university
graduates who left Taiwan earlier. It would be stretching the truth
to point to this process entirely as the reaping of benefits of past
investments in education by Taiwan in the form of the "maturing" of prior overseas investment in human resources by Taiwan,
because many of the senior personnel involved received their
education in China long before the period covered by this volume.
However, younger engineers, scientists, and managerial personnel
are gradually appearing on the scene, and the "maturing" of their
investment in human resources overseas by Taiwan investors
(including both the ROC government and the private sector) could
well become an expanding reality.
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The kind of technological inflow described above had its
beginning in 1966. Its effects on production and increase in
productivity through technological upgrading has only just
begun. One is probably correct in assuming that the effectiveness
of this process is contingent upon the attainment by the Taiwan
economy of a stage in economic development at which it will no
longer be dependent in every case upon external sources for both
financing and technology. This would seem to be the same
condition under which licensing agreements with foreign businesses can begin to be effectively used to expand and upgrade
production in any developing country. It is a variant of the
technological inflow process that takes advantage of the "brain
drain".

Technical and Managerial Training of Ethnic Chinese from
Southeast Asia - Effect on Future Export Marketing
and Investment Abroad
Still another often-ignored aspect of ROC external economic
activities is the technical training Taiwan offers to students of
Chinese origin from foreign countries, mostly from Southeast
Asia. Where advanced technical training is denied to ethnic
Chinese by certain foreign governments through a quota system,
as in Malaysia, the availability of such training in Taiwan is a
boon to those who cannot go to Europe or the United States for
their advanced education and technical training. Statistics in
Table 5 on ethnic Chinese students from foreign countries who
have undergone such training in summer institutes in Taiwan are
a good demonstration of the scope and potential of this phenomenon.

205

TAIWAN'S EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Table 5. Distribution of Ethnic Chinese Students
from Outside Taiwan in Summer Training Courses
By Field of Interest 1961-75
Discipline
Engineering and technology
Electrical engineering
Mechanical engineering
Chemical engineering
Agricultural engineering
Textile engineering
Mining
·Civil engineering
Hydraulic engineering
Architecture
Marine products manufacturing
Metallurgy
Industrial engineering
Agricultural machinery
Electronics
Computers
Physics
Navigation
Marine mechanics
Urban planning
Shipbuilding
Food technology
River and ocean engineering
Mining and petroleum industry
Engineering science

Year
Initiated

1961
61
61

63
63
63
63
64
64
65
68
68
68

Subtotal

388
538

464
25
6

32
310
12
41
4
3
2
5

70

36

72
72
72
72

9

4
1

8

72

1

72
72
74

10

75
75

3
1

Subtotal
Life, agricultural, and medical sciences
Horticulture
Forestry
Agricultural chemistry
Animal husbandry
Agronomy
Veterinary
Agricultural extensions
Plant pathology
Fishery
Entomology
Botany
Soil conservation
Agricultural products processing
Afforestation

Number of
Students

7
1

1,911

63
63
63
63
63
63
64
64
65
68
70
71

74
74

71
44
93
53
50
18
6

40
2
5
3
4

5
1

395
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Business and economics
Economics
Industrial & business management
International trade
Business administration
Agricultural economics
Banking
Accounting
Maritime management
Finance and taxation
Enterprise management
Cooperatives
Customs administration
Transportation and management
Banking and insurance
Statistics
Tourist business

62
62
62
63
63
63
63

64
64
65
68
68
68
72
72
74

Subtotal
Total

49
107
23
33
94

132
7
6
85
4
1
3
3
2
1

661

Subtotal
Psychology
Art
Home economics

Ill

72
72
72

4
1
1

6
2,973

Source: Hua-cha'iao eking-chi nien-chien (Overseas Chinese Handbook)
(Taipei: World Chinese Traders Liaison Office, 1976), pp. 589-593.

Taiwan's role as an intermediary in conveying technological
know-how and experience in economic development to Southeast
Asian countries began in the 1960s. At its peak in 1967, 60 114
persons were involved in the program of overseas technical
cooperation and teams of specialists from Taiwan were found in
Vietnam and Singapore. Two years earlier, similar teams from
Taiwan were also found in Malaysia and the Philippines. By 1974,
however, Vietnam was the only Southeast Asian country that still
had a Taiwan technical cooperation team. With the fall of
Vietnam in 1975, Taiwan's role in providing technical aid was
sharply curtailed in Southeast Asia. Consequently, training of
students from Southeast Asian countries has become a much more
important source of contact with the future technological cum
business elite of Southeast Asia than it was ten years earlier. It is
more than likely that upon return to their own countries, many of
these students will become active businessmen and professionGO. See Economic Planning Council, Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1976
(Taipei, Taiwan: 1976), pp. 236-237.
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als.The contacts they have gained in Taiwan will be an asset that
could lead to a preference for Taiwan products and opportunities
for joint ventures with Taiwan interests. Their assistance in
foreign marketing and an expanding investment horizon in
Southeast Asia are advantages of vast importance to Taiwan's
future export growth.
What is peculiarly Chinese in the Taiwan case is the specific
opportunities presented by the many large and economically
active - in some instances, even dominant - ethnic Chinese
communities in Southeast Asia, together with the importance of
Southeast Asia as a source of raw material supply. Joint ventures
between ROC and Southeast Asian business interests have vast
potential. At the same time, the educational, training, and
business opportunities that Taiwan offers to the ethnic Chinese
elsewhere are attractions that the latter can hardly ignore. Future
expansion of trade and investment relationships that take
advantage of these facts and ultimately use Taiwan as an
intermediary in the infusion of technological know-how from the
West (and Japan) to Southeast Asia, along with direct infusions
from the West to Southeast Asia, offer a challenge to business
entrepreneurs everywhere who are interested in the region.
Various efforts capitalizing on the sense of kinship among
ethnic Chinese in different countries have been initiated by
Taiwan to promote trade, investments, and other economic
activities between Taiwan and other countries where Chinese
reside. Joint meetings of various national chambers of commerce
in which ethnic Chinese businessmen are a major component, as
well as a joint banking institution with a strong Filipino-Chinese
participation, are some good examples.
At first glance, one would assume that the specific advantages the ROC enjoys by virtue of the affinity of its population to
ethnic Chinese communities elsewhere, both in the United States
and in Southeast Asia, would be equally available to the PRC. In
reality, however, this is not quite so.
In the first place, it is true that both the ROC and the PRC
have changed their policies toward ethnic Chinese outside China.
Both have now called upon the latter to conduct themselves as
good citizens of their adopted countries. However, there are still
some fundamental differences between the two in the eyes of
Southeast Asian countries. First, the PRC has never abandoned
its ideological stand on revolution. To endeavor to bring about
social change by revolutionary means is by implication the basic

208

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

duty of every member of a pre-socialist society. Therefore, any
ostensible policy not to pursue such a goal smacks of a tactical
shift only. Second, even for those who are inclined to give scant
emphasis to an argument based on the PRC's ideological position,
it is undeniably true that the PRC is large while Taiwan is small.
A large Chinese power could become a threat to a country with a
large ethnic Chinese community if it should choose to, and could
successfully, exploit the Chinese in that country. Regardless of the
latter's real attitude, perception by the non-Chinese local authorities, right or wrong, is the all-important factor. One would suspect
that the more they have discriminated against Chinese in the
past, the more they would be concerned about the ethnic Chinese
in their midst and the more fearful they would be of hostile
intentions on the part of the PRC that might attempt to exploit
the ethnic Chinese communities outside China and Taiwan.
In the second place, by virtue of its non-market economic
system, the PRC does not possess as much flexibility as private
business in Taiwan. It is not able, in the long-run, to enter into
free-wheeling joint ventures with ethnic Chinese businessmen in
Southeast Asia, Hong Kong, Japan, and the United States. While
the PRC can subsidize ethnic Chinese business outside China,
especially covertly and indirectly, the scope and variety of its
economic activities are necessarily limited by its inability to give
private entrepreneurship the full range of the imaginativeness of
which it is capable. Although one group of ethnic Chinese
engineers in the United States has, as of this writing (1977), also
organized several technical tours and seminars in Mainland
China, providing introductions to new developments overseas,
their effort appears to have been somewhat less productive than
that of their counterpart in Taiwan. In the long-run, the same will
probably hold true for their relationship with ethnic Chinese
businessmen outside China in general.

III. EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, POLITICS
AND STRATEGY
Some Basic Considerations
Viewed both domestically and internationally, there are
certain political and strategic aspects of trade that should not be
ignored if we wish to understand the economic and political
evolution of Taiwan in its entirety.
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First, as long as the PRC continues to threaten Taiwan with
military annexation and irredentist political claims, residents on
the island will always be subjected to feelings of uncertainty. This
sense of uncertainty tends to be pushed to the background of
public consciousness when business is brisk, employment is high,
and the benefits of prosperity are widely shared. Thus, economic
growth is a sine qua non of Taiwan's internal "political
buoyancy" and of the people's confidence in their own system.
Second, since 1971, Peking has actively pursued its policy to
isolate the ROC government diplomatically. As a result, many
countries have, since that time, shifted diplomatic recognition
from Taipei to Peking. This means that the existence of
nondiplomatic relations with other countries, particularly the
establishment and expansion of external trade ties, is viewed both
internally and externally as evidence of Taiwan's economic and
political viability as an independent system.
Third, from Taiwan's point of view, expansion of trade and
other economic relations is one way to develop a community of
interest between other countries and Taiwan. Such a community
of interest could benefit Taiwan diplomatically. When diplomatic
relations have been severed or are nonexisting, expanding trade
relations conceivably could lead to quasi-diplomatic relations.
Fourth, while the last two points focus on the function of trade
and economic relations as a substitute for external political and
diplomatic relations, a separate factor that needs to be considered
is the importance to trade expansion of international political
status. The crux of the issue lies in the geographical position of
Taiwan, which is dependent upon open and secure transportation,
communication, and travel between the island and the rest of the
world. Unless these conditions are maintained, continued trade
expansion would become progressively difficult. Therefore, a
fundamental issue is whether these conditions can in fact be
secured for an indefinite period independently of Taiwan's
international political status.
Finally, there is a corollary to the above point. As the political
importance of trade and other external economic relations
increases, it will be necessary for Taiwan to minimize the
vulnerability of such relations to adverse external political
influences or deliberate attacks on Taiwan's economy by the
ROC's political enemies. In this connection, there is a potential
dilemma between Taiwan's alternative national objectives.
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Concentration Versus Dispersion of Trade
The more a country sells to, or buys from, a single foreign
country, the more vulnerable it will be to an unfavorable change
in trade policy on the part of the latter. In terms of specific
commodities, the larger the market share accounted for by a
country's export in the total supply in another country, the more
susceptible it will be to protectionist measures instigated by the
other country's domestic producers. The same may not be true,
however, in the case of imports, inasmuch as foreign exporters
would normally not object to expanding purchases by a single
foreign buyer. Of course, foreign consumers may raise objections
in this case just as they would reap greater benefits in the
previous .case. However, consumers are usually politically less
influential than producers in the formulation of national trade
policies.
In view of the above, reduction of the degree of concentration
of Taiwan's growing foreign trade and diversification of exports
to any given country are likely to become increasingly important
elements in Taiwan's foreign trade policy. Any political benefit
Taiwan conceivably might derive from the growing economic
interdependence of other countries with Taiwan, however, is likely
to be larger if Taiwan's foreign trade is concentrated in a few
countries and is, therefore, of importance to them. This potential
dilemma can be side-stepped in the long-run only if Taiwan can
become a major, but not overdominant, supplier of a significant
number of commodities to a large number of countries. The same
may be said of Taiwan's imports, although, for reasons mentioned
earlier, the requirement regarding the varieties of commodities
might be relaxed in this case. In order to achieve such a
reconciliation of objectives, an inescapable conclusion is that
Taiwan's foreign trade must continue to grow for both economic
and political reasons. The long-term target of trade expansion
envisaged by ROC economic planners is thus entirely understandable.

Community of Interests with Other Countries
What are some of the more important circumstances governing Taiwan's trade prospects? The usual economic factors can be
quickly listed: for example, the state of the world economy,
particularly the rate of economic recovery and growth of the
United States and Japan as long as they are still Taiwan's largest
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trade partners; the extent to which protectionism will continue to
rear its head, especially in countries with which Taiwan hopes to
expand trade in the future; Taiwan's success in restructuring its
commodity pattern in trade and in remaining competitive with
Korea and Hong Kong, etc. These economic factors aside, perhaps
the most important political condition is the extent to which other
countries will be interested in maintaining for businessmen from
Taiwan freedom of transportation, communication, and travel as
they would for themselves.
Since Taiwan is astride the principal sea lanes between Japan
and countries to the South, as well as the Middle Eastern
countries and others west of the Malacca Straits, Japan in
particular would not wish to see the establishment of any overt
precedent of trade disruption as a result of the open and gross
infringement of freedom of shipping, communication, and travel.
The same may be said of other countries in the Western Pacific,
especially Indonesia, whose trade links with Japan pass by
Taiwan. The more powerful nations, such as the United States
and the Soviet Union, may wish to keep these same freedoms
intact as a matter of principle, although one can readily think of
exceptions.
A special economic interest also exists for those countries
whose trade with the PRC is substantially smaller and is faced
with less favorable growth prospects than their Taiwan trade.
This is true especially if their exports to Taiwan are both sizable
and larger than exports to the PRC. In their case, loss of the
Taiwan market cannot be ignored, nor can it be replaced by
expanding exports to the PRC. If exports to Taiwan must be
maintained, imports from Taiwan can also be more readily
tolerated, although experience shows that this attitude does not
always follow.
During 1976, U.S. exports to Taiwan amounted to $1,569
million, or 1.4 percent of U.S. exports to the world, while U.S.
exports to the PRC were $135 million, or 0.12 percent of total U.S.
exports. On the import side, the United States imported $2,958
million of goods from Taiwan in 1976, or 2.3 percent of total U.S.
imports, versus $202 million, or 0.15 percent, from the PRC (see
Tables 6 and 7). As a market for U.S. products, Taiwan was half
as important as the average of France and Italy combined, which
in 1976, accounted for 3 percent and 2.7 percent of U.S. exports to
the world. As a supplier of goods on the U.S. market, Taiwan was
exceeded only by two of the nine European Community members

212

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

-West Germany (4.7 percent of total U.S. imports from the world)
and the United Kingdom (3.5 percent) - ranking ahead of France
and Italy (2.1 percent each), as well as the Netherlands, BelgiumLuxembourg, Denmark, and Ireland. To U.S. businessmen and
consumers the Taiwan economy can no longer be off-handedly
dismissed.
Table 6. U.S. Imports from Taiwan and PRC, 1971-75
(Million US $)
1971

Total imports
Taiwan
PRC
Food, live animals
Taiwan
PRC
Beverages, tobacco
Taiwan
PRC
Crude materials, inedible
(except fuel)
Taiwan
PRC
Mineral fuels, lubricants, etc.
Taiwan
PRC
Oils & fats, animal, vegetable
Taiwan
PRC
Chemicals
Taiwan
PRC
Manufactured goods
Taiwan
PRC
Machinery, transportation
equipment
Taiwan
PRC
Miscellaneous, transportation
equipment
Taiwan
PRC
Miscellaneous
Taiwan
PRC
Sources: See table 7.

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

817.4 1,293.5
4.9
32.3

1,772.5
64.0

2,107.6
114.7

1,946.0
158.3

2,958.4
201.9

84.1
4.2

85.3
6.0

111.9
13.5

192.4
14.2

142.0
23.8

0.3
0.7

0.4
2.8

1.8

0.09
0.3

11.7
12.3

15.0
14.6

14.1
16.3

11.1
17.6

13.9
38.5

0.4

2.1
0.4

0.4
0.1

3.4

0.01

0.1
0.7

0.1
0.4

0.5
1.9

0.3
2.4

54.2
1.5

7.0
2.2

6.9
0.3

9.5
2.1

12.1
8.2

31.9
18.4

16.2
15.9

26.1
18.0

119.4
0.5

193.2
7.4

242.2
21.0

288.0
42.7

238.0
79.4

355.4
68.5

202.2

401.1
0.1

600.5
0.4

685.3
0.1

488.5
0.3

780.2
1.3

420.1
0.3

584.0
6.1

797.6
11.2

954.7
19.2

964.5
25.6

1,618.0
47.5

7.5

9.4
0.1

17.1
0.8

20.8
1.2

31.4
1.6

22.4
1.6
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7. U.S. Exports to Taiwan and PRC, 1971-75
(US $ Millions)
1971

Total exports
342.7
Taiwan
PRC
Food and live animals
30.5
Taiwan
PRC
Beverage and tobacco
Taiwan
10.1
PRC
Cruje materials, inedible
(except fuel)
Taiwan
141.6
PRC
Mineral fuels, lubricants, etc.
Taiwan
2.1
PRC
Oils & fats, animal, vegetable
Taiwan
4.4
PRC
Chemicals
Taiwan
25.2
PRC
Manufactured goods
Taiwan
25.3
PRC
Machinery, transportation
equipment
Taiwan
157.5
PRC
Miscellaneous, transportation
equipment
Taiwan
13.1
PRC
Items not classified by
kind
Taiwan
1.8
PRC

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

629.5
60.2

1,165.0
689.1

1,423.8
806.9

1,655.7
303.6

1,568.9
135.4

55.9
56.0

154.1
410.1

167.8
329.6

180.9
0.02

202.1

14.9

18.7
1.4

30.8
2.7

27.5

13.2

149.1

319.1
171.9

307.3
328.0

407.5
100.1

304.5
13.0

2.6

3.5

7.2
0.2

7.2
0.2

0.01
0.1

4.3
2.2

5.2
19.2

18.4
7.5

10.0

12.2

32.4

90.0
7.9

127.4
10.2

125.3
5.2

154.6
10.4

31.4

76.2
9.0

123.4
18.5

141.3
73.8

143.2
43.3

233.4
2.0

398.2
69.0

562.7
106.7

599.7
118.8

666.2
65.1

20.5
1.1

21.2
0.8

32.4
2.7

39.2
4.9

69.5
3.4

2.5

5.9

6.7
0.3

6.2
0.4

3.4
0.02

Sources: 1971: U.S. Department of Commerce, General Imports, World Area
by Commodity Groups, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972, pp. 374; 1972-75:
Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), July 2, 1976, p. 44. U.S. Department of
Commerce; Bureau of East-West Trade, office of East-West, U.S. Trade Status with
Communist Countries, February 1977.
For comparison with The European Economic Community, see U.S. Department of State, Special Reoirt No. 32, U.S. Trade with the European Community,
April 1977.
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During 1971-73, Japan exported an average of $1.2 billion of
merchandise to Taiwan versus $740 million of goods to the PRC.
These figures were respectively 4.1 percent and 2.5 percent of
Japan's exports to the world (Table 8). The relative shares of
Taiwan and the PRC in Japan's total exports during 1974-75
shifted to 3.4 percent, at $1.9 billion, and 3.8 percent, $2.1 billion,
respectively, as a result of a slowdown of the Taiwan economy
immediately after the oil crisis as well as stepped-up purchases by
Peking from Japan, some based on deferred payments. On the
import side, Taiwan accounted for 2.0 percent of Japan's total
imports from the world in 1971-73 as against Peking's 2.1 percent.
These ratios also changed during 1974-75 to 1.5 percent for
Taiwan and 2.4 percent for Peking, as a result of Taiwan's post-oil
crisis economic slow-down and increased oil exports from the PRC
to Japan (Tables 9 and 10). However, allowing for economic
recovery in Taiwan in 1976, even a modest rate of growth of
imports should boost Japan's exports to Taiwan at a rate at least
commensurate with the rate of Japan's exports to Peking. This is
likely to be true in spite of Taiwan's efforts to favor machinery
imports from the United States over Japan in view of the large
export surplus Taiwan enjoys in the American market.
Table 8. Destinations of Exports (1971-73 average)
Taiwan

Exporting
Countries
Japan
ASEAN
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
Thailand
Singapore
Total

Value

In percent of
exporting country's
total exports from
the world

1,220.9

4.1

99.5•
(1972-73)
26.3
27.2

4.6
1.3
2.0

PRC

Value
743.5
0.4

(1973)
42.0
4.7
(1972-73)

In percent of
exporting country's
total exports from
the world
2.5
0.0002
2.0

42.9
26.5

3.7
1.0

29.6

1.2

1,443.3

3.7

820.2

2.1

Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade (Washington, D.C.:
Annual 1969-75), pp. 138, 221, 262, 272, and 275.
(a) Chinese Chamber of Commerce to Jakarta, Economic Data on Republic of
Indonesia (Jakarta: July 1975).
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Table 9. Sources of Imports (1971-73 average)
(US $ million)
PRC

Taiwan

Importing
Countries
Japan
ASEAN
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
Thailand
Singapore
Total

In percent of
importing country's
total imports from
the world

Value

In percent of
importing country's
total imports from
the world

Value

532.9

2.0

596.2

2.1

76.1 8
(1972-73)
37.7
22.4

3.9

38.5

2.1

2.0
1.5

94.2
13.0
(1972-73)

5.1
0.009

51.3
90.0

3.2
2.2

170.3

4.5

810.4

2.2

912.2

2.5

Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade (Washington, D.C.:
Annual 1970), pp. 169, 203, 246, 265, 280, and 321.
• Chinese Chamber of Commerce to Jakarta, Economic Data on Republic of
Indonesia (Jakarta: July 1975), p. 17.

Table 10. Sources of Imports (1974-75) average)
(US $ million)
Taiwan

PRC

Value

In percent of
importing country's
total imports from
the world

Value

In percent of
importing country's
total imports from
the world

882.5

1.5

1,416.5

2.4

2.0

145.0

3.2

Malaysia
Philippines
Thailand
Singapore

73.9
(1975)
77.2
82.7
76.8
151.8

2.0
2.3
2.4
1.7

172.1
38.9
7.4
275.3

4.5

Total

1,458.8

1.7

2,055.2

2.5

Importing
Countries
Japan
A SEAN
Indonesia

1.1

2.3
3.3

Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade (Washington, D.C.:
Annual 1969-75), pp. 137, 221, 262, 272, and 275.
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If comparison is made between Taiwan and Peking with
respect to exports from the ASEAN countries, it can be easily seen
from Tables 8 and 11 that, with the exception of Malaysia, all the
other four countries exported substantially more to Taiwan than
to the PRC during 1971-73 and 1974-75. The Malaysian exception
was accounted for by larger PRC imports of rubber and tin, partly
to curry political favor with Kuala Lumpur. However, Peking's
role as a source of supply of imports to the ASEAN countries was
larger than that of Taiwan in the case of Singapore and Malaysia
during 1971-73, and possibly also Indonesia during 1974-75.

Table 11. Destinations (1974-75 average) (US $ million)
Taiwan

PRC

Value

In percent of
exporting country's
total exports from
the world

Value

1,914.0

3.4

2,120.5

1.1

Malaysia
Philippines
Thailand
Singapore

79.5
(1975)
50.0
28.0
107.5
62.4

4.4
1.1

69.8
18.2
2.0
46.0

Total

2,241.4

2.9

2,256.5

Exporting
Countries
Japan
ASEAN
Indonesia

1.2
1.1

In percent of
exporting country's
total exports from
the world
3.8

1.7
0.007
0.0008
0.008
2.9

Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade (Washington, D.C.:
Annual 1969-75), pp. 138, 221, 262, 266, 272, and 275.

If, as we have speculated earlier, Taiwan should increase its
raw material imports from Southeast Asia as its economic
expansion continues, the probability is very high that it will have
a larger share of the exports of countries on its sea route than
Peking. Such a situation would enhance the community of interest
these countries will have with Taiwan. It is fortunate for all
concerned that political-strategic considerations in this connection coincide with economic interests. From Taiwan's point of
view, a reinforced orientation of its foreign trade toward Japan
and Southeast Asia would have much, to recommend it in
Taiwan's future trade policy, although other potential and actual
trade partners should not be ignored.
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